This paper discusses the natural science philosophy outlook of Bohr and Heisenberg, two most outstanding representative personers of quantum theory philosophy thought. It analysises and researches into Bohr's quantum dialectics of nature of mutual complement and Heisenberg's quantum philosophy outlook. In terms of these discussions and researches, it gets a deeper and more systematic comgnition and comprehension to quantum theory philosophy thought.
This paper discusses the natural science philosophy outlook of Bohr and Heisenberg, two most outstanding representative personers of quantum theory philosophy thought. It analysises and researches into Bohr's quantum dialectics of nature of mutual complement and Heisenberg's quantum philosophy outlook. In terms of these discussions and researches, it gets a deeper and more systematic comgnition and comprehension to quantum theory philosophy thought.
Contemporary physicists, in creating theories adequate to nature's patterns of movement and development, speak the language of dialectics whether willingly or unwillingly. Even those whose personal outlook is at variance with dialectical philosophy acknowledge this in their own way. Thus Heisenberg states that inquiry into the foundations of the quantum theory, especially as carried out by Bohr, has features reminiscent of Hegelian philosophy. (1) And, to quote Pauli, "dialectics is that mutual game of two opponents which is typical of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics." (2) Bohr himself, while discussing the quantum theory, speaks of "profoundly true statements the opposites of which likewise contain deep verities." (3)
Many of the pioneers of quantum mechanics – notably Planck, Einstein, Bohr, de Broglie, Heisenberg, Schrodinger, Born, Jordan, Landé, Wigner, and London – were seriously concerned with philosophical problems. In each case one can ask a question of psychological and historical interest: was it a philosophical penchant which drew the investigator towards a kind of physics research which is linked to philosophy, or was it rather that the conceptual difficulties of fundamental physics pulled him willynilly into the labyrinth of philosophy? I shall not undertake to discuss this question, but shall cite an opinion of Peter Bergmann, which I find congenial: he learned from Einstein that “the theoretical physicist is … a philosopher in workingman's clothes” ([1], q. v.). The problems with which I am preoccupied concern the philosophical implications of quantum mechanics – either epistemological, bearing on the extent, validity, and character of human knowledge; or metaphysical, bearing on the character of reality. Although quantum mechanics is not a system of philosophy, one can wonder whether it is susceptible to coherent incorporation in a philosophical system. I propose to examine the thought of three masters of quantum mechanics – Bohr, Heisenberg, and Schrödinger – not with a critical or historical intention, but in hope of finding some enlightenment concerning the problems posed by contemporary physics. I can say in advance that enlightenment will continue to elude us; nevertheless, the ideas of Bohr, Heisenberg and Schrödinger are rich and evocative for new studies.
As an epoch-making achievement in the field of natural science, the scientific principles of quantum mechanics, such as nonlocality, entanglement and decoherence, and role at a distance, have triggered many different interpretations and controversies in the field of philosophy, among which idealism, metaphysics, and agnosticism are based on which to question or even deny dialectical materialism. Marxist philosophy has always closely interacted with natural science. In the face of new and old propositions in quantum mechanics, such as uncertainty principle, quantum tunneling, large distance zero interaction measurement, and Poincare regression of multi particle quantum system, we can promote its compatibility with the new world outlook and methodology of quantum science in the intertextuality interpretation. Quantum mechanics reveals the "intermediate phenomenon" in the process of understanding the micro world, highlighting the dialectical characteristics of materialistic epistemology; It emphasizes probability, but denies that uncertainty is subjective conjecture, defending the objectivity of existence; For the movement and change of things, the status of the contingency category has been improved and the linear causality has been exceeded, but the existence of universal and inevitable connection has not been fundamentally denied.
The ideas in Heisenberg's paper on quantum mechanics in 1925 mark the beginning not only of a new phase in modern physics, but also of Heisenberg's own philosophical journey. This thesis examines that journey between 1925 and the late 1950s by situating Heisenberg's philosophy of quantum mechanics in the context of his encounters with his contemporaries as well as the context of various strands of thought in the German-speaking world at the time. Heisenberg's early philosophical critique of the 'classical' viewpoint between 1925 and 1927 bears the decisive influence of Einstein's theory of relativity, more specifically, the positivism he saw as underpinning Einstein's emancipation from Newtonian physics. The positivist influence on Heisenberg's early attitude to quantum mechanics is evident in three ways: (a) his invocation of an observability principle in 1925 to justify the renunciation of the concept of the electron orbit, (b) an instrumentalist conception of understanding, which characterised Heisenberg's response to Schrodinger's demand for classical visualisation in space and time in 1926-7, and (c) the introduction of an operational definition of concepts such as position and velocity in 1927, in an attempt to replace the concepts of classical physics. But after discussions with Bohr and Einstein in 1926-7, Heisenberg soon recognised what we might term his `empiricist' viewpoint was problematic. In 1927 Heisenberg's thought undergoes a shift away from the `empiricist' viewpoint that had underpinned his early philosophy of quantum mechanics. The nature and scope of this transformation, which forms the central theme in this thesis, has, up until now, been poorly understood and often completely neglected. Through his discussions with Bohr, Heisenberg came to the realisation that despite their limitations, classical concepts were conditions for the possibility of the description of all experience. This marked the abandonment of his earlier attempt to replace classical concepts with quantum concepts. The recognition of the primacy of classical language forms the point of departure for much of Heisenberg's later thought, which brought him into contact with the attempts in the German-speaking world in the 1920s to reconstruct Kantian epistemology. By the mid-1930s, Heisenberg advocated a 'pragmatic transformation' of Kantian philosophy, in which classical concepts were held to be a priori in the sense that they remained the conditions for the possibility of experience, but were no longer held to be necessary or universal in a strict Kantian sense. After 1940 Heisenberg saw the paradoxes of quantum mechanics under the aegis of what can be termed a 'transcendental conception of language', according to which language is not a mere tool, but actively shapes, gives form, and objectifies, our 'reality'. The limits of a classical 'description' in quantum mechanics therefore came to signify for Heisenberg, the limits of 'objective reality'. While Bohr exerted perhaps the most important philosophical influence on Heisenberg, their intellectual relationship was characterised by disagreement and misunderstanding. This is most strikingly displayed in their respective views on wave-particle duality and complementarily. While after 1927 Heisenberg accepted Bohr's basic insight that our knowledge of the quantum world is mediated through classical language, he did not share Rohr's interpretation of complementarity. While Heisenberg certainly used terms such as 'complementarity' and wave-particle duality' in his writings, a close reading reveals that these terms had very different meanings for the two physicists. This is particularly evident in the contrast between Heisenberg's notion of wave-particle equivalence and Bohr's idea of complementarity. In bringing to light these divergences between Bohr and Heisenberg, this thesis lends further weight to the view - already advocated by scholars such as John Hendry and Mara Beller - that the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics should not be thought of as a unified philosophical position, but actually comprises a number of different strands.