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Lecture Notes on Software Engineering

An Authenticated Key Exchange with Perfect Forward Secrecy for Two Message Diffie-Hellman Type Protocols

Tribid Debbarma, Anupam Jamatia, Kunal Chakma

Published Nov 13, 2014• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.7763/lnse.2015.v3.213

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This paper implements the concepts of perfect forward secrecy and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using EPR pairs to establish and share a secret key between two non-authenticated parties and transfer messages between them without the risk of compromise. Current implementations of quantum cryptography are based on the BB84 protocol, which is susceptible to siphoning attacks on the multiple photons emitted by practical laser sources. This makes BB84-based quantum cryptography protocol unsuitable for network computing environments. Diffie-Hellman does not require the two parties to be mutually authenticated to each other, yet it can provide a basis for a number of authenticated protocols, most notably the concept of perfect forward secrecy. The work proposed in this paper provides a new direction in utilizing quantum EPR pairs in quantum key exchange. Although, classical cryptography boasts of efficient and robust protocols like the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, in the current times, with the advent of quantum computing they are very much vulnerable to eavesdropping and cryptanalytic attacks. Using quantum cryptographic principles, however, these classical encryption algorithms show more promise and a more robust and secure structure for applications. The unique properties of quantum EPR pairs also, on the other hand, go a long way in removing attacks like eavesdropping by their inherent nature of one particle of the pair losing its state if a measurement occurs on the other. The concept of perfect forward secrecy is revisited in this paper to attribute tighter security to the proposed protocol.
Abstract We examine the recently introduced CF and CF‐perfect forward secrecy (PFS) models for two‐message authenticated key exchange (TMAKE) by Cremers et al., where the difference between CF and CF‐PFS model is that the CF formulates the weak PFS (wPFS), whereas the CF‐PFS formulates the PFS. The CF model is claimed by Cremers et al. to be strictly stronger the previous extended Canetti‐Krawczyk (eCK) model. However, we notice that the implication relations among CF, CF‐PFS, eCK and eCK‐PFS model have not been completely studied. Based on TMAKE, we particularly show that CF model and eCK model imply each other under random oracle model. Moreover, we provide a new result on the generic security strengthening transformation (compiler) for building CF‐PFS‐secure TMAKE protocols. In contrast to a previous work, we show that it is possible to apply the transformation to all CF‐secure AKE protocols including all eCK‐secure TMAKE protocols in the random oracle model, without restricting to a small specific class of Diffie–Hellman key based protocols. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.