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Quantum Miracles and Immortality

Allan F. Randall

Published Jan 1, 2004• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Abstract

It has become common in transhumanist circles to claim that quantum physics implies some kind of proof of immortality, of one kind or another. While these claims are met with widespread scepticism, there has been relatively little attempt to analyze them carefully. I critique some of these, and related, claims about quantum mechanics, from the perspective of algorithmic information theory, showing that they are mostly fallacious, due to reasons of thermodynamic instability. While some of the more minor claims are shown to possibly have substance, the claimed effects are not publically verifiable.

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Comment on “Nonlocal character of quantum theory,” by Henry P. Stapp [Am. J. Phys. 65 (4), 300–304 (1997)]

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A 1997 paper by Henry Stapp attempts to achieve a definitive argument for his long-sustained thesis that quantum mechanics implies a nonlocality inconsistent with the locality of relativity theory. His argument assumes both the validity of counterfactual reasoning under certain circumstances and the free choice of performance of experiments, and it specifically refrains from any assumptions about “elements of physical reality” as understood by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. In Sec. I we drastically condense his argument but retain his central principle of inference, called “LOC2,” which he claims is a consequence of relativistic locality. By careful attention to counterfactual reasoning we then throw doubt upon this claim and hence upon his argument as a whole. In Sec. II we answer Stapp’s reply to our critique of the 1997 paper. Section III is a postscript, commenting briefly on Stapp’s answer to Sec. II.

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Psi: a neutral term denoting the unknown factors that underlie parapsychological phenomena. \nPsi effects/phenomena: observable outcomes attributed to the action of psi. \nPsi agent: a person thought to play an active role in the production of psi effects. \n \nOne major criticism of parapsychology is that it lacks accepted theoretical models, and that those it does have tend to make use of the more esoteric and speculative areas of physics. Part of the reason for the widespread scepticism and dearth of viable theories is, I think, due to the perceived properties of psi effects rather than properties that are necessarily real. Given our current knowledge, it is difficult if not impossible to model psi effects as the claimed properties rarely appear to be consistent with theory and observation in other areas of science. But are the claims often made for psi phenomena really justified? Here, I look at three of the more common claims made by parapsychologists and critically assess the assumptions that led to them. I will try to show how the different assumptions we make about psi effects can radically alter the physical requirements of any potential mechanisms and suggest alternative perspectives on some parapsychological phenomena.

McFarland eBooks•Nov 18, 2009•0 citations

Quantum computer get real

Jonathan A. Jones

Quantum mechanics is an extremely successful theory, but also a troubling one. For many years progress was made by concentrating on the obvious applications, and not worrying too much about the counterintuitive world view that quantum mechanics implies. More recently, however, the development of quantum-information theory has reversed this approach. If we take seriously what quantum mechanics seems to be telling us about the world, we can use this “quantum weirdness” to do apparently impossible things (see Physics World March 1998 pp33–57).

Physics World•Apr 1, 2002•1 citation
It has become common in transhumanist circles to claim that quantum physics implies some kind of proof of immortality, of one kind or another. While these claims are met with widespread scepticism, there has been relatively little attempt to analyze them carefully. I critique some of these, and related, claims about quantum mechanics, from the perspective of algorithmic information theory, showing that they are mostly fallacious, due to reasons of thermodynamic instability. While some of the more minor claims are shown to possibly have substance, the claimed effects are not publically verifiable.
Abstract The prospect, in terms of subjective expectations, of immortality under the no‐collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is certain, as pointed out by several authors, both physicists and, more recently, philosophers. The argument, known as quantum suicide, or quantum immortality, has received some critical discussion, but there hasn't been any questioning of David Lewis's point that there is a terrifying corollary to the argument, namely, that we should expect to live forever in a crippled, more and more damaged state, that barely sustains life. This is the prospect of eternal quantum torment. Based on some empirical facts, I argue for a conclusion that is much more reassuring than Lewis's terrible scenario. 1
A 1997 paper by Henry Stapp attempts to achieve a definitive argument for his long-sustained thesis that quantum mechanics implies a nonlocality inconsistent with the locality of relativity theory. His argument assumes both the validity of counterfactual reasoning under certain circumstances and the free choice of performance of experiments, and it specifically refrains from any assumptions about “elements of physical reality” as understood by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. In Sec. I we drastically condense his argument but retain his central principle of inference, called “LOC2,” which he claims is a consequence of relativistic locality. By careful attention to counterfactual reasoning we then throw doubt upon this claim and hence upon his argument as a whole. In Sec. II we answer Stapp’s reply to our critique of the 1997 paper. Section III is a postscript, commenting briefly on Stapp’s answer to Sec. II.
Psi: a neutral term denoting the unknown factors that underlie parapsychological phenomena. \nPsi effects/phenomena: observable outcomes attributed to the action of psi. \nPsi agent: a person thought to play an active role in the production of psi effects. \n \nOne major criticism of parapsychology is that it lacks accepted theoretical models, and that those it does have tend to make use of the more esoteric and speculative areas of physics. Part of the reason for the widespread scepticism and dearth of viable theories is, I think, due to the perceived properties of psi effects rather than properties that are necessarily real. Given our current knowledge, it is difficult if not impossible to model psi effects as the claimed properties rarely appear to be consistent with theory and observation in other areas of science. But are the claims often made for psi phenomena really justified? Here, I look at three of the more common claims made by parapsychologists and critically assess the assumptions that led to them. I will try to show how the different assumptions we make about psi effects can radically alter the physical requirements of any potential mechanisms and suggest alternative perspectives on some parapsychological phenomena.
Quantum mechanics is an extremely successful theory, but also a troubling one. For many years progress was made by concentrating on the obvious applications, and not worrying too much about the counterintuitive world view that quantum mechanics implies. More recently, however, the development of quantum-information theory has reversed this approach. If we take seriously what quantum mechanics seems to be telling us about the world, we can use this “quantum weirdness” to do apparently impossible things (see Physics World March 1998 pp33–57).