Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Journal of Information Engineering University

Application Analysis of Quantum Error Correcting-Codes in Security Proving

Hongxi Li

Published Jan 1, 2015• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Based on BB84 protocols,three classes of security proving for quantum cryptography are briefly introduced,and a deep research on security proving methods is provided based upon entanglement purification and quantum CSS code. The research mainly analyzes the application of quantum error correcting-codes in two representative schemes called Lo-Chau and Shor-Preskill protocol.Meanwhile,it investigates two classes of equivalence,one is the one-way entanglement purification and quantum error correction,the other is the phase error correction and removing of listener-in entanglement. Through concrete examples,it analyzes and implements the function of quantum error correcting-codes in security proving,validates the equivalence between quantum key distribution protocols based on entanglement and standard BB84 protocols,and testifies the separability between bit error correction and phase error correction,which shows the great importance of quantum error correcting-codes in security proving.

Related papers

Quantum Error Correcting Codes and the Security Proof of the BB84 Protocol

Ramesh Bhandari

We describe the popular BB84 protocol and critically examine its security proof as presented by Shor and Preskill. The proof requires the use of quantum error correcting codes called the Calderbank-Shor-Steanne (CSS) quantum codes. These quantum codes are constructed in the quantum domain from two suitable classical linear codes, one used to correct for bit-flip errors and the other for phase-flip errors. Consequently, as a prelude to the security proof, the report reviews the essential properties of linear codes, especially the concept of cosets, before building the quantum codes that are utilized in the proof. The proof considers a security entanglement-based protocol, which is subsequently reduced to a "Prepare and Measure" protocol similar in structure to the BB84 protocol, thus establishing the security of the BB84 protocol. The proof, however, is not without assumptions, which are also enumerated. The treatment throughout is pedagogical, and this report, therefore, serves a useful tutorial for researchers, practitioners, and students, new to the field of quantum information science, in particular, quantum cryptography, as it develops the proof in a systematic manner, starting from the properties of linear codes, and then advancing to the quantum error correcting codes, which are critical to the understanding of the security proof.

arXiv:1409.1452•Aug 30, 2014•1 citation

On the security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol

Cannings, Richard

The BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol enables two authenticated parties to generate a secret key over an insecure quantum channel. Using a standardized security definition, we prove that BB84 is secure and include explicit bounds on its security. Furthermore, our use of quantum circuit diagrams simplify the Shor-Preskill proof. Namely, we can reduce the Modified Lo-Chau QKD to a practical version of BB84 using the observation from Shor and Preskill that one may ignore a correctable number of phase errors, and the fact that computational basis measurements commute with controls of CNOT operations. The first four chapters provide the required background material on quantum computing, information theory, cryptography, coding theory, and quantum error correcting codes. Chapter 5 presents protocols for entanglement purification. Chapter 6 reduces an entanglement purification protocol to the Modified Lo-Chau QKD, and proves that it is secure. Finally, a reduction from the Modified Lo-Chau QKD to BB84 establishes the security of the latter.

•Jan 1, 2004•0 citations

Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol

Peter W. Shor, John P. Preskill

We prove that the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution is secure. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure using methods from Lo and Chau's proof of security for a similar protocol. We then show that the security of this protocol implies the security of BB84. The entanglement purification based protocol uses Calderbank-Shor-Steane codes, and properties of these codes are used to remove the use of quantum computation from the Lo-Chau protocol.

arXiv:quant-ph/0003004•Physical Review Letters•Jul 10, 2000•3,049 citations

Quantum key distribution protocol based on CSS error correcting codes

Wei Jia, Feng Bao, Hao Cheng Yu +1 more

In the quantum key distribution (QKD) process, the presence of noise in the quantum channel reduces the efficiency of QKD with low transmission reliability. Quantum error correcting codes (QECCs) can weaken the impact of noise on the final result due to its flexibility in code length and rate selection. In this paper, QECCs is used to overcome the adverse effects of quantum channel noise, and a QKD protocol based on quantum CSS error correcting codes is proposed. Firstly, we construct the corresponding quantum CSS codes based on classical linear code, then modify and simplify some steps of BB84 protocol by using the characteristics of error correcting codes to design the new protocol. Through theoretical deduction, our QKD protocol based on quantum CSS codes improves the security of key transmission, and the confidentiality of transmission in the noisy quantum channel is also enhanced.

ACM Turing Celebration Conference - China (ACM TURC)•May 17, 2019•3 citations

The security analysis of the BB84 protocol in the case of Calderbank–Shor–Steane code leakage

Ming Fang, Yaping Li, Li Fei

Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows authenticated parties to share secure keys. Its security comes from quantum physics rather than computational complexity. The previous work has been able to demonstrate the security of the BB84 protocol based on the uncertainty principle, entanglement purification and information theory. In the security proof method based on entanglement purification, it is assumed that the information of Calderbank–Shor–Steane (CSS) error correction code cannot be leaked, otherwise, it is insecure. However, there is no quantitative analysis of the relationship between the parameter of CSS code and the amount of information leaked. In the attack and defense strategy of the actual quantum key distribution system, especially in the application of the device that is easy to lose or out of control, it is necessary to assess the impact of the parameter leakage. In this paper, we derive the relationship between the leaked parameter of CSS code and the amount of the final key leakage based on the BB84 protocol. Based on this formula, we simulated the impact of different CSS code parameter leaks on the final key amount. Through the analysis of simulation results, the security of the BB84 protocol is inversely proportional to the value of [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] in the case of the CSS code leak.

International Journal of Quantum Information•Jan 6, 2022•0 citations

Error correction and detection techniques in quantum cryptography protocol

S H Sreelatha, G. Murali

Quantum Cryptography evolves a technology which provides secure communication. In this work error correction and detection techniques are used to correct and detect the errors which occur either due to noise or attacks while transferring bits. The main objective of this paper is using error correction and detection techniques to correct and detect the error and analyze the comparison between BB84 Protocol, BB84 using Parity Bits and BB84 using Cyclic Redundancy Check for the number of bits match and mismatch frequency between sender and receiver. This methodology can be implemented using Mat lab simulator. It is very easy to analyze mathematically when compared to theoretical process.

International Conference on Energy, Communication, Data Analytics and Soft Computing (ICECDS)•Aug 1, 2017•3 citations
Based on BB84 protocols,three classes of security proving for quantum cryptography are briefly introduced,and a deep research on security proving methods is provided based upon entanglement purification and quantum CSS code. The research mainly analyzes the application of quantum error correcting-codes in two representative schemes called Lo-Chau and Shor-Preskill protocol.Meanwhile,it investigates two classes of equivalence,one is the one-way entanglement purification and quantum error correction,the other is the phase error correction and removing of listener-in entanglement. Through concrete examples,it analyzes and implements the function of quantum error correcting-codes in security proving,validates the equivalence between quantum key distribution protocols based on entanglement and standard BB84 protocols,and testifies the separability between bit error correction and phase error correction,which shows the great importance of quantum error correcting-codes in security proving.
We describe the popular BB84 protocol and critically examine its security proof as presented by Shor and Preskill. The proof requires the use of quantum error correcting codes called the Calderbank-Shor-Steanne (CSS) quantum codes. These quantum codes are constructed in the quantum domain from two suitable classical linear codes, one used to correct for bit-flip errors and the other for phase-flip errors. Consequently, as a prelude to the security proof, the report reviews the essential properties of linear codes, especially the concept of cosets, before building the quantum codes that are utilized in the proof. The proof considers a security entanglement-based protocol, which is subsequently reduced to a "Prepare and Measure" protocol similar in structure to the BB84 protocol, thus establishing the security of the BB84 protocol. The proof, however, is not without assumptions, which are also enumerated. The treatment throughout is pedagogical, and this report, therefore, serves a useful tutorial for researchers, practitioners, and students, new to the field of quantum information science, in particular, quantum cryptography, as it develops the proof in a systematic manner, starting from the properties of linear codes, and then advancing to the quantum error correcting codes, which are critical to the understanding of the security proof.
The BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol enables two authenticated parties to generate a secret key over an insecure quantum channel. Using a standardized security definition, we prove that BB84 is secure and include explicit bounds on its security. Furthermore, our use of quantum circuit diagrams simplify the Shor-Preskill proof. Namely, we can reduce the Modified Lo-Chau QKD to a practical version of BB84 using the observation from Shor and Preskill that one may ignore a correctable number of phase errors, and the fact that computational basis measurements commute with controls of CNOT operations. The first four chapters provide the required background material on quantum computing, information theory, cryptography, coding theory, and quantum error correcting codes. Chapter 5 presents protocols for entanglement purification. Chapter 6 reduces an entanglement purification protocol to the Modified Lo-Chau QKD, and proves that it is secure. Finally, a reduction from the Modified Lo-Chau QKD to BB84 establishes the security of the latter.
We prove that the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution is secure. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure using methods from Lo and Chau's proof of security for a similar protocol. We then show that the security of this protocol implies the security of BB84. The entanglement purification based protocol uses Calderbank-Shor-Steane codes, and properties of these codes are used to remove the use of quantum computation from the Lo-Chau protocol.
In the quantum key distribution (QKD) process, the presence of noise in the quantum channel reduces the efficiency of QKD with low transmission reliability. Quantum error correcting codes (QECCs) can weaken the impact of noise on the final result due to its flexibility in code length and rate selection. In this paper, QECCs is used to overcome the adverse effects of quantum channel noise, and a QKD protocol based on quantum CSS error correcting codes is proposed. Firstly, we construct the corresponding quantum CSS codes based on classical linear code, then modify and simplify some steps of BB84 protocol by using the characteristics of error correcting codes to design the new protocol. Through theoretical deduction, our QKD protocol based on quantum CSS codes improves the security of key transmission, and the confidentiality of transmission in the noisy quantum channel is also enhanced.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows authenticated parties to share secure keys. Its security comes from quantum physics rather than computational complexity. The previous work has been able to demonstrate the security of the BB84 protocol based on the uncertainty principle, entanglement purification and information theory. In the security proof method based on entanglement purification, it is assumed that the information of Calderbank–Shor–Steane (CSS) error correction code cannot be leaked, otherwise, it is insecure. However, there is no quantitative analysis of the relationship between the parameter of CSS code and the amount of information leaked. In the attack and defense strategy of the actual quantum key distribution system, especially in the application of the device that is easy to lose or out of control, it is necessary to assess the impact of the parameter leakage. In this paper, we derive the relationship between the leaked parameter of CSS code and the amount of the final key leakage based on the BB84 protocol. Based on this formula, we simulated the impact of different CSS code parameter leaks on the final key amount. Through the analysis of simulation results, the security of the BB84 protocol is inversely proportional to the value of [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] in the case of the CSS code leak.
Quantum Cryptography evolves a technology which provides secure communication. In this work error correction and detection techniques are used to correct and detect the errors which occur either due to noise or attacks while transferring bits. The main objective of this paper is using error correction and detection techniques to correct and detect the error and analyze the comparison between BB84 Protocol, BB84 using Parity Bits and BB84 using Cyclic Redundancy Check for the number of bits match and mismatch frequency between sender and receiver. This methodology can be implemented using Mat lab simulator. It is very easy to analyze mathematically when compared to theoretical process.