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NeuroQuantology

The Third State: Toward a Quantum Information Theory of Consciousness

Scot Forshaw

Published Jan 6, 2016• 29 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The question of how our perceived reality is constructed and subsequently how our mind has evolved such that we are able to both perceive and subsequently alter our own causality or even our own evolution within this reality has been a long running open question. Referred to as “The Hard Problem”. There have been many theoretical interpretations on the nature of causal self-observance – hereafter referred to as 'consciousness'. The current paper introduces the reader to the indeterminable operator - “The Third State”. The Third State is a term used to describe space itself in relation to the position of all things. As the paper shall show, The Third State is a required omnipresent and universal operator in the otherwise binary realm of data → information. The Third State augments the accepted binary operators to produce the required 'tristate' condition that facilitates the required probabilistic nature of the conscious manifestation. Secondly the Unity Magnitude [Um] scale, which facilitates the bounding of quantum probabilistic memory in a finite model. The paper further introduces the reader to a model and experimental theory that suggests all things we perceive as physical reality can be fabricated from primitive components of data, bits – matter / antimatter / something or nothing. That facilitated by the Third State, our immediate present reality as we experience it and theretofore consciousness is a simultaneous product of the current physical configuration of the frequency stable systems of which we are comprised , interpreted past reality, self-predicted future provided by cyclic frequency stable systems and the immediate physical and sensory state including recursive imagination systems generated by the output of these perturbed frequency stable systems in the cyclic feedback process - ultimately perturbed by, but as one unified with the stochastic processes in relation to the quantum cosmological domain.

DOI
10.14704/nq.2016.14.1.899

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The Quantum Geometry of Consciousness: Synthesist Mechanics, Scientific Incompatibilities, Super-Intelligent AI, and the Perception of Reality

Vincent James Anthony Johannes Førde

Perceived reality is an illusion.We exist in a universal quantum geometrical system that operates because of consciousness, not in isolation from it.Consciousness is not a byproduct of matter.Matter is arguably a by-product of consciousness, as matter is essentially structurally indistinct and far less tangible than what classical, materialist science has led us to believe.Consciousness stimulates excitations and changes in the quantum field; the omnipresent energy baseline field of the universe.This facilitates quantum collapse of probability waveforms that existed in super-position prior to this process.Reality is manifested initially via sound, and secondarily, via light, both of which are fundamentally quantum information data streams that encode holographic, atomic/quantum field geometrical constructs.These encoded quantum/sound/light geometrical formations, are essentially, reality.The classical physical world that we perceive and experience, and the nebulous, nonlinear, and exceptional nature of quantum mechanics, are potentially irreconcilable.Arguably, the only way this is not the case, is if an intermediary processing modality of physics can be found, one that bridges the diametrically opposed features of classical and quantum physics by incorporating and embodying, to varying extents, aspects from both.This research offers an appellation and classification for this third discipline: synthesist mechanics.If synthesist mechanics can be discovered, as our technological measuring capabilities continue to improve, which may render such a discovery possible, the inherent reality of both our perceived, classical reality, and the mechanics of quantum physics, will be affirmed.However, if synthesist mechanics cannot be found, as has proved to be the case thus far, we must accept the logical, deductive revelation this will pose, that ultimately, our perceived reality is nothing more than an interpretative illusion; a cognitive, translational impression that life subconsciously provides itself with in order to foster reflective, spatiotemporal, geometry-based interactions and experiences.This research confirms that we live in a self-rendering, generative illusion, which exists so that individualised shards of consciousness may interact with others.Ultimately, perceived reality is an illusion derived from the constant quantum interpretations that are made by consciousness via the quantum field.This process provides the unified consciousness behind reality with opportunities to experience, acknowledge, actualise, remove, or refine all possible variances of itself.Existence is the quantum dance consciousness performs in the darkness so that it may illuminate itself.

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The Quantum Observer and Mind Collapse

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The study of consciousness and subjective experience represents one of the most intricate frontiers in contemporary philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. For decades, dominant paradigms have characterized the mind through two reductive lenses: as a passive receptor of sensory data or as a computational system processing information through fixed algorithmic operations. While useful in specific contexts, these models consistently fail to capture the dynamic, participatory nature of conscious experience—the recursive relationship between awareness and reality construction. Recent theoretical developments challenge these frameworks by integrating diverse conceptual domains: quantum mechanics metaphors, classical mindfulness traditions, and cognitive behavioral theory. These emerging approaches propose a fundamentally transformative role for the observer, suggesting consciousness does not merely witness reality but actively participates in shaping it.

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Evolution of Consciousness

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The natural evolution of consciousness in different animal species mandates that conscious experiences are causally potent in order to confer any advantage in the struggle for survival. Any endeavor to construct a physical theory of consciousness based on emergence within the framework of classical physics, however, leads to causally impotent conscious experiences in direct contradiction to evolutionary theory since epiphenomenal consciousness cannot evolve through natural selection. Here, we review recent theoretical advances in describing sentience and free will as fundamental aspects of reality granted by quantum physical laws. Modern quantum information theory considers quantum states as a physical resource that endows quantum systems with the capacity to perform physical tasks that are classically impossible. Reductive identification of conscious experiences with the quantum information comprised in quantum brain states allows for causally potent consciousness that is capable of performing genuine choices for future courses of physical action. The consequent evolution of brain cortical networks contributes to increased computational power, memory capacity, and cognitive intelligence of the living organisms.

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Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics

Jonathan Simon

This book is a treat, a collection of essays about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics that is guaranteed to move the needle: serious, original, and relatively accessible. The essays develop cutting-edge views by thought-leading authors on questions that matter for the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of mind, and while to follow along you need to know what supervenience is and what an eigenstate is, the majority of essays should be accessible to advanced undergraduates (i.e., those who have taken a rigorous introductory course in quantum mechanics as well as a course or two in the philosophy of mind).Why care about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics? If you are coming from physics, your point of entry is probably the measurement problem. When you let quantum systems evolve according to the Schrödinger equation, they enter into superpositions of mutually incompatible states. How can this be reconciled with the testimony of our senses that such systems are always in one state or the other when we measure them (with a probability distribution given by the Born rule)? This is the measurement problem, and it concerns consciousness because it draws from the testimony of our senses.If you are coming from the philosophy of mind, your primary concern is probably the mind-body problem: the task of accounting for how consciousness arises out of or fits into physical reality. If consciousness is reducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to establish that reduction? If consciousness is irreducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to explain why consciousness exists, or to find some work for it to do in the world? You may also be concerned with the structure and function of consciousness: for example, you may hold that minds can do things that classical digital computers cannot, and take it that we must look to the quantum realm to discover how.If you are not already entrenched, you might just wonder what kind of world we live in. The mechanistic philosophy of centuries past seemed to disenchant the world, rendering it a place of barren corpuscles banging into one another, leaving no room for mind or meaning, except perhaps as patterns in the collisions, or useless epiphenomena. But quantum mechanics and its relativistic generalizations force a rethinking of the mechanistic picture from the ground up. Once the dust has settled—if it ever does—we may find reasons to relegate consciousness once again to the shadows. But we may also find reasons to give it pride of place. If you are after scientific reasons to reenchant the world, this is a good place to look.The entries in this volume address these questions and others besides. The volume is organized into three parts. The first part contains four essays about the idea that consciousness causes (or constrains) quantum collapse. The second part contains eight essays discussing other ways that consciousness might contribute to theories of quantum mechanics. The third part contains five essays about how quantum mechanics might contribute to an ultimate theory of consciousness. I’ll follow the book’s order.In chapter 1, David Chalmers and Kelvin McQueen develop a new consciousness-triggered collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics. On their approach, consciousness has a strict physical correlate (perhaps given by quantum integrated information theory), it is approximately superposition-resistant, and collapse dynamics are continuous (à la Philip Pearle). They respond to the standard objections that a consciousness-collapse link makes the collapse mechanism imprecise and requires dualism, as well as to worries about Quantum Zeno, among others. Crucially, their approach allows that superpositions of consciousness are possible: their motivation is to give the view a run for its money and to find work for consciousness to do in the universe, not to rid the world of all traces of superposed consciousness. One question: In taking consciousness itself to be superposition-resistant (rather than the environmental systems it asks questions about, as Henry Stapp suggests), we appear to favor internalism over externalism. What would an externalist variant look like? Another question: How exactly would experimental results—for example, that simple enough systems with maximal Φ remain in coherent superposition—constrain our theoretical options? If to accommodate this we have to impose an experimentally determined threshold for the minimal absolute Φ for consciousness, will that mean that on the physicalist version of the view, the property we privilege for superposition-resistance is just an arbitrary collection of atoms?In chapter 2, Elias Okon and Miguel Angel Sebastian defend a consciousness-collapse theory that they call the Subjective-Objective collapse model. Like Chalmers and McQueen, Okon and Sebastian invoke a Pearle-style continuous collapse dynamics and think of consciousness as only weakly superposition-resistant. A key contribution is the treatment of a worry about multiple realizability (i.e., the way that some property of biological neurons and some other property of artificial neurons might both realize the state of being in pain). The problem is that it is not straightforward to define Hermitian operators whose eigenstates are disjunctions of the eigenstates of other Hermitian operators: you must ensure orthogonality (“being red or being a circle” is not orthogonal to “being red or being square”). In answer, the authors point out that we don’t need each multiply realizable phenomenal state to be an eigenstate of our collapse operator; it suffices that each way of realizing each phenomenal state is an eigenstate. One question is whether this problematizes the dancing qualia argument. A second worry is that we still must find a suitable basis for Hilbert space. But theories of consciousness may constrain both position and momentum: for example, both distances between neurons and how energy is transferred. We can talk about wave packets, but these will not get us eigenstates of a Hermitian operator.In chapter 3, J. Acacio de Barros and Carlos Montemayor suggest that if a mentality-triggered collapse theory is what you want, you should opt for intentionality rather than phenomenality. This is because, first, we have evidence from psychophysics that there is unconscious perception. Second, the first-personal data that motivate collapse theory concern intentionality: we remember only recording definite values; our decisions about what to measure affect the outcomes we see. First question: Can the reasons we have for thinking that there is unconscious intentionality extend into a case for unconscious primitive intentionality? Another question is how the proposal here would differ from Stapp’s treatment of what questions a mind asks of the universe. A third is how we contend with Quantum Zeno, the effect that forces both Chalmers-McQueen and Okon-Angel Sebastian to say that consciousness is only weakly superposition-resistant. Those authors note the possibility that the relevant superposed states of consciousness might overflow access consciousness (in Ned Block’s sense). We may have an easier time ensuring that access conscious states only rarely enter into superposition, if we set them back from our front line of superposition-resistant states.In chapter 4, Adrian Kent explores objective collapse theories—mass-dependent continuous spontaneous localization models. Consciousness may not be in the spotlight on these theories, but they should at least ensure that collapse happens faster than the time it takes for a stimulus (e.g., a system of several photons) to make it from a retinal impact to consciousness. Angelo Bassi, Dirk-André Deckert, and Luca Ferialdi (2010) argue that for a range of theories this constraint is respected, with collapse for a system of several photos happening at around 100 ms. Kent problematizes their argument, showing that their estimation may be off by an order of magnitude or more. Kent’s point is compelling: more work is needed to refine the estimate and to conceptually clarify the import of the constraints from perception.Part 2 consists of eight essays on various ways that consciousness might figure in or constrain quantum theories. In chapter 5, Phillip Goff argues that 3N-dimensional wave function monism cannot accommodate ground truths about consciousness, pressing on worries that the view imposes too few structural constraints to allow for the unambiguous recovery of ordinary 3D reality. While I agree that wave function monistic accounts of ordinary reality (e.g., Albert’s functionalism or Ney’s priority monism) yield an explanatory gap (even given the 3D-ish structure of GRW jumps), I was puzzled here. All type-B physicalists confront an explanatory gap where consciousness is concerned. Isn’t this a point in support of wave function monism, since it amounts to a companions-in-guilt argument against opposition from other type-B materialists?In chapter 6, Peter Lewis raises some sensible worries about the use of phenomenal consciousness as an unanalyzed primitive or special case in quantum theory. He objects to the suggestion made by some Bohmians that we can be directly aware of the particles in our brains. Another target is John von Neumann, who appeals to intuitions about psychophysical connections to justify a collapse hypothesis. These are nice points: I would be curious to know whether Lewis thinks they apply to the justifications for mentalistic collapse theories from part 1.In chapter 7, Jenann Ismael first argues that the hard problem of consciousness is of no concern to physics per se: “If consciousness enters the problem space of physics, it does so by making a difference to the behavior of physical objects.” She then offers some clarifying remarks about how we might reconcile Van Gelder-style dynamicist conceptions of mentality with (virtual) machine functionalism. I find much to agree with here, though I do wonder how strictly to take Ismael’s claims about the irrelevance of the hard problem. If there is a tie between two theories of physics over predictive accuracy, elegance, and naturalness, but one yields a more satisfying analysis of consciousness than the other, are we not even allowed to treat that as a tie-breaker?In chapter 8, Shan Gao defends a mentalistic characterization of the measurement problem in reply to Andrea Oldofredi (2019). The question is whether the key premise of the measurement problem should be that measurements take on definite values or only that we (definitely) experience them as taking on definite values. Of course, our reasons for thinking that they do arise from our seeing or remembering that they do, but we can distinguish between the claim and our evidence for it. Gao argues that the underlying mentalistic claims are more inextricable from the dilemma than that. Many dilemmas involve premises for which the evidence is perceptual, though they make no mention of perception. Here, however, solutions to the problem require special attention to the nature of that evidence.In chapter 9, Paul Skokowski illustrates one reason that we must pay special attention to the nature of that evidence. Jeffrey A. Barrett’s (1999) bare theory is a minimalistic reading of Everett on which measurement outcomes are only definite if they obtain on all branches. One question is whether this means that observers have blatantly false disjunctive beliefs: let someone measure an electron’s spin and then ask, Do you believe that you got a definite measurement outcome, either “UP” or “DOWN”? The observer will say yes, because on each branch they saw one and not the other. However, by the lights of the theory, this disjunctive belief is false. Skokowski’s insight is that while the observer definitely says yes, it does not follow (by the lights of the bare theory) that the observer has a (definite) false belief, since the neural realizer for the disjunctive belief will be different on each branch and therefore not correspond to a common eigenstate (compare the worry from chapter 2 about multiple realizability). But isn’t this just to move from the frying pan to the fire, as it seems now that our observer has no (definite) beliefs at all?In chapter 10, Michael Silberstein and W. M. Stuckey advocate for a psi-epistemicist perspective that vindicates many phenomenological intuitions, including the one that experimental outcomes are definite (and intersubjectively consistent). The approach requires that we rethink naïve realism about the wave function and that we rethink mind-body duality, in favor of a neutral monist ontology governed by constraints. This is an exciting approach, though I’m not fully clear on how to differentiate neutral monism from its idealist, dual aspect, or panpsychist cousins.In chapter 11, Michael Bitbol suggests a phenomenology-first approach to interpreting quantum mechanics. Bitbol favors a QBist participatory realism, tempered by phenomenology, that could perhaps also be described as neutral monist. He notes that the phenomenology of embodiment (à la Merleau-Ponty) acquaints us with how something can be both active and passive, both minded and incarnate, and he traces the error of believing in a separate, physical world (an error participatory realism corrects) to the tendency of self-separation: the tendency to try to project ourselves beyond ourselves, discussed in Heidegger, Sartre, and Michel Henry. These phenomenological insights are enlightening, though I am still not quite clear on how the underlying (neutral?) ontology works. Who, precisely, are the observers? Do electrons have feelings, or are they just fictions we use to cope with ours?In chapter 12, Lucien Hardy describes an experiment in which humans might be used to determine the settings in a Bell experiment. Hardy suggests that the outcome may be a violation of quantum theory consistent with the Bell inequality. He argues that this result would support (superdeterministic) mind-body dualism and also could serve as a new more objective Turing test. This is a fascinating proposal: it remains only to do the experiment.This brings us to part 3: accounts that move from quantum mechanics to consciousness, rather than conversely. In chapters 13 and 14, Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff give a comprehensive account of the current state of their ORCH-OR theory of quantum collapse and consciousness. Among other things we find here a nice presentation of Goodstein’s theorem as an example of a theorem that is noncomputable but easy enough for humans to understand, and a nice discussion of how retroactivity might equip us with something to say to Benjamin Libet about the role of consciousness in action selection. I’ll note, though, that I asked ChatGPT to explain Goodstein to me and it did a fairly good job, suggesting something like understanding. On Libet, I’m not sure what exactly we need retrocausality for: Why not just content ourselves that awareness of the action plan leaves time for a veto, as Libet and others have suggested?In chapter 15, Basil J. Hiley and Paavo Pylkkänen explore another route to a comprehensive theory of consciousness, drawing from the materials of a theory of quantum reality. Here, that theory is the Bohmian implicate order picture, with special attention to the notion of active information that arises there. This is another approach with neutral monist overtones, but here the wave function of a system behaves something like a customized hylomorphic form for the system while at the same time imbuing it with intentionality. There are interesting claims here about the continuity between life and mind, the unity of consciousness, and protopanpsychism, as well as some speculation of how the theory might align with the various scientific theories of consciousness inspired by psychophysics, like higher-order or global workspace theories.In chapter 16, William Seager offers a helpful discussion of the kinds of intelligibility at issue in these debates, distinguishing between mundane, mathematical, and metaphysical intelligibility, weaving together insights from Leibniz and others to argue that a Bohmian approach offers the best bet for a metaphysically intelligible world view. I sympathize with the positive aspects of his argument, though I think that other papers in this volume showcase the metaphysical intelligibility of rival approaches.Finally, in chapter 17, Lee Smolin describes a completion of quantum mechanics, also echoing Leibniz, which could support a theory of quantum gravity and which offers a new conception of consciousness: the causal theory of views, alongside the principle of precedence. This yields a novel sort of protopanpsychism in which the world is a collection of (background-independent) causal views, where views are conscious when they have a few extra features, including being unprecedented and being maximal. This is an exciting approach. One question is how we reconcile the claim that experiential states are maximal with the (mental) problem of the many, the problem that there are ties between composites (that differ over a stray ion or two) over which has best claim to be me.In closing, this is a fantastic volume. I commend Shan Gao for his editorial work: he would make a wonderful DJ. There are subtle symmetries in the way that each entry segues to the next, and the collection has a remarkable coherence.

The Philosophical Review•Jul 1, 2024•0 citations

The mathematical nature of the universe and consciousness: the universe is a collection of self-driven mathematical entities; consciousness is the use of mathematical models by a Turing machine

Xiaoyang Yu

Humans are limited in what they know by the technical limitation of their cortical language network. A reality is a situation model. The universe is a collection of self-driven mathematical entities. If we are happy to accept randomness, it’s obviously possible that all other so-called “worlds” in the many-worlds interpretation don’t exist objectively. The so-called “physical interaction” (aka objective interaction) among any number of elementary particles is consistent with the so-called “physical law”. From the viewpoint of an imagined external observer (who is located somewhere outside of all worlds), in all worlds, every self-driven elementary particle is changing its state to match its fated state, together form a single fated self-driven state machine; the so-called “subjective reality” (aka the so-called “subjective conscious experience”) is actually the use of a mathematical model (MM) by a Turing machine (TM). The so-called “subjective reality” shouldn’t be able to alter/impact the fated world line of any elementary particle within this world. Except one objective MM which is a fitted MM of the objective reality, every other causality is not an objective MM but a Granger causality, and is an under-fitted MM of the objective reality.

•Feb 3, 2021•0 citations

The Nature of Quantum Reality: Physical Reality as a Creation of Consciousness (Part III)

Steven E. Kaufman

What quantum theory has revealed about the nature of reality has remained hidden in plain sight for almost one-hundred years because what quantum theory has revealed about the nature of reality cannot be comprehended in the context of the materialist model and conception of reality in which science presently operates, which materialist model places physical reality at the center of reality and Consciousness at the periphery, as a secondary or derivative reality. What this work will demonstrate, by explaining the heretofore inexplicable basis of the phenomena that lie at the heart of quantum theory, is that it is Consciousness rather than physical reality that lies at the center of reality, and that it is physical reality rather than Consciousness that is a secondary or derivative reality. Specifically, wave-particle duality, quantum uncertainty, quantum non-locality, the probabilistic nature of the wavefunction, and the collapse of the wavefunction, will all be shown to be phenomena that have as their basis the way in which the fundamental Reality of Consciousness, through relation to Itself, creates what it apprehends as physical reality.One of the most important things the phenomena that lie at the heart of quantum theory will be shown to reveal about the nature of reality is that the nature of physical reality is like that of a reflection, and like a reflection, physical reality is able to obscure from view what is actually there, as long as it is mistaken for what is actually there. Thus, in revealing the reflection-like nature of physical reality, the phenomena that lie at the heart of quantum theory indirectly reveal that what is actually there, underlying the reflection that is physical reality, is the non-physical, non-experiential Reality of Consciousness that is, through relation to Itself, both creating and apprehending experiential reality in general and physical reality in particular. Ultimately, understanding the reflection-like nature of physical reality should make it possible for Individuals to understand that what actually Exists directly where they are, where their physical bodies appear to be, is not different in Nature than what actually Exists everywhere else as well, where the rest of physical reality appears to be, thereby disabusing them of the notion that what they are is a physical reality, while at the same time revealing to them their true Nature as Consciousness, which, through relation to that which is also Consciousness, creates what they, as Individual points of Consciousness, apprehend as experiential reality in general and physical reality in particular.Part III of this series of three articles includes: 3. The nature of the wavefunction; 4. There is no spoon; and 5. The connection between quantum physics and eastern philosophy.

Prespacetime journal•Jun 27, 2014•0 citations
The question of how our perceived reality is constructed and subsequently how our mind has evolved such that we are able to both perceive and subsequently alter our own causality or even our own evolution within this reality has been a long running open question. Referred to as “The Hard Problem”. There have been many theoretical interpretations on the nature of causal self-observance – hereafter referred to as 'consciousness'. The current paper introduces the reader to the indeterminable operator - “The Third State”. The Third State is a term used to describe space itself in relation to the position of all things. As the paper shall show, The Third State is a required omnipresent and universal operator in the otherwise binary realm of data → information. The Third State augments the accepted binary operators to produce the required 'tristate' condition that facilitates the required probabilistic nature of the conscious manifestation. Secondly the Unity Magnitude [Um] scale, which facilitates the bounding of quantum probabilistic memory in a finite model. The paper further introduces the reader to a model and experimental theory that suggests all things we perceive as physical reality can be fabricated from primitive components of data, bits – matter / antimatter / something or nothing. That facilitated by the Third State, our immediate present reality as we experience it and theretofore consciousness is a simultaneous product of the current physical configuration of the frequency stable systems of which we are comprised , interpreted past reality, self-predicted future provided by cyclic frequency stable systems and the immediate physical and sensory state including recursive imagination systems generated by the output of these perturbed frequency stable systems in the cyclic feedback process - ultimately perturbed by, but as one unified with the stochastic processes in relation to the quantum cosmological domain.
Perceived reality is an illusion.We exist in a universal quantum geometrical system that operates because of consciousness, not in isolation from it.Consciousness is not a byproduct of matter.Matter is arguably a by-product of consciousness, as matter is essentially structurally indistinct and far less tangible than what classical, materialist science has led us to believe.Consciousness stimulates excitations and changes in the quantum field; the omnipresent energy baseline field of the universe.This facilitates quantum collapse of probability waveforms that existed in super-position prior to this process.Reality is manifested initially via sound, and secondarily, via light, both of which are fundamentally quantum information data streams that encode holographic, atomic/quantum field geometrical constructs.These encoded quantum/sound/light geometrical formations, are essentially, reality.The classical physical world that we perceive and experience, and the nebulous, nonlinear, and exceptional nature of quantum mechanics, are potentially irreconcilable.Arguably, the only way this is not the case, is if an intermediary processing modality of physics can be found, one that bridges the diametrically opposed features of classical and quantum physics by incorporating and embodying, to varying extents, aspects from both.This research offers an appellation and classification for this third discipline: synthesist mechanics.If synthesist mechanics can be discovered, as our technological measuring capabilities continue to improve, which may render such a discovery possible, the inherent reality of both our perceived, classical reality, and the mechanics of quantum physics, will be affirmed.However, if synthesist mechanics cannot be found, as has proved to be the case thus far, we must accept the logical, deductive revelation this will pose, that ultimately, our perceived reality is nothing more than an interpretative illusion; a cognitive, translational impression that life subconsciously provides itself with in order to foster reflective, spatiotemporal, geometry-based interactions and experiences.This research confirms that we live in a self-rendering, generative illusion, which exists so that individualised shards of consciousness may interact with others.Ultimately, perceived reality is an illusion derived from the constant quantum interpretations that are made by consciousness via the quantum field.This process provides the unified consciousness behind reality with opportunities to experience, acknowledge, actualise, remove, or refine all possible variances of itself.Existence is the quantum dance consciousness performs in the darkness so that it may illuminate itself.
The study of consciousness and subjective experience represents one of the most intricate frontiers in contemporary philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. For decades, dominant paradigms have characterized the mind through two reductive lenses: as a passive receptor of sensory data or as a computational system processing information through fixed algorithmic operations. While useful in specific contexts, these models consistently fail to capture the dynamic, participatory nature of conscious experience—the recursive relationship between awareness and reality construction. Recent theoretical developments challenge these frameworks by integrating diverse conceptual domains: quantum mechanics metaphors, classical mindfulness traditions, and cognitive behavioral theory. These emerging approaches propose a fundamentally transformative role for the observer, suggesting consciousness does not merely witness reality but actively participates in shaping it.
The natural evolution of consciousness in different animal species mandates that conscious experiences are causally potent in order to confer any advantage in the struggle for survival. Any endeavor to construct a physical theory of consciousness based on emergence within the framework of classical physics, however, leads to causally impotent conscious experiences in direct contradiction to evolutionary theory since epiphenomenal consciousness cannot evolve through natural selection. Here, we review recent theoretical advances in describing sentience and free will as fundamental aspects of reality granted by quantum physical laws. Modern quantum information theory considers quantum states as a physical resource that endows quantum systems with the capacity to perform physical tasks that are classically impossible. Reductive identification of conscious experiences with the quantum information comprised in quantum brain states allows for causally potent consciousness that is capable of performing genuine choices for future courses of physical action. The consequent evolution of brain cortical networks contributes to increased computational power, memory capacity, and cognitive intelligence of the living organisms.
This book is a treat, a collection of essays about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics that is guaranteed to move the needle: serious, original, and relatively accessible. The essays develop cutting-edge views by thought-leading authors on questions that matter for the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of mind, and while to follow along you need to know what supervenience is and what an eigenstate is, the majority of essays should be accessible to advanced undergraduates (i.e., those who have taken a rigorous introductory course in quantum mechanics as well as a course or two in the philosophy of mind).Why care about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics? If you are coming from physics, your point of entry is probably the measurement problem. When you let quantum systems evolve according to the Schrödinger equation, they enter into superpositions of mutually incompatible states. How can this be reconciled with the testimony of our senses that such systems are always in one state or the other when we measure them (with a probability distribution given by the Born rule)? This is the measurement problem, and it concerns consciousness because it draws from the testimony of our senses.If you are coming from the philosophy of mind, your primary concern is probably the mind-body problem: the task of accounting for how consciousness arises out of or fits into physical reality. If consciousness is reducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to establish that reduction? If consciousness is irreducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to explain why consciousness exists, or to find some work for it to do in the world? You may also be concerned with the structure and function of consciousness: for example, you may hold that minds can do things that classical digital computers cannot, and take it that we must look to the quantum realm to discover how.If you are not already entrenched, you might just wonder what kind of world we live in. The mechanistic philosophy of centuries past seemed to disenchant the world, rendering it a place of barren corpuscles banging into one another, leaving no room for mind or meaning, except perhaps as patterns in the collisions, or useless epiphenomena. But quantum mechanics and its relativistic generalizations force a rethinking of the mechanistic picture from the ground up. Once the dust has settled—if it ever does—we may find reasons to relegate consciousness once again to the shadows. But we may also find reasons to give it pride of place. If you are after scientific reasons to reenchant the world, this is a good place to look.The entries in this volume address these questions and others besides. The volume is organized into three parts. The first part contains four essays about the idea that consciousness causes (or constrains) quantum collapse. The second part contains eight essays discussing other ways that consciousness might contribute to theories of quantum mechanics. The third part contains five essays about how quantum mechanics might contribute to an ultimate theory of consciousness. I’ll follow the book’s order.In chapter 1, David Chalmers and Kelvin McQueen develop a new consciousness-triggered collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics. On their approach, consciousness has a strict physical correlate (perhaps given by quantum integrated information theory), it is approximately superposition-resistant, and collapse dynamics are continuous (à la Philip Pearle). They respond to the standard objections that a consciousness-collapse link makes the collapse mechanism imprecise and requires dualism, as well as to worries about Quantum Zeno, among others. Crucially, their approach allows that superpositions of consciousness are possible: their motivation is to give the view a run for its money and to find work for consciousness to do in the universe, not to rid the world of all traces of superposed consciousness. One question: In taking consciousness itself to be superposition-resistant (rather than the environmental systems it asks questions about, as Henry Stapp suggests), we appear to favor internalism over externalism. What would an externalist variant look like? Another question: How exactly would experimental results—for example, that simple enough systems with maximal Φ remain in coherent superposition—constrain our theoretical options? If to accommodate this we have to impose an experimentally determined threshold for the minimal absolute Φ for consciousness, will that mean that on the physicalist version of the view, the property we privilege for superposition-resistance is just an arbitrary collection of atoms?In chapter 2, Elias Okon and Miguel Angel Sebastian defend a consciousness-collapse theory that they call the Subjective-Objective collapse model. Like Chalmers and McQueen, Okon and Sebastian invoke a Pearle-style continuous collapse dynamics and think of consciousness as only weakly superposition-resistant. A key contribution is the treatment of a worry about multiple realizability (i.e., the way that some property of biological neurons and some other property of artificial neurons might both realize the state of being in pain). The problem is that it is not straightforward to define Hermitian operators whose eigenstates are disjunctions of the eigenstates of other Hermitian operators: you must ensure orthogonality (“being red or being a circle” is not orthogonal to “being red or being square”). In answer, the authors point out that we don’t need each multiply realizable phenomenal state to be an eigenstate of our collapse operator; it suffices that each way of realizing each phenomenal state is an eigenstate. One question is whether this problematizes the dancing qualia argument. A second worry is that we still must find a suitable basis for Hilbert space. But theories of consciousness may constrain both position and momentum: for example, both distances between neurons and how energy is transferred. We can talk about wave packets, but these will not get us eigenstates of a Hermitian operator.In chapter 3, J. Acacio de Barros and Carlos Montemayor suggest that if a mentality-triggered collapse theory is what you want, you should opt for intentionality rather than phenomenality. This is because, first, we have evidence from psychophysics that there is unconscious perception. Second, the first-personal data that motivate collapse theory concern intentionality: we remember only recording definite values; our decisions about what to measure affect the outcomes we see. First question: Can the reasons we have for thinking that there is unconscious intentionality extend into a case for unconscious primitive intentionality? Another question is how the proposal here would differ from Stapp’s treatment of what questions a mind asks of the universe. A third is how we contend with Quantum Zeno, the effect that forces both Chalmers-McQueen and Okon-Angel Sebastian to say that consciousness is only weakly superposition-resistant. Those authors note the possibility that the relevant superposed states of consciousness might overflow access consciousness (in Ned Block’s sense). We may have an easier time ensuring that access conscious states only rarely enter into superposition, if we set them back from our front line of superposition-resistant states.In chapter 4, Adrian Kent explores objective collapse theories—mass-dependent continuous spontaneous localization models. Consciousness may not be in the spotlight on these theories, but they should at least ensure that collapse happens faster than the time it takes for a stimulus (e.g., a system of several photons) to make it from a retinal impact to consciousness. Angelo Bassi, Dirk-André Deckert, and Luca Ferialdi (2010) argue that for a range of theories this constraint is respected, with collapse for a system of several photos happening at around 100 ms. Kent problematizes their argument, showing that their estimation may be off by an order of magnitude or more. Kent’s point is compelling: more work is needed to refine the estimate and to conceptually clarify the import of the constraints from perception.Part 2 consists of eight essays on various ways that consciousness might figure in or constrain quantum theories. In chapter 5, Phillip Goff argues that 3N-dimensional wave function monism cannot accommodate ground truths about consciousness, pressing on worries that the view imposes too few structural constraints to allow for the unambiguous recovery of ordinary 3D reality. While I agree that wave function monistic accounts of ordinary reality (e.g., Albert’s functionalism or Ney’s priority monism) yield an explanatory gap (even given the 3D-ish structure of GRW jumps), I was puzzled here. All type-B physicalists confront an explanatory gap where consciousness is concerned. Isn’t this a point in support of wave function monism, since it amounts to a companions-in-guilt argument against opposition from other type-B materialists?In chapter 6, Peter Lewis raises some sensible worries about the use of phenomenal consciousness as an unanalyzed primitive or special case in quantum theory. He objects to the suggestion made by some Bohmians that we can be directly aware of the particles in our brains. Another target is John von Neumann, who appeals to intuitions about psychophysical connections to justify a collapse hypothesis. These are nice points: I would be curious to know whether Lewis thinks they apply to the justifications for mentalistic collapse theories from part 1.In chapter 7, Jenann Ismael first argues that the hard problem of consciousness is of no concern to physics per se: “If consciousness enters the problem space of physics, it does so by making a difference to the behavior of physical objects.” She then offers some clarifying remarks about how we might reconcile Van Gelder-style dynamicist conceptions of mentality with (virtual) machine functionalism. I find much to agree with here, though I do wonder how strictly to take Ismael’s claims about the irrelevance of the hard problem. If there is a tie between two theories of physics over predictive accuracy, elegance, and naturalness, but one yields a more satisfying analysis of consciousness than the other, are we not even allowed to treat that as a tie-breaker?In chapter 8, Shan Gao defends a mentalistic characterization of the measurement problem in reply to Andrea Oldofredi (2019). The question is whether the key premise of the measurement problem should be that measurements take on definite values or only that we (definitely) experience them as taking on definite values. Of course, our reasons for thinking that they do arise from our seeing or remembering that they do, but we can distinguish between the claim and our evidence for it. Gao argues that the underlying mentalistic claims are more inextricable from the dilemma than that. Many dilemmas involve premises for which the evidence is perceptual, though they make no mention of perception. Here, however, solutions to the problem require special attention to the nature of that evidence.In chapter 9, Paul Skokowski illustrates one reason that we must pay special attention to the nature of that evidence. Jeffrey A. Barrett’s (1999) bare theory is a minimalistic reading of Everett on which measurement outcomes are only definite if they obtain on all branches. One question is whether this means that observers have blatantly false disjunctive beliefs: let someone measure an electron’s spin and then ask, Do you believe that you got a definite measurement outcome, either “UP” or “DOWN”? The observer will say yes, because on each branch they saw one and not the other. However, by the lights of the theory, this disjunctive belief is false. Skokowski’s insight is that while the observer definitely says yes, it does not follow (by the lights of the bare theory) that the observer has a (definite) false belief, since the neural realizer for the disjunctive belief will be different on each branch and therefore not correspond to a common eigenstate (compare the worry from chapter 2 about multiple realizability). But isn’t this just to move from the frying pan to the fire, as it seems now that our observer has no (definite) beliefs at all?In chapter 10, Michael Silberstein and W. M. Stuckey advocate for a psi-epistemicist perspective that vindicates many phenomenological intuitions, including the one that experimental outcomes are definite (and intersubjectively consistent). The approach requires that we rethink naïve realism about the wave function and that we rethink mind-body duality, in favor of a neutral monist ontology governed by constraints. This is an exciting approach, though I’m not fully clear on how to differentiate neutral monism from its idealist, dual aspect, or panpsychist cousins.In chapter 11, Michael Bitbol suggests a phenomenology-first approach to interpreting quantum mechanics. Bitbol favors a QBist participatory realism, tempered by phenomenology, that could perhaps also be described as neutral monist. He notes that the phenomenology of embodiment (à la Merleau-Ponty) acquaints us with how something can be both active and passive, both minded and incarnate, and he traces the error of believing in a separate, physical world (an error participatory realism corrects) to the tendency of self-separation: the tendency to try to project ourselves beyond ourselves, discussed in Heidegger, Sartre, and Michel Henry. These phenomenological insights are enlightening, though I am still not quite clear on how the underlying (neutral?) ontology works. Who, precisely, are the observers? Do electrons have feelings, or are they just fictions we use to cope with ours?In chapter 12, Lucien Hardy describes an experiment in which humans might be used to determine the settings in a Bell experiment. Hardy suggests that the outcome may be a violation of quantum theory consistent with the Bell inequality. He argues that this result would support (superdeterministic) mind-body dualism and also could serve as a new more objective Turing test. This is a fascinating proposal: it remains only to do the experiment.This brings us to part 3: accounts that move from quantum mechanics to consciousness, rather than conversely. In chapters 13 and 14, Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff give a comprehensive account of the current state of their ORCH-OR theory of quantum collapse and consciousness. Among other things we find here a nice presentation of Goodstein’s theorem as an example of a theorem that is noncomputable but easy enough for humans to understand, and a nice discussion of how retroactivity might equip us with something to say to Benjamin Libet about the role of consciousness in action selection. I’ll note, though, that I asked ChatGPT to explain Goodstein to me and it did a fairly good job, suggesting something like understanding. On Libet, I’m not sure what exactly we need retrocausality for: Why not just content ourselves that awareness of the action plan leaves time for a veto, as Libet and others have suggested?In chapter 15, Basil J. Hiley and Paavo Pylkkänen explore another route to a comprehensive theory of consciousness, drawing from the materials of a theory of quantum reality. Here, that theory is the Bohmian implicate order picture, with special attention to the notion of active information that arises there. This is another approach with neutral monist overtones, but here the wave function of a system behaves something like a customized hylomorphic form for the system while at the same time imbuing it with intentionality. There are interesting claims here about the continuity between life and mind, the unity of consciousness, and protopanpsychism, as well as some speculation of how the theory might align with the various scientific theories of consciousness inspired by psychophysics, like higher-order or global workspace theories.In chapter 16, William Seager offers a helpful discussion of the kinds of intelligibility at issue in these debates, distinguishing between mundane, mathematical, and metaphysical intelligibility, weaving together insights from Leibniz and others to argue that a Bohmian approach offers the best bet for a metaphysically intelligible world view. I sympathize with the positive aspects of his argument, though I think that other papers in this volume showcase the metaphysical intelligibility of rival approaches.Finally, in chapter 17, Lee Smolin describes a completion of quantum mechanics, also echoing Leibniz, which could support a theory of quantum gravity and which offers a new conception of consciousness: the causal theory of views, alongside the principle of precedence. This yields a novel sort of protopanpsychism in which the world is a collection of (background-independent) causal views, where views are conscious when they have a few extra features, including being unprecedented and being maximal. This is an exciting approach. One question is how we reconcile the claim that experiential states are maximal with the (mental) problem of the many, the problem that there are ties between composites (that differ over a stray ion or two) over which has best claim to be me.In closing, this is a fantastic volume. I commend Shan Gao for his editorial work: he would make a wonderful DJ. There are subtle symmetries in the way that each entry segues to the next, and the collection has a remarkable coherence.
Humans are limited in what they know by the technical limitation of their cortical language network. A reality is a situation model. The universe is a collection of self-driven mathematical entities. If we are happy to accept randomness, it’s obviously possible that all other so-called “worlds” in the many-worlds interpretation don’t exist objectively. The so-called “physical interaction” (aka objective interaction) among any number of elementary particles is consistent with the so-called “physical law”. From the viewpoint of an imagined external observer (who is located somewhere outside of all worlds), in all worlds, every self-driven elementary particle is changing its state to match its fated state, together form a single fated self-driven state machine; the so-called “subjective reality” (aka the so-called “subjective conscious experience”) is actually the use of a mathematical model (MM) by a Turing machine (TM). The so-called “subjective reality” shouldn’t be able to alter/impact the fated world line of any elementary particle within this world. Except one objective MM which is a fitted MM of the objective reality, every other causality is not an objective MM but a Granger causality, and is an under-fitted MM of the objective reality.
What quantum theory has revealed about the nature of reality has remained hidden in plain sight for almost one-hundred years because what quantum theory has revealed about the nature of reality cannot be comprehended in the context of the materialist model and conception of reality in which science presently operates, which materialist model places physical reality at the center of reality and Consciousness at the periphery, as a secondary or derivative reality. What this work will demonstrate, by explaining the heretofore inexplicable basis of the phenomena that lie at the heart of quantum theory, is that it is Consciousness rather than physical reality that lies at the center of reality, and that it is physical reality rather than Consciousness that is a secondary or derivative reality. Specifically, wave-particle duality, quantum uncertainty, quantum non-locality, the probabilistic nature of the wavefunction, and the collapse of the wavefunction, will all be shown to be phenomena that have as their basis the way in which the fundamental Reality of Consciousness, through relation to Itself, creates what it apprehends as physical reality.One of the most important things the phenomena that lie at the heart of quantum theory will be shown to reveal about the nature of reality is that the nature of physical reality is like that of a reflection, and like a reflection, physical reality is able to obscure from view what is actually there, as long as it is mistaken for what is actually there. Thus, in revealing the reflection-like nature of physical reality, the phenomena that lie at the heart of quantum theory indirectly reveal that what is actually there, underlying the reflection that is physical reality, is the non-physical, non-experiential Reality of Consciousness that is, through relation to Itself, both creating and apprehending experiential reality in general and physical reality in particular. Ultimately, understanding the reflection-like nature of physical reality should make it possible for Individuals to understand that what actually Exists directly where they are, where their physical bodies appear to be, is not different in Nature than what actually Exists everywhere else as well, where the rest of physical reality appears to be, thereby disabusing them of the notion that what they are is a physical reality, while at the same time revealing to them their true Nature as Consciousness, which, through relation to that which is also Consciousness, creates what they, as Individual points of Consciousness, apprehend as experiential reality in general and physical reality in particular.Part III of this series of three articles includes: 3. The nature of the wavefunction; 4. There is no spoon; and 5. The connection between quantum physics and eastern philosophy.