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Soviet Studies in Philosophy

The Concept of Dialectical Contradictions in Quantum Physics

M. E. Omel'ianovskii

Published Dec 1, 1963• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Contemporary physicists, in creating theories adequate to nature's patterns of movement and development, speak the language of dialectics whether willingly or unwillingly. Even those whose personal outlook is at variance with dialectical philosophy acknowledge this in their own way. Thus Heisenberg states that inquiry into the foundations of the quantum theory, especially as carried out by Bohr, has features reminiscent of Hegelian philosophy. (1) And, to quote Pauli, "dialectics is that mutual game of two opponents which is typical of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics." (2) Bohr himself, while discussing the quantum theory, speaks of "profoundly true statements the opposites of which likewise contain deep verities." (3)

DOI
10.2753/rsp1061-1967020317

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Contemporary physicists, in creating theories adequate to nature's patterns of movement and development, speak the language of dialectics whether willingly or unwillingly. Even those whose personal outlook is at variance with dialectical philosophy acknowledge this in their own way. Thus Heisenberg states that inquiry into the foundations of the quantum theory, especially as carried out by Bohr, has features reminiscent of Hegelian philosophy. (1) And, to quote Pauli, "dialectics is that mutual game of two opponents which is typical of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics." (2) Bohr himself, while discussing the quantum theory, speaks of "profoundly true statements the opposites of which likewise contain deep verities." (3)
Abstract This book tells the story of Bohm’s hitherto unpublished lecture notes on quantum theory and dialectical materialism. It places his lecture notes in a wider historical, scientific, and philosophical context and traces Bohm’s intellectual development from an early attempt to better understand the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics to his elaboration of an alternative causal interpretation based on the notion of “hidden variables.” As the lecture notes strikingly illustrate, dialectical materialism played a fundamental role in the further development of his understanding of quantum mechanics. Bohm placed the notions of the infinity of nature and the unity of opposites at the center of his natural philosophy, drawing from the works of Hegel, Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The book also examines Bohm’s legacy in the history of quantum mechanics and his contribution to preparing the “second quantum revolution.” Bohm’s engagement with dialectical materialism and his role as a dissident from the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics were pivotal in bringing about the novel insights and technologies associated with this second quantum revolution. During the 1960s, Bohm developed a growing interest in the nature of consciousness and engaged with the philosopher Jiddu Krishnamurti. But this new phase in Bohm’s intellectual odyssey was, in spite of a seemingly fundamental break with earlier philosophical positions, not completely unrelated to his fascination with, and deep understanding of, Hegel’s philosophy, which the lecture notes amply document for the first time.
Discussions of the interpretation of quantum theory are at present obstructed by (1) the increasing axiomania in physics and philosophy which replaces fundamental problems by problems of formulation within a certain preconceived calculus, and (2) the decreasing (since 1927) philosophical interest and sophistication both of professional physicists and of professional philosophers which results in the replacement of subtle positions by crude ones and of dialectical arguments by dogmatic ones. More especially, such discussions are obstructed by the ignorance of both opponents, and also defenders of the Copenhagen point of view, as regards the arguments which once were used in its defence. The publication of Bunge's Quantum Theory and Reality and especially of Popper's contribution to it are taken as an occasion for the restatement of Bohr's position and for the refutation of some quite popular, but surprisingly naive and uninformed objections against it. Bohr's position is distinguished both from the position of Heisenberg and from the vulgarized versions which have become part of the so-called “Copenhagen Interpretation” and whose inarticulateness has been a boon for all those critics who prefer easy victories to a rational debate. Einstein's main counterargument is discussed, and Bohr's refutation restated. The philosophical background and earlier forms of Bohr's views are stated also. Considering that these views are more detailed, better adapted to the facts of the microdomain than any existing alternative it follows that fundamental discussion must first return to them. Their uniqueness is not asserted, however. Here the author still maintains that a hundred shabby flowers are preferable to a single blossom, however exquisite. But a hundred shabby flowers plus an exquisite blossom are more desirable still.
‘Sprache und Wirklichkeit in der modernen Physik’ is the title of a lecture Heisenberg gave in 1960 at the Bayerische Akademie der Schönen Künste. The polemics that had accompanied the establishment of quantum mechanics were over by then and the so-called problems of its foundations had lost much of their initial interest. Einstein had been dead for some years. Right up to the end he had expressed his profound dissatisfaction with a theory which, in his opinion, had something unreasonable about it. With the volume dedicated to him by the community of physicists and philosophers, the long debate between Bohr and Einstein had come to an end. It had been a disappointing conclusion, marked by the reaffirmation of the respective viewpoints of two scientists who by now found great difficulty even in defining a common code of communication. As though seeking to narrow the gap between them, Heisenberg took the opportunity to underline the existence of a common feature in their contributions to 20th century physics. Their discoveries had in fact made it possible to recognize that ‘even the fundamental and most elementary concepts of science, such as space, time, place, velocity, have become problematic and must be re-examined’. The conceptual and cognitive implications of relativity and of quantum mechanics were obviously different but Heisenberg maintained that both theories asked the same question: ‘Does the language we use when we speak of experiments correspond to the artificial language of mathematics which, as we know, describes real relationships correctly; or has it become separated from it so that we must be content with imprecise linguistic formulations and only return to the artificial language of mathematics when we are forced to express ourselves with precision?’.
The theoretical and experimental context within which the “Copenhagen Interpretation” of quantum theory was generated is underemphasized by recent critics of the Bohr-Heisenberg philosophy. When an interpretation of a theory has been as successful as this one has been, there is little practical warrant for the “alternative interpretations” which have, since Bohm, been receiving prominence. Indeed, these are not even genuine alternatives; although rich in provocative prose, they provide not a scrap of algebra with which to organize the practical physicist's thinking. Several objections to the Bohr interpretation are critically examined, as is also a particular use of the correspondence principle which has seemed to cast doubt on the Copenhagen ideas.