Psi: a neutral term denoting the unknown factors that underlie parapsychological phenomena. \nPsi effects/phenomena: observable outcomes attributed to the action of psi. \nPsi agent: a person thought to play an active role in the production of psi effects. \n \nOne major criticism of parapsychology is that it lacks accepted theoretical models, and that those it does have tend to make use of the more esoteric and speculative areas of physics. Part of the reason for the widespread scepticism and dearth of viable theories is, I think, due to the perceived properties of psi effects rather than properties that are necessarily real. Given our current knowledge, it is difficult if not impossible to model psi effects as the claimed properties rarely appear to be consistent with theory and observation in other areas of science. But are the claims often made for psi phenomena really justified? Here, I look at three of the more common claims made by parapsychologists and critically assess the assumptions that led to them. I will try to show how the different assumptions we make about psi effects can radically alter the physical requirements of any potential mechanisms and suggest alternative perspectives on some parapsychological phenomena.
Psi: a neutral term denoting the unknown factors that underlie parapsychological phenomena. \nPsi effects/phenomena: observable outcomes attributed to the action of psi. \nPsi agent: a person thought to play an active role in the production of psi effects. \n \nOne major criticism of parapsychology is that it lacks accepted theoretical models, and that those it does have tend to make use of the more esoteric and speculative areas of physics. Part of the reason for the widespread scepticism and dearth of viable theories is, I think, due to the perceived properties of psi effects rather than properties that are necessarily real. Given our current knowledge, it is difficult if not impossible to model psi effects as the claimed properties rarely appear to be consistent with theory and observation in other areas of science. But are the claims often made for psi phenomena really justified? Here, I look at three of the more common claims made by parapsychologists and critically assess the assumptions that led to them. I will try to show how the different assumptions we make about psi effects can radically alter the physical requirements of any potential mechanisms and suggest alternative perspectives on some parapsychological phenomena.
Conceptual spaces can be barriers to understanding. Our classical understanding is hard to escape, with its precepts even being imposed on QM “behaviours”. Interpretation is also an artifact of methodology; a problem already noted in parapsychology. In physics, consciousness—some sort of awareness centre —is thought to have anomalous physical effects in the world, but there is no consensus on the claim, thus making consciousness as ambiguous as psi. A broader understanding of the causes and relations inherent in the world, at all levels, requires pluralistic and holistic thinking; this is the approach taken in synchronicity theory. If the psi function is essentially synchronistic and aided by consciousness, then consciousness has a grander role yet to be discovered. Jung states that synchronicity occurs when archetypes are constellated (activated); they act as bridges, so that synchronicity is an experience in consciousness where we witness the unity of mind and matter.
Scientific facts are constituted as consensus about observable phenomena against the background of an accepted, or at least plausible, theory. Empirical data without a theoretical framework are at best curiosities and anomalies, at worst they are neglected. The problem of parapsychological research since its inception with the foundation of the Society of Psychical Research in 1882 was that no sound theoretical basis existed. On the contrary, the proponents of the SPR often indulged in a theoretical model that ran contrary to the perceived materialism of mainstream science, and many tried to use the data of parapsychological research to bolster the case of “mind over matter,” yet without producing a good model of how such effects could be conceptualized. In general, parapsychological (PSI) research has been rather devoid of theorizing and, if anything, assumed a tacit signaltheoretical, local-causal model of some sort of subtle energy that would be vindicated, once enough empirical data were amassed. History, and data, proved this stance wrong. We will present a theoretical approach that challenges this local-causal, signal-theoretical approach by proposing that parapsychological phenomena are instances of a larger class of phenomena that are examples of nonlocal correlations. These are predicted by Generalized Quantum Theory (GQT) and can be expected to occur, whenever global descriptions of a system are complementary to or incompatible with local descriptions of elements of such a system. We will analyze the standard paradigms of PSI-research along those lines and describe how they can be reconceptualized as instances of such generalized nonlocal correlations. A direct consequence of this conceptual framework is that misrepresentations of these phenomena as local causes, as is done in direct experimentation, is bound to fail long-term. Strategies to escape this problem are discussed. Journal of Scientifi c Exploration, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 605–631, 2014 0892-3310/14 606 Harald Walach, Walter von Lucadou, and Hartmann Romer
Abstract—The problem of devising a theory for paranormal phenomena (psi) may be separated into, first, the basic physical mechanism and second, the psychological aspects of how and when people are able to elicit psi. Observational theory addresses primarily the first aspect, the basic physical mechanism of psi. A problem is that the known types of physical interaction do not fit the existing data. The measurement problem in quantum mechanics can be used to hypothe-size an observer who adds information at the collapse of the wave function. For each random event one of the possible outcomes becomes realized as the event is being observed. The basic tenet of observational theory is: the statis-tics of single events become biased if the observer is motivated and prefers one of the possible outcomes over the other. Features of observational theory are: its predictive power, proven with re-gard to retroactive psychokinesis (PK); parsimony: the same mechanism ex-plains ESP as well as PK; fruitfulness, as there is a direct relationship with quantum mechanics; and openness to crucial experiments. The falsifiability criterion poses some problems: these are discussed in relation to Lakatos’ methodology of research programmes. Observational theory is a solution to the problem of the mediation of psi, thus providing a framework for the psychological problem of the manifesta-tion of psi. Henceforth, the observation of the outcome should be regarded as formal part of parapsychological experiments. There is reason for cautious, patient optimism about the acceptance of observational theory.
In parapsychology, unlike psychology, there is no known way to determine whether any measured effect comes from the (so-called) subjects - S, or the (nominal) experimenter - E. In each generation parapsychology has been dominated by a mere handful of experimenters who report regular extra-chance results, while the great mass of experimenters encounter, at best, only sporadic success. This paper pursues the view that parapsychology's elite are themselves particularly endowed with psi ability: they attribute scoring to subjects, in line with the psychological tradition, while it actually comes from their own psi. The Geiger counter of the radioactive man ticks everywhere! It is suggested that the experiment using subjects is a ritual tailored to maximize experimenter-psi. Today the experiment with subjects seems to replace the Juju of former times. The E-centric view explains why parapsychological experiments can rarely be repeated by different experimenters. Skeptics maintain that many parapsychology results are due to the experimenter affecting his results in an improper way: the E-centric model agrees, but suggests that he does so with his mind rather than with his hands. What has been lacking until now are systematic methods to measure how much of a psi effect is due to subjects, and how much to the experimenter. The physics-based Observational Theories break this impasse. An outline is given of the author's take on these theories as Minimalistic Observational Theory (MOT). The parapsychological experiment is physically no more than a source of (informational) entropy which is acted on by psi. If the subject is the source of psi then he affects the result at the level of the trial. On the other hand, if the experimenter is the source of psi he (typically) affects the experiment as a single global unit. The consequences of this elementary dichotomy are remarkably wide-reaching and testable. Only two examples are noted here: for E-psi a small experiment is as good as a big one and the usual measure of effect size (based on the trial) is inappropriate; another is that the error mean squares in ANOVA will be depressed by E-psi. The effects predicted by the MOT allow partitioning of the effect into S and E components. Typically Psi effects are small and differences between models are smaller still; so a great deal of data is required. Recourse must be taken to meta-analysis as well as the modern ultra-large experiment.
This paper explores the role of the mind in the physical world. We begin with a brief introduction to distinct types of retrocausal phenomena connected with parapsychology and physics. We provide an introduction to laws of quantum mechanics (QM) that lead some to surmise connections between QM and psychic phenomena (psi). Next, we present our argument that verification of psi will require changes to QM. As a possible placeholder for these changes we introduce “Mind”, from Cartesian dualism. This area of research points the way to connections between two fundamental issues in science: the mind-matter hard problem and the measurement problem of QM. Positive outcomes of carefully executed experiments could demonstrate a close relationship between these two problems, including the possibility that sentience plays an important role in the fundamental laws of physics. We focus on a version of Daryl Bem’s seeing the future experiments, which should allow for discrimination between various interpretations of QM. Finally, although the authors are psi skeptics, we suggest methodologies that may enable psi phenomena to be acceptable to mainstream science.
Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behavior generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g., ''feeling,'' ''knowing,'' and ''effort'') are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classical physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, due to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analyzing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classical-physics-based predecessor is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics, and is able to represent more adequately than classical concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.