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International Conference on Automatic Control and Artificial Intelligence (ACAI)

Security weaknesses of two-party ID-based authenticated key agreement protocols

Jianzhong Zhang, Zuoshun Wu

Published Jan 1, 2012• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We analyse the existing ID-based authenticated key agreement protocols, and find out that several proposed protocols of this type do not satisfy related security attributes. This paper reviews Wang's, He's and Guo's protocols sequentially, and shows key compromise impersonation attack on Wang's scheme, ephemeral secrets reveal attack on He's scheme, key reveal attack and ephemeral secrets reveal attack on Guo's scheme, respectively, Finally, this paper proposes some improving suggestions on corresponding weaknesses of these protocols.

DOI
10.1049/cp.2012.1343

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We analyse the existing ID-based authenticated key agreement protocols, and find out that several proposed protocols of this type do not satisfy related security attributes. This paper reviews Wang's, He's and Guo's protocols sequentially, and shows key compromise impersonation attack on Wang's scheme, ephemeral secrets reveal attack on He's scheme, key reveal attack and ephemeral secrets reveal attack on Guo's scheme, respectively, Finally, this paper proposes some improving suggestions on corresponding weaknesses of these protocols.
This paper studied two-party authenticated agreement protocol in the certificateless public setting.Analyzed the security of Liu-xu's certificateless authenticated two-party key agreement protocol,and it was shown that the scheme did not achieve strong security.The scheme was vulnerable to key compromise impersonation attack and leakage of ephemeral secrets attack.The reason why the attack can work was analyzed and proposed an improved scheme to remove the attack.It is not hard to devise certificateless authenticated two-party key agreement protocols that look secure,but making the proofs word is not always so simple.
The security attributes of three provable secure ID-based authenticated key agreement protocols are analyzed,and an enhanced ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol is presented based on the previous work.The new scheme achieves most of the known security attributes,such as known-key secrecy,key-compromise impersonation resilience,unknown key-share resilience,no-key control and message independence,especially the PKG-forward secrecy and known session-specific temporary information secrecy attributes,meanwhile keeping with the nice efficiency.
Two-Party Authenticated key agreement protocol is essential for setting up the common session key for parties to establish secure channel for network communication in the open environment. Most of proposed schemes require expensive bilinear pairing operation and only provide limited security attributes. So such protocols are unsuitable for real-world applications that require stronger sense of secrecy. In this paper, we first analysis two schemes recently proposed by Cao etc., and then present a one-round ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol with more desired security attributes, which need no pairing operations while still achieve nice computational efficiency. These security attributes include known-key secrecy, perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience and no key control. Moreover, it captures the enhanced security attributes known session-specific temporary key information secrecy, which means that even the ephemeral secret key were compromised, the adversary can hardly acquire the agreed session key.
Recently, two certificateless three-party authenticated key agreement protocols were proposed, and both protocols were claimed they can meet the desirable security properties including forward security, key compromise impersonation resistance and so on. Through cryptanalysis, we show that one neither meets forward security and key compromise impersonation resistance nor resists an attack by an adversary who knows all users' secret values, and the other cannot resist key compromise impersonation attack. Finally, we propose improved protocols to make up two original protocols' security weaknesses, respectively. Further security analysis shows that our improved protocols can remove such security weaknesses.
Key agreement protocols are essential for secure communications in open and distributed environments. Identity-based cryptography has become extremely fashionable in the last few years for its special advantages. In this paper, we point out some flaw in the scheme proposed by Wang et al., then we present a two-party identity-based explicit authenticated key agreement protocol with key confirmation, which was inspired on a new identity-based encryption scheme first proposed by Gentry and can be used properly in the escrowless mode. The scheme captures the attributes of known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience, perfect forward secrecy, and no-key control. Especially, the scheme captures the PKG forward secrecy property. The PKG still could not recover all the userspsila past session keys even he knows the long-term private keys of all users.