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A Modular-based Approach to Design Secure Protocol

Binqiang Wang

Published Jan 1, 2006• 1 citation

Abstract

The present methods to design secure protocol have the following characters:abstract,the narrow application range,complexity,and non-system.This paper presents a novel approach,which firstly combines the implementation modules of protocol type and secure properties to construct the original protocol,and then according to protocol requirements,perfects it to form the final protocol.The approach can be applied to all secure protocols,and it is easier for people to design secure protocol,and to implement the auto-design of secure protocol.At last,the paper illustrates the two-part key establishment protocol to show how one use this approach to design secure protocol.

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