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Journal of Optoelectronics·laser

Influence of sequential attacks on 1310 nm differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution

Feng Zhao

Published Jan 1, 2012• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The characteristics of 1 310 nm differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution are discussed,the influence of sequential attacks with intensity modulation on which is also analyzed.It indicates that the 1 310 nm is suitable for high speed quantum key distribution over 10-50 km distance.Sequential attacks with intensity modulation will not change Bob′s detection probability and this behavior can be hided by the inherent error rate,so the decoy states technique can not beat it.Based on the L.J.Ma et al experimental data,we evaluated the security of it,and the result indicates that under the sequential attacks,the upper bound of key generation rate is 6.9 Kb/s at 50 km,so it turns out to be insecure.

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•Sep 1, 2007•30 citations
The characteristics of 1 310 nm differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution are discussed,the influence of sequential attacks with intensity modulation on which is also analyzed.It indicates that the 1 310 nm is suitable for high speed quantum key distribution over 10-50 km distance.Sequential attacks with intensity modulation will not change Bob′s detection probability and this behavior can be hided by the inherent error rate,so the decoy states technique can not beat it.Based on the L.J.Ma et al experimental data,we evaluated the security of it,and the result indicates that under the sequential attacks,the upper bound of key generation rate is 6.9 Kb/s at 50 km,so it turns out to be insecure.
In this paper, we discuss the security of the differential-phase-shift quantum-key-distribution (DPSQKD) protocol by introducing an improved version of the so-called sequential attack, which was originally discussed by Waks et al. [Phys. Rev. A 73, 012344 (2006)]. Our attack differs from the original form of the sequential attack in that the attacker Eve modulates not only the phases but also the amplitude in the superposition of the single-photon states which she sends to the receiver. Concentrating especially on the ``discretized Gaussian'' intensity modulation, we show that our attack is more effective than the individual attack, which had been the best attack up to present. As a result of this, the recent experiment with communication distance of 100km100\phantom{\rule{0.3em}{0ex}}\mathrm{km}100km reported by Diamanti et al. [Opt. Express 14, 13073 (2006)] turns out to be insecure. Moreover, it can be shown that in a practical experimental setup which is commonly used today, the communication distance achievable by the DPSQKD protocol is less than 95km95\phantom{\rule{0.3em}{0ex}}\mathrm{km}95km.
The performance of active decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) system with an untrusted source is compared with that of passive decoy-state QKD. The key generation rate with the change of the secure transmission distance is shown under the condition of active decoy-state (or passive decoy-state) QKD where we pick the data size to be N=1012. The security characteristics of the passive scheme are studied with statistical fluctuation of the counting rate and the intensity of the practical source. At communication wavelength 1310 nm or 1550 nm, The security range of communication distance is [73.2 km, 96.5 km] or [104.5 km, 137.9 km] respectively. This analysis will provide important theoretical parameters for practical QKD experiment.
The analysis is based on the error rate and the secure communication rate as functions of distance for three quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocols: the Bennett–Brassard 1984, the Bennett–Brassard–Mermin 1992, and the coherent differential-phase-shift keying (DPSK) protocols. We consider the secure communication rate of the DPSK protocol against an arbitrary individual attack, including the most commonly considered intercept-resend and photon-number splitting attacks, and concluded that the simple and efficient differential-phase-shift-keying protocol allows for more than 200 km of secure communication distance with high communication rates.
We investigate limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the performance of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution protocols that use pulsed coherent light. In particular, we analyze two sequential attacks based on unambiguous state discrimination and minimum error discrimination, respectively, of the signal states emitted by the source. Sequential attacks represent;I special type of intercept-resend attacks and, therefore, they provide ultimate upper bounds on the maximal distance achievable by quantum key distribution schemes.