IEEE International Conference on Computational Science and Engineering (CSE) and IEEE International Conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing (EUC)

Converters for Designing Applied Cryptographic Protocols

Zhao Huawei, Jing Qin, Fang Zhifeng

Published Dec 1, 2008• 0 citations

Publisher

Abstract

Two modularized, non-interactive converters are proposed to design applied cryptographic protocols. The converters are based on the refined scheme given by Wenbo Mao, and can transform protocols secure in the ideal model into those secure in the real model. Because the converters are modularized, once proved secure, they can be widely reused in many protocols. And in contrast to BCK-authenticator, the converters have the following advantages: 1, Because of the character of non-interactivity, the transformed protocols outputted by the converters have higher performance than those protocols outputted by BCK-authenticator. 2, The converters can transform some symmetric-key protocols that can not be transformed by BCK-authenticator. 3, The converters have algorithms, which can help to realize automatic transformation.

DOI: 10.1109/euc.2008.18

Related papers

A Modular Approach to the Design and Analysis of Authentication and Key Exchange Protocols.

Mihir Bellare Y, Ran Canetti, Hugo Krawczyk

We present a general framework for constructing and analyzing authentication protocols in realistic models of communication networks. This framework provides a sound formalization for the authentication problem and suggests simple and attractive design principles for general authentication and key exchange protocols. The key element in our approach is a modular treatment of the authentication problem in cryptographic protocols; this applies to the definition of security, to the design of the protocols, and to their analysis. In particular, following this modular approach, we show how to systematically transform solutions that work in a model of idealized authenticated communications into solutions that are secure in the realistic setting of communication channels controlled by an active adversary. Using these principles we construct and prove the security of simple and practical authentication and key-exchange protocols. In particular, we provide a security analysis of some well-known key exchange protocols (e.g. authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange), and of some of the techniques underlying the design of several authentication protocols that are currently being

Jan 1, 1998380 citations

A modular approach to the design and analysis of authentication and key exchange protocols (extended abstract)

Mihir Bellare Y, Ran Canetti, Hugo Krawczyk

We prcscnt a general framework for constructing and analyzing authentication protocols in realistic models of communication networks.This framework provides a sound formalization for the authentication problem and suggests simple and attractive design principles for general authentication and key exchange protocols.The key element in our appronch io a modular treatment of the authentication problem in cryptographic protocols; thii applies to the definition of accurity, to the design of the protocols, and to their analysis.In particulnr, following this modular approach, we show how to systematically transform solutions that work in a model of idaalizcd authenticated communications into solutions that are secure in the realistic setting of communication channels controlled by an active adversary.Using these principles we construct and prove the security of simple and practical authentication and key-exchange protocols.In particular, we provide a security analysis of aomo well-known key exchange protocols (e.g.authenticated Dlfllc-Hcllman key exchange), and of some of the techniques underlying the design of several authentication protocols that are currently being deployed on a large scale for the Intornot Protocol and other applications.

ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)Jan 1, 1998357 citations

Efficient Authenticators with Application to Key Exchange

Shaoquan Jiang, Guang Gong

Abstract. The notion of authenticator, proposed by Bellare et al., is to transform a protocol secure in the authenticated-link model to a new one secure in the unauthenticated-link model. This notion admits a modular design and analysis of cryptographic protocols and thus greatly simplifies the underlying tasks. However, all previous authenticators are constructed via a so called MT-authenticator. This kind of authenticator authenticates each message independently. Thus, the round complexity of the resulting protocol is amplified by a multiplicative factor. In this paper, we propose two efficient authenticators which authenticate the protocol as a whole and the round complexity of the resulting protocol increases only by at most an additively small number. We also construct a very efficient key exchange protocol. Our protocol is provably secure under the general cryptographic assumption (especially without a concrete hardness assumption such as DDH or RSA). Of an independent interest, our security proof lies in the emulation based ideal-real model, instead of the widely adopted (seemingly weaker) SKsecurity. To our knowledge, this is the first protocol of its kind. It is worth mentioning that all our constructions are obtained by improving the related protocols of Bellare et al. [1]. 1

Jan 1, 20061 citation

A commitment-based authentication model for key exchange protocols

Iván Blanco Chacón, David Domingo Martín, I. Luengo +1 more

In this work we construct an alternative model for Authenticated Key Exchange, intended to build a theoretic security framework for protocols whose characteristics may not always concur with the specifics of already existing models for authenticated exchanges. This model is constructed in a modular way, from the notion of commitment schemes and employing ephemeral information, therefore avoiding the exchange of long-term cryptographic material. From this model, we propose a number of Commitment-based protocols to establish a shared secret between two parties, and study their resistance over unauthenticated channels. This means analyzing the security of the protocol itself, and its robustness against Man-in-the-Middle attacks, by formalizing their security under this model. The protocols are constructed from Key Agreement (KA) and Key Encapsulation (KEM) primitives, to show that this model can be applied to both established and new paradigms. We highlight the differences that arise naturally, due to the nature of KEM constructions, in terms of the protocol itself and the types of attacks that they are subject to. We provide practical go-to protocols instances to migrate to, both for KEM-based and KA-based cryptographic primitives.

arXiv:2307.15465International Journal of Computer Mathematics Computer Systems TheoryMay 20, 20260 citations

UC-Secure Non-interactive Public-Key Encryption

Jan L. Camenisch, Anja Lehmann, Gregory Neven +1 more

The universal composability (UC) framework enables the modular design of cryptographic protocols by allowing arbitrary compositions of lower-level building blocks. Public-key encryption is unarguably a very important such building block. However, so far no UC-functionality exists that offers non-interactive encryption necessary for modular protocol construction. We provide an ideal functionality for non-committing encryption (i.e., public-key encryption secure against adaptive corruptions) with locally generated, and therefore non-interactive, ciphertexts. As a sanity check, we also provide a property-based security notion that we prove to be equivalent to the UC notion. We then show that the encryption scheme of Camenisch et al. (SCN '16) based on trapdoor permutations securely implements our notion in the random-oracle model without assuming secure erasures. This is the best one can hope to achieve as standard-model constructions do not exist due to the uninstantiability of round-optimal adaptively secure message transfer in the standard model (Nielsen, Crypto '02). We illustrate the modular reusability of our functionality by constructing the first non-interactive signcryption scheme secure against adaptive corruptions without secure erasures in the UC framework.

IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW)Aug 1, 20177 citations

A Modular-based Approach to Design Secure Protocol

Binqiang Wang

The present methods to design secure protocol have the following characters:abstract,the narrow application range,complexity,and non-system.This paper presents a novel approach,which firstly combines the implementation modules of protocol type and secure properties to construct the original protocol,and then according to protocol requirements,perfects it to form the final protocol.The approach can be applied to all secure protocols,and it is easier for people to design secure protocol,and to implement the auto-design of secure protocol.At last,the paper illustrates the two-part key establishment protocol to show how one use this approach to design secure protocol.

Jisuanji gongchengJan 1, 20061 citation