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Journal of Discrete Mathematical Sciences and Cryptography

An efficient non-interactive deniable authentication protocol with anonymous sender protection

Shin‐Jia Hwang, Chien-Hung Chao

Published Jun 1, 2010• 7 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Deniable authentication protocols satisfy two basic properties: Deniability and the specifiable receiver properties. However, the deniability also damages the sender right. To protect senders, Hwang and Ma first proposed deniable authentication with anonymous sender protection. The sender’s anonymity is also used to protect the sender’s privacy. To reduce the computation cost, an efficient deniable authentication protocol is proposed. Our new protocol not only achieves the two properties but also provides the protection of sender and receiver to keep the privacy of the sender and receiver. Though the sent message is forgeable by receivers, but the sender can provide evidence to prove the message was really sent by him/her. Due to the efficient performance, our protocol is more practical than the other protocols in the real world.

DOI
10.1080/09720529.2010.10698289

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Deniable authentication protocols satisfy two basic properties: Deniability and the specifiable receiver properties. However, the deniability also damages the sender right. To protect senders, Hwang and Ma first proposed deniable authentication with anonymous sender protection. The sender’s anonymity is also used to protect the sender’s privacy. To reduce the computation cost, an efficient deniable authentication protocol is proposed. Our new protocol not only achieves the two properties but also provides the protection of sender and receiver to keep the privacy of the sender and receiver. Though the sent message is forgeable by receivers, but the sender can provide evidence to prove the message was really sent by him/her. Due to the efficient performance, our protocol is more practical than the other protocols in the real world.
Intended receiver and deniability properties are two basic properties satisfied by deniable authentication protocols. Recently, a deniable authentication protocol with sender protection is proposed to protect the right of the real sender. In other words, the sender can prove that he/she really sent the message to guard against circumvention by some receivers. However, the honest receiver still suffers the circumventing risk due to the senders' deniability. If the sender sent a deniable authenticated message to the innocent receiver and claimed that the message was generated by receivers. Then the receiver has nothing to convince the others that he/she is innocent. To provide fair protection and anonymity both for senders and receivers, a new deniable authentication protocol with anonymous fair protection is proposed.
A deniable authentication protocol should satisfy the property that only the intended receiver authenticates the sender’s identity of received messages. This property is called authentication property. On the other hand, the intended receiver cannot prove the sender’s identity to the third party. The second property is called deniability property. To satisfy deniability property, in most deniable authentication protocols, the receiver is able to forge/modify the received message from the sender. Since the received data is forgeable by the receiver, the sender easily denies that he/she sent the data. Although the sent message is deniable for the sender, the sender still has no evidence to prove that he/she sent the message to prevent the receiver’s circumvention. In this propose, a new property, sender protection, is proposed for the deniable authentication protocol. In a deniable authentication protocol with sender protection, although the sent message is still forgeable by the receiver, the sender can provide an evidence to prove that whether or not the message is really sent from him/her. To protect senders more completely, it is better that the sender is anonymous in a deniable authentication protocol. Therefore, another goal of our research is to design a deniable authentication protocols with anonymous and protected sender.
Many proposed non-interactive deniable authentication protocols providing anonymity assume that the sender and receiver know each other in advance. To protect sensitive transmitted identity data, Hwang and Sung proposed the first non-interactive deniable authentication protocol with message confidentiality, anonymity, and fair protection. However, the underlying assumption of anonymity with Hwang and Sung's protocols is impractical because the sender and receiver are anonymous. Moreover, the message confidentiality of Hwang and Sung's protocol is only indistinguishably secure against chosen plaintext attacks. To remove this inappropriate assumption, this study proposes a non-interactive fair deniable authentication protocol with anonymity and indistinguishable message confidentiality against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. This novel protocol is more suitable for practical application.
Deniable authentication protocol allows a sender to deny his/her involvement after the protocol run and a receiver can identify the true source of a given message.Meanwhile, the receiver has no ability to convince any third party of the fact that the message was sent by the specific sender.However, most of the proposed protocols didn't achieve confidentiality of the transmitted message.But, in some special application scenarios such as e-mail system, electronic voting and Internet negotiations, not only the property of deniable authentication but also message confidentiality are needed.To settle this problem, in this paper, we present a non-interactive identity-based deniable authenticated encryption (IBDAE) scheme using pairings.We give the security model and formal proof of the presented IBDAE scheme in the random oracle model under bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption.
Deniable Authentication protocols allow a Sender to authenticate a message for a Receiver, in a way that the Receiver cannot convince a third party that such authentication (or any authentication) ever took place.We present two new approaches to the problem of deniable authentication. The novelty of our schemes is that they do not require the use of CCA-secure encryption (all previous known solutions did), thus showing a different generic approach to the problem of deniable authentication. This new approach is practically relevant as it leads to more efficient protocols and security reductions.In the process we point out a subtle definitional issue for deniability. In particular we propose the notion of forward deniability, which requires that the authentications remain deniable even if the Sender wants to later prove that she authenticated a message. We show that forward deniability is not implied by the original notion of deniability, by showing some deniable protocols which are not forward deniable. Our new proposals are forward deniable.