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Journal of the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Sciences

Identity-Based Threshold Decryption Schemes Secure against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks in the Standard Model

Mei Qi, He Da

Published Jan 1, 2006• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Abstract

We propose two efficient Identity-Based threshold decryption schemes.They are proved secure against chosen ciphertext attacks under the standard decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.The first one is constructed from(one of) the Selective ID-Based Encryption(Selective-IBE) scheme proposed by Boneh and Boyen recently,yet the second one is transformed from the Full ID-Based Encryption(Full-IBE) scheme obtained by Waters.As the based IBE schemes,the attacker in the first proposal has to choose the challenge identity before the common parameter is generated.while the attacker in the second one could choose the identity adaptively.To the best of our knowledge,previous related schemes could only be proved secure in the random oracle model.

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•Jan 1, 2011•1 citation
We propose two efficient Identity-Based threshold decryption schemes.They are proved secure against chosen ciphertext attacks under the standard decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.The first one is constructed from(one of) the Selective ID-Based Encryption(Selective-IBE) scheme proposed by Boneh and Boyen recently,yet the second one is transformed from the Full ID-Based Encryption(Full-IBE) scheme obtained by Waters.As the based IBE schemes,the attacker in the first proposal has to choose the challenge identity before the common parameter is generated.while the attacker in the second one could choose the identity adaptively.To the best of our knowledge,previous related schemes could only be proved secure in the random oracle model.
In Eurocrypt 2005,Waters' identity-based encryption scheme suffers from a drawback that the scheme only guarantees chosen plaintext security,which hampers its applications in higher security level environments.A chosen ciphertext secure identity-based encryption scheme was proposed to remedy this drawback.The proposed encryption scheme was regarded as the extended version of Waters' scheme with only one additional element in the ciphertext,and guaranteed chosen ciphertext security.The extended scheme's indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks was proven in the standard model and rested on the hardness of the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman intractability assumption.
We propose a generic construction that yields efficient identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes secure against chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) in the standard model. Our construction extends Kiltz et al.'s (Eurocrypt '09) method of constructing CCA-secure public-key encryption schemes via randomness extraction to the identity-based setting. The main idea of our construction is to transform ‘|ϵ1\epsilon _1ϵ1​|-almost |$\kappa ∣−entropic’andvalid/invalidciphertextindistinguishable(VI−IND)identity−basedhashproofsystemtotheonethatsatisfiesthestronger‘∣|-entropic’ and valid/invalid ciphertext indistinguishable (VI-IND) identity-based hash proof system to the one that satisfies the stronger ‘|∣−entropic’andvalid/invalidciphertextindistinguishable(VI−IND)identity−basedhashproofsystemtotheonethatsatisfiesthestronger‘∣\epsilon _2$|-universal’ and VI-IND property. This transformation is realized by a randomness extractor based on the 4-wise hash function. We demonstrate that our generic construction can produce CCA-secure IBE schemes whose efficiency is comparable with the most efficient but non-generic CCA-secure IBE schemes without random oracles in the literature.
The paradigm of forward security provides a promising approach to deal with the key exposure problem as it can effectively minimize the damage caused by the key exposure. In this paper, we develop a new forward-secure identity-based encryption scheme without random oracles. We formally prove that the proposed scheme is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks in the standard model. In the proposed scheme, the running time of the private key extraction and decryption algorithms and the sizes of the user's initial private key and the ciphertext are independent on the total number of time periods, and any other performance parameter has at most log-squared complexity in terms of the total number of time periods. Compared with the previous forward-secure identity-based encryption schemes, the proposed scheme enjoys obvious advantage in the overall performance. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first forward-secure identity-based encryption scheme that achieves direct chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model.
Identity-based encryption (IBE) has many appealing applications. However, some traditional IBE schemes may not be secure in the real world due to the side-channel attacks. Leakage-resilient cryptography can capture these attacks by modeling information leakage that adversary can access. In this paper, we apply a hash proof technique in the existing CCA-secure variant of the Gentry's IBE scheme to construct a new leakage-resilient IBE scheme in the bounded-leakage model. The proposed scheme is more computationally efficient than the original Alwen et al. 's leakage-resilient IBE scheme. It enjoys a shorter key (public/secret key) length, and a higher relative key leakage ratio. The new leakage-resilient scheme is proved semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the standard model under the truncated augmented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent ( |qqq| -TABDHE) assumption.
The paper presents an identity based encryption (IBE) under selective opening attacks (SOA) whose security is almost-tightly related to a set of computational assumptions in composite-order bilinear groups. Our result is a combination of Bellare, Waters and Yilek's method [TCC, 2011] for constructing (not tightly) SOA secure IBE and Hofheinz, Koch and Striecks’ technique [PKC, 2015] on building almost-tightly secure IBE in the multi-ciphertext setting. In the paper, we first tune Bellare et al.’s generic construction for SOA secure IBE to show that a one-bit IBE achieving ciphertext indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack in the multi-ciphertext setting (with one-sided public openability) tightly implies a multi-bit IBE secure under the selective opening attack. Next, we almost tightly reduce such a one-bit IBE to static assumptions in the composite-order bilinear groups employing the technique of Hofheinz et al. This yields the first SOA secure IBE with almost-tight reduction.