It is expounded that a statistical distribution is a realistic distribution, while a probability distribution is its idea image; a statistical distribution is objective distribution, while a probability distribution depends on observers. In quantum mechanics, the confusion between statistical distributions and probability distributions creates two mistakes: misreading a probability distribution as a realistic distribution and misreading a subjective uncertainty as an objective uncertainty. Schrodinger' s cat is an imagery that opens out these two mistakes.
It is expounded that a statistical distribution is a realistic distribution, while a probability distribution is its idea image; a statistical distribution is objective distribution, while a probability distribution depends on observers. In quantum mechanics, the confusion between statistical distributions and probability distributions creates two mistakes: misreading a probability distribution as a realistic distribution and misreading a subjective uncertainty as an objective uncertainty. Schrodinger' s cat is an imagery that opens out these two mistakes.
INTRODUCTION In his essay ‘Quantum Mechanics Without “the Observer”’ (in [20], 7–44), Popper criticizes the Copenhagen Interpretation and suggests construing the quantum theory as a ‘generalization of classical statistical mechanics’ ([20], 16). The uncertainty relations, he says, set ‘limits to the statistical dispersion … of the results of sequences of experiments’ ([20], 20) and not to what can be said about individual systems. Some strange features of orthodox microphysics are due either to a misinterpretation of probability, involving some ‘very simple mistakes’ ([20], 42); or else they are a straightforward consequence of the fact that the quantum theory is a statistical theory. For example, ‘the reduction of the wave packet … has nothing to do with quantum theory: it is a trivial feature of probability theory’ ([20], 37). The idea of probability that is presupposed in all these arguments, however, is Popper's propensity interpretation. Adopting this interpretation suffices for making clear what the quantum theory really is: a ‘generalization of classical statistical mechanics’ ([20], 16). This is Popper's position as I understand it. This position, it seems to me, is attractive enough as long as one does not carry the analysis too far. But it breaks down when confronted with all the facts which Bohr wanted to take into account. Altogether Popper's criticism and his alternative proposals once more reveal the strong points of the Copenhagen philosophy, and especially of the ideas of Niels Bohr. Today it is very difficult to find a satisfactory account of these ideas.
Historical remarks The quantum mechanical formalism discovered by Heisenberg [Heis 25] an Schrödinger [Schrö 26] in 1925 was first interpreted in a statistical sense by Born [Born 26]. The formal expressions p (φ, a i ) = |(φ,φ ai )| 2 , i ∈ N, were interpreted as the probabilities that a quantum system S with preparation φ possesses the value a i that belongs to the state φ ai . This original Born interpretation, which was formulated for scattering processes, was, however, not tenable in the general case. The probabilities must not be related to the system S in state φ, since in the preparation φ the value a i of an observable A is in general not subjectively unknown but objectively undecided. Instead, one has to interpret the formal expressions p ( a i , a i ) as the probabilities of finding the value a i after measurement of the observable A of the system S with preparation φ. In this improved version, the statistical or Born interpretation is used in the present-day literature. On the one hand, the statistical (Born) interpretation of quantum mechanics is usually taken for granted, and the formalism of quantum mechanics is considered as a theory that provides statistical predictions referring to a sufficiently large ensemble of identically prepared systems S (φ) after the measurement of the observable in question. On the other hand, the meaning of the same formal terms p (φ, a i ) for an individual system is highly problematic.
We reopen Erwin Schrodinger's thought experiment involving a cat in an informationally impenetrable box. A common view is that the cat enters a superposition of alive/dead because of a lack of observation, leading to uncertainty about the state of the cat. We, on the other hand, argue that the cat only enters a superposition if everything about the cat is known prior to the box being closed. The superposition results from a lack of uncertainty inside the box. Rather than interpreting this state of affairs as a live and dead cat interacting with each other, we suggest that the more natural interpretation is that of an inability to precisely position events within spacetime due to the lack of uncertainty. We clarify how stable measurement depends on a diversified portfolio of statistical uncertainty, and how the lack of such uncertainty in Schrodinger's box precludes stabilization.
The concept of probability was prominent in the original foundations of quantum mechanics and continues to be so today. Indeed, the controversies regarding objective and subjective interpretations of probability have again become active. I argue that, although both objective and subjective probabilities have domains of relevance in QM, their roles are quite distinct. Even where both are legitimate, the objective and subjective probabilities differ, both conceptually and numerically. There are quantum probabilities that have no useful subjective interpretations, and there are subjective probabilities that cannot be realized as quantum probabilities.
Quantum mechanics is basically a mathematical recipe on how to construct physical models. Historically its origin and main domain of application has been in the microscopic regime, although it strictly seen constitutes a general mathematical framework not limited to this regime. Since it is a statistical theory, the meaning and role of probabilities in it need to be defined and understood in order to gain an understanding of the predictions and validity of quantum mechanics. The interpretational problems of quantum mechanics are also connected with the interpretation of the concept of probability. In this thesis the use of probability theory as extended logic, in particular in the way it was presented by E. T. Jaynes, will be central. With this interpretation of probabilities they become a subjective notion, always dependent on one's state of knowledge or the context in which they are assigned, which has consequences on how things are to be viewed, understood and tackled in quantum mechanics. For instance, the statistical operator or density operator, is usually defined in terms of probabilities and therefore also needs to be updated when the probabilities are updated by acquisition of additional data. Furthermore, it is a context dependent notion, meaning, e.g., that two observers will in general assign different statistical operators to the same phenomenon, which is demonstrated in the papers of the thesis. It is also presented an alternative and conceptually clear approach to the problematic notion of "probabilities of probabilities", which is related to such things as probability distributions on statistical operators. In connection to this, we consider concrete numerical applications of Bayesian quantum state assignment methods to a three-level quantum system, where prior knowledge and various kinds of measurement data are encoded into a statistical operator, which can then be used for deriving probabilities of other measurements. The thesis also offers examples of an alternative quantum state assignment technique, using maximum entropy methods, which in some cases are compared with the Bayesian quantum state assignment methods. Finally, the interesting and important problem whether the statistical operator, or more generally quantum mechanics, gives a complete description of "objective physical reality" is considered. A related concern is here the possibility of finding a "local hidden-variable theory" underlying the quantum mechanical description. There have been attempts to prove that such a theory cannot be constructed, where the most well-known impossibility proof claiming to show this was given by J. S. Bell. In connection to this, the thesis presents an idea for an interpretation or alternative approach to quantum mechanics based on the concept of space-time.