As is well known, the standard Kolmogorov definition of probability may not be adequate for describing the physical world. In this work, we weaken the Kolmogorovian axioms and depart slightly from its measure theoretical context enabling one to describe systems with an infinite number of degrees of freedom. The resulting framework is more broad and physical than Kolmogorov’s and constitutes the basis for the understanding of Quantum Theory as envisioned by this author.
As is well known, the standard Kolmogorov definition of probability may not be adequate for describing the physical world. In this work, we weaken the Kolmogorovian axioms and depart slightly from its measure theoretical context enabling one to describe systems with an infinite number of degrees of freedom. The resulting framework is more broad and physical than Kolmogorov’s and constitutes the basis for the understanding of Quantum Theory as envisioned by this author.
Abstract By formulating the axioms of quantum mechanics, von Neumann also laid the foundations of a “quantum probability theory”. As such, it is regarded a generalization of the “classical probability theory” due to Kolmogorov. Outside of quantum physics, however, Kolmogorov’s axioms enjoy universal applicability. This raises the question of whether quantum physics indeed requires such a generalization of our conception of probability or if von Neumann’s axiomatization of quantum mechanics was contingent on the absence of a general theory of probability in the 1920s. This work argues in favor of the latter position. In particular, it shows how to construct a mathematically rigorous theory for non-relativistic N -body quantum systems subject to a time-independent scalar potential, which is based on Kolmogorov’s axioms and physically natural random variables. Though this theory is provably distinct from its quantum-mechanical analog, it nonetheless reproduces central predictions of the latter. Further work may make an empirical comparison possible. Moreover, the approach can in principle be adapted to other classes of quantum-mechanical models. Part II of this series discusses the empirical violation of Bell inequalities in the context of this approach. Part III addresses the projection postulate and the question of measurement.
According to the Kolmogorovian Censorship Hypothesis, everything that quantum theory says about the world in the language of the quantum mechanical Hilbert space formalism is actually about relationships between ordinary relative frequencies expressible in operational terms using classical Kolmogorovian probability theory. In other words, a quantum theoretical description of a system should in principle be translatable into a purely operational-probabilistic description. However, our goal in this paper is different; we do not want to deal with the problem how to translate the known theory of quantum mechanics into operational terms, or to reconstruct the theory from postulates which can be interpreted in operational terms. Our aim is somewhat broader and points in the opposite direction. We start with a general scheme for the operational description of an arbitrary physical system. The description is based solely on the notion of observable events (measurement operations and measurement results) and on general, empirically established simple laws concerning their relative frequency. These laws are so simple and fundamental that they apply equally to any physical system. In the first part of the paper, we outline the basic elements of such an operational-probabilistic theory. In the second part, we discuss how this operational-probabilistic description compares to the quantum mechanical description and to what extent the standard Hilbert space quantum mechanics can be regarded as a reformulation of the general operational-probabilistic theory.
Applications of quantum mechanics have led to many successful predictions and explanations of puzzling phenomena, and we now apply quantum mechanics to gain, process, and communicate information in novel ways. We can understand quantum mechanics by understanding how we have applied it. We should not seek agreement on the nature of the world it represents, because this theory does not itself represent the physical world (though its applications do help us to represent it better). When applied to a quantum state, quantum mechanics yields probabiities for physical events: both state and probability are objective--not because they represent elements of phyiscal reality, but because each exerts norrmative authority over the beliefs of anyone who accepts quantum mechanics and applies it relative to a physical situation they may (but need not) occupy. These events may be described by statements that are meaningful in an appropriate environmental context, and quantum mechanics can help one to say when that is. Measurement creates an appropriate context, so here the Born rule indirectly yields probabilities of measurement outcomes. The quantum state of a system does not "collapse" on measurement: a new state must be assigned relative to a physical situation in which information about the outcome is accessible. Understood this way, there is no measurement problem, and violations of Bell inequalities does not demonstrate "spooky" non-local action. Quantum field theories have no physical ontology of their own: a quantum field is a mathematical object in a model whose application helps us to improve and extend our descriptions of the world in other terms. We cannot realise the scenario of Wigner's friend and its recent extensions: but the data that provide overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics are objective in the same sense as the relative measurement outcomes described in those scenarios.
Kolmogorov's axioms of probability theory are extended to conditional probabilities among distinct (and sometimes intertwining) contexts. Formally, this amounts to row stochastic matrices whose entries characterize the conditional probability to find some observable (postselection) in one context, given an observable (preselection) in another context. As the respective probabilities need not (but, depending on the physical/model realization, can) be of the Born rule type, this generalizes approaches to quantum probabilities by Aufféves and Grangier, which in turn are inspired by Gleason's theorem.
Applications of quantum mechanics have led to many successful predictions and explanations of puzzling phenomena, and we now apply quantum mechanics to gain, process, and communicate information in novel ways. We can understand quantum mechanics by understanding how we have applied it. We should not seek agreement on the nature of the world it represents, because this theory does not itself represent the physical world (though its applications do help us to represent it better). When applied to a quantum state, quantum mechanics yields probabilities for physical events: both state and probability are objective—not because they represent elements of physical reality, but because each exerts normative authority over the beliefs of anyone who accepts quantum mechanics and applies it relative to a physical situation they may (but need not) occupy. These events may be described by statements (about values of magnitudes) that are meaningful in an appropriate environmental context, and quantum mechanics can help one to say when that is. Measurement creates an appropriate context, so here the Born rule indirectly yields probabilities of measurement outcomes. The quantum state of a system does not “collapse” on measurement: a new state must be assigned relative to a physical situation in which information about the outcome is accessible. Understood this way, there is no measurement problem, and violation of Bell inequalities does not demonstrate “spooky” non-local action. Quantum field theories have no physical ontology of their own: a quantum field is a mathematical object in a model whose application helps to improve and extend our descriptions of the world in other terms. We cannot realise the scenario of Wigner’s friend and its recent extensions: but the data that provide overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics are objective in the same sense as the relative measurement outcomes described in those scenarios.
It is a matter of course that Kolmogorov’s probability theory is a very useful mathematical tool for the analysis of statistics. However, this fact never means that statistics is based on Kolmogorov’s probability theory, since it is not guaranteed that mathematics and our world are connected. In order that mathematics asserts some statements concerning our world, a certain theory (so called “world view”) mediates between mathematics and our world. Recently we propose measurement theory (i.e., the theory of the quantum mechanical world view), which is characterized as the linguistic turn of quantum mechanics. In this paper, we assert that statistics is based on measurement theory. And, for example, we show, from the pure theoretical point of view (i.e., from the measurement theoretical point of view), that regression analysis can not be justified without Bayes’ theorem. This may imply that even the conventional classification of (Fisher’s) statistics and Bayesian statistics should be reconsidered.