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Lecture notes in computer science

An authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol secure against active attacks

Shoichi Hirose, Susumu Yoshida

Published Jan 1, 1998• 18 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bfb0054020

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An authenticated key agreement protocol for cross-domain based on heterogeneous signcryption scheme

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In this paper, we present a new efficient authenticated key agreement protocol. Compared with other cross-domain protocols which are all in the same cryptosystem, our protocol is innovatively designed to shift between the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and the Identity-based Cryptosystem (IBC). This protocol combined with heterogeneous signcryption method is proved to satisfy confidentiality and unforgeability on the basis of the assumptions of Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP) and Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDHP) in the authentication phases, and it simultaneously guarantees the ciphertext anonymity. In addition, it can efficiently resist kinds of active attacks such as known-session key attack, key forge attack, and known-temporary secret key attack. Compared with other two-party authenticated key agreement protocols, the newly proposed key agreement protocol has better security, practicability and efficiency.

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TOPAS

Sven Schäge

We present TOPAS (Transmission Optimal Protocol with Active Security), the first key agreement protocol with optimal communication complexity that provides security against fully active adversaries. This solves a longstanding open problem. The size of the protocol messages (approx. 160 bits for 80-bit security) and the computational costs to generate them are comparable to the basic Diffie-Hellman protocol over elliptic curves (which is well-known to only provide security against passive adversaries). Session keys are indistinguishable from random keys - even under reflection and key compromise impersonation attacks - under generalizations of TOPAS stand out is that it also features a security proof of full perfect forward secrecy (PFS), where the attacker can actively modify messages sent to or from the test-session. The proof of full PFS relies on two new extraction-based security assumptions. It is well-known that existing implicitly-authenticated 2-message protocols like HMQV cannot achieve this strong form of (full) security against active attackers (Krawczyk, Crypto'05). We also present a variant of our protocol, TOPAS+, which, under the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption, provides better computational efficiency in the key derivation phase.

ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)•Oct 6, 2015•9 citations
In this paper, we present a new efficient authenticated key agreement protocol. Compared with other cross-domain protocols which are all in the same cryptosystem, our protocol is innovatively designed to shift between the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and the Identity-based Cryptosystem (IBC). This protocol combined with heterogeneous signcryption method is proved to satisfy confidentiality and unforgeability on the basis of the assumptions of Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP) and Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDHP) in the authentication phases, and it simultaneously guarantees the ciphertext anonymity. In addition, it can efficiently resist kinds of active attacks such as known-session key attack, key forge attack, and known-temporary secret key attack. Compared with other two-party authenticated key agreement protocols, the newly proposed key agreement protocol has better security, practicability and efficiency.
A recently proposed authenticated key agreement protocol is shown to be insecure. In particular, one of the two parties is not authenticated, allowing an active man in the middle opponent to replay old messages. The protocol is essentially an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme, and the lack of authentication allows an attacker to replay old messages and have them accepted. Moreover, if the ephemeral key used to compute a protocol message is ever compromised, then the key established using the replayed message will also be compromised. Fixing the problem is simple - there are many provably secure and standardised protocols which are just as efficient as the flawed scheme.
We present TOPAS (Transmission Optimal Protocol with Active Security), the first key agreement protocol with optimal communication complexity that provides security against fully active adversaries. This solves a longstanding open problem. The size of the protocol messages (approx. 160 bits for 80-bit security) and the computational costs to generate them are comparable to the basic Diffie-Hellman protocol over elliptic curves (which is well-known to only provide security against passive adversaries). Session keys are indistinguishable from random keys - even under reflection and key compromise impersonation attacks - under generalizations of TOPAS stand out is that it also features a security proof of full perfect forward secrecy (PFS), where the attacker can actively modify messages sent to or from the test-session. The proof of full PFS relies on two new extraction-based security assumptions. It is well-known that existing implicitly-authenticated 2-message protocols like HMQV cannot achieve this strong form of (full) security against active attackers (Krawczyk, Crypto'05). We also present a variant of our protocol, TOPAS+, which, under the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption, provides better computational efficiency in the key derivation phase.