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Periodica Polytechnica Social and Management Sciences

TWO NON-KOLMOGOROVIAN GENERALIZATIONS OF REICHENBACH'S COMMON CAUSE DEFINITION

Gábor Szabó

Published Jan 1, 1996• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Given a probabilistic correlation between two events, this correlation might be explained in terms of a common cause. In [1] Reichenbach defines the notion of common cause and shows that the definition is consistent with the explicable correlation, i.e. if two events have a common cause then they do correlate. In this paper we generalize the notion of common cause to Hilbert lattices in two different ways according to the two different definitions of conditional probability in the quantum case, and show that Reichenbach's theorem does not hold in either case. There will be given counter-examples when a common cause 'causes' correlation, anticorrelation and independence, respectively.

Related papers

On Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle and Reichenbach's Notion of Common Cause

Gábor Hofer‐Szabó, Miklós Rédei, László E. Szabó

It is shown that, given any finite set of pairs of random events in a Boolean algebra which are correlated with respect to a fixed probability measure on the algebra, the algebra can be extended in such a way that the extension contains events that can be regarded as common causes of the correlations in the sense of Reichenbach's definition of common cause. It is shown, further, that, given any quantum probability space and any set of commuting events in it which are correlated with respect to a fixed quantum state, the quantum probability space can be extended in such a way that the extension contains common causes of all the selected correlations, where common cause is again taken in the sense of Reichenbachs definition. It is argued that these results very strongly restrict the possible ways of disproving Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle.

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Common-Causes are Not Common Common-Causes

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A condition is formulated in terms of the probabilities of two pairs of correlated events in a classical probability space which is necessary for the two correlations to have a single (Reichenbachian) common-cause and it is shown that there exists pairs of correlated events, probabilities of which violate the necessary condition. It is concluded that different correlations do not in general have a common common-cause. It is also shown that this conclusion remains valid even if one weakens slightly Reichenbach's definition of common-cause. The significance of the difference between common-causes and common common-causes is emphasized from the perspective of Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle.

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Reichenbach's principle asserts that if two observed variables are found to be correlated, then there should be a causal explanation of these correlations.Furthermore, if the explanation is in terms of a common cause, then the conditional probability distribution over the variables given the complete common cause should factorize.The principle is generalized by the formalism of causal models, in which the causal relationships among variables constrain the form of their joint probability distribution.In the quantum case, however, the observed correlations in Bell experiments cannot be explained in the manner Reichenbach's principle would seem to demand.Motivated by this, we introduce a quantum counterpart to the principle.We demonstrate that under the assumption that quantum dynamics is fundamentally unitary, if a quantum channel with input A and outputs B and C is compatible with A being a complete common cause of B and C, then it must factorize in a particular way.Finally, we show how to generalize our quantum version of Reichenbach's principle to a formalism for quantum causal models and provide examples of how the formalism works.

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REICHENBACH'S COMMON CAUSE PRINCIPLE AND QUANTUM CORRELATIONS

Miklós Rédel

Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle is the claim that if two events are correlated, then either there is a causal connection between the correlated events that is responsible for the correlation or there is a third event, a so called (Reichenbachian) common cause, which brings about the correlation. The paper reviews some results concerning Reichenbach's notion of common cause, results that are directly relevant to the problem of how one can falsifY Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle. Special emphasis will be put on the question of whether EPR-type correlations can have an explanation in terms of Reichenbachian common causes. Most of the results to be recalled indicate that falsifYing Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle is much more tricky than one may have thought and that, contrary to some claims in the literature, there is no conclusive proof yet that the EPR correlations predicted by ordinary, non-relativistic quantum mechanics cannot have a common cause; furthermore, recent results about possible Reichenbachian common causes of correlations predicted by quantum field states between spacelike separated local observable algebras in algebraic quantum field theory strongly indicate that there may very well exist Reichenbachian common causes of superluminal correlations predicted by quantum field theory.

•Jan 1, 2011•1 citation

Introduction and overview

Gábor Hofer‐Szabó, Miklós Rédei, László E. Szabó

No correlation without causation. This is, in its most compact and general formulation, the essence of what has become Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle . More explicitly, the Common Cause Principle says that every correlation is either due to a direct causal effect linking the correlated entities, or is brought about by a third factor, a so-called Reichenbachian common cause that stands in a well-defined probabilistic relation to the correlated events, a relation that explains the correlation in the sense of entailing it. The Common Cause Principle is a nontrivial metaphysical claim about the causal structure of the World and entails that all correlations can (hence, should) be explained causally either by pointing at a causal connection between the correlated entities or by displaying a common cause of the correlation. Thus, the Common Cause Principle licenses one to infer causal connections from probabilistic relations; at the same time the principle does not address whether the causal connection holds between the correlated entities or between the common cause and the elements in the correlation. While the technically explicit notion of common cause of a probabilistic correlation within the framework of classical Kolmogorovian probability theory is due to Reichenbach (1956), the Common Cause Principle was articulated explicitly only later, especially in the works by W. Salmon (see the “Notes and bibliographic remarks” to Chapter 2). The chief aim of this book is to investigate the Common Cause Principle; in particular, the problem of to what extent the Common Cause Principle can explain probabilistic correlations.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•May 16, 2013•0 citations

Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle and EPR correlations

Gábor Hofer‐Szabó, Miklós Rédei, László E. Szabó

Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) correlations Explaining the correlations predicted by quantum mechanics in the case of joint quantum systems of the EPR type has proved to be a major challenge for the Common Cause Principle. The EPR correlations have been confirmed by a large number of sophisticated experiments carried out since the early 1980s, and, since quantum theory does not give us any hints as to where to look for possible common causes that could explain the correlations in question, the suspicion arose that common causes of EPR correlations might not exist at all. If this were indeed the case, then the EPR correlations would constitute strong empirical evidence against Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle. But how could this be possible in view of the results presented in the previous chapters? As we have seen (Chapter 3), every common cause incomplete probability space is common cause extendible (even strongly common cause extendible with respect to any finite set of correlations; Proposition 3.9); therefore every correlation can, in principle, be explained by a (possibly hidden) common cause, including the (finite number of) EPR correlations. Could the EPR correlations (not) be explained by referring to such hidden common causes? To answer this question, one has to realize first that it is not quite obvious how to link the Common Cause Principle to quantum mechanics because Reichenbach's notion of common cause was defined in terms of classical probability theory (Chapter 2), not in terms of quantum probability theory.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•May 16, 2013•0 citations
Given a probabilistic correlation between two events, this correlation might be explained in terms of a common cause. In [1] Reichenbach defines the notion of common cause and shows that the definition is consistent with the explicable correlation, i.e. if two events have a common cause then they do correlate. In this paper we generalize the notion of common cause to Hilbert lattices in two different ways according to the two different definitions of conditional probability in the quantum case, and show that Reichenbach's theorem does not hold in either case. There will be given counter-examples when a common cause 'causes' correlation, anticorrelation and independence, respectively.
It is shown that, given any finite set of pairs of random events in a Boolean algebra which are correlated with respect to a fixed probability measure on the algebra, the algebra can be extended in such a way that the extension contains events that can be regarded as common causes of the correlations in the sense of Reichenbach's definition of common cause. It is shown, further, that, given any quantum probability space and any set of commuting events in it which are correlated with respect to a fixed quantum state, the quantum probability space can be extended in such a way that the extension contains common causes of all the selected correlations, where common cause is again taken in the sense of Reichenbachs definition. It is argued that these results very strongly restrict the possible ways of disproving Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle.
A condition is formulated in terms of the probabilities of two pairs of correlated events in a classical probability space which is necessary for the two correlations to have a single (Reichenbachian) common-cause and it is shown that there exists pairs of correlated events, probabilities of which violate the necessary condition. It is concluded that different correlations do not in general have a common common-cause. It is also shown that this conclusion remains valid even if one weakens slightly Reichenbach's definition of common-cause. The significance of the difference between common-causes and common common-causes is emphasized from the perspective of Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle.
Reichenbach's principle asserts that if two observed variables are found to be correlated, then there should be a causal explanation of these correlations.Furthermore, if the explanation is in terms of a common cause, then the conditional probability distribution over the variables given the complete common cause should factorize.The principle is generalized by the formalism of causal models, in which the causal relationships among variables constrain the form of their joint probability distribution.In the quantum case, however, the observed correlations in Bell experiments cannot be explained in the manner Reichenbach's principle would seem to demand.Motivated by this, we introduce a quantum counterpart to the principle.We demonstrate that under the assumption that quantum dynamics is fundamentally unitary, if a quantum channel with input A and outputs B and C is compatible with A being a complete common cause of B and C, then it must factorize in a particular way.Finally, we show how to generalize our quantum version of Reichenbach's principle to a formalism for quantum causal models and provide examples of how the formalism works.
Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle is the claim that if two events are correlated, then either there is a causal connection between the correlated events that is responsible for the correlation or there is a third event, a so called (Reichenbachian) common cause, which brings about the correlation. The paper reviews some results concerning Reichenbach's notion of common cause, results that are directly relevant to the problem of how one can falsifY Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle. Special emphasis will be put on the question of whether EPR-type correlations can have an explanation in terms of Reichenbachian common causes. Most of the results to be recalled indicate that falsifYing Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle is much more tricky than one may have thought and that, contrary to some claims in the literature, there is no conclusive proof yet that the EPR correlations predicted by ordinary, non-relativistic quantum mechanics cannot have a common cause; furthermore, recent results about possible Reichenbachian common causes of correlations predicted by quantum field states between spacelike separated local observable algebras in algebraic quantum field theory strongly indicate that there may very well exist Reichenbachian common causes of superluminal correlations predicted by quantum field theory.
No correlation without causation. This is, in its most compact and general formulation, the essence of what has become Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle . More explicitly, the Common Cause Principle says that every correlation is either due to a direct causal effect linking the correlated entities, or is brought about by a third factor, a so-called Reichenbachian common cause that stands in a well-defined probabilistic relation to the correlated events, a relation that explains the correlation in the sense of entailing it. The Common Cause Principle is a nontrivial metaphysical claim about the causal structure of the World and entails that all correlations can (hence, should) be explained causally either by pointing at a causal connection between the correlated entities or by displaying a common cause of the correlation. Thus, the Common Cause Principle licenses one to infer causal connections from probabilistic relations; at the same time the principle does not address whether the causal connection holds between the correlated entities or between the common cause and the elements in the correlation. While the technically explicit notion of common cause of a probabilistic correlation within the framework of classical Kolmogorovian probability theory is due to Reichenbach (1956), the Common Cause Principle was articulated explicitly only later, especially in the works by W. Salmon (see the “Notes and bibliographic remarks” to Chapter 2). The chief aim of this book is to investigate the Common Cause Principle; in particular, the problem of to what extent the Common Cause Principle can explain probabilistic correlations.
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) correlations Explaining the correlations predicted by quantum mechanics in the case of joint quantum systems of the EPR type has proved to be a major challenge for the Common Cause Principle. The EPR correlations have been confirmed by a large number of sophisticated experiments carried out since the early 1980s, and, since quantum theory does not give us any hints as to where to look for possible common causes that could explain the correlations in question, the suspicion arose that common causes of EPR correlations might not exist at all. If this were indeed the case, then the EPR correlations would constitute strong empirical evidence against Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle. But how could this be possible in view of the results presented in the previous chapters? As we have seen (Chapter 3), every common cause incomplete probability space is common cause extendible (even strongly common cause extendible with respect to any finite set of correlations; Proposition 3.9); therefore every correlation can, in principle, be explained by a (possibly hidden) common cause, including the (finite number of) EPR correlations. Could the EPR correlations (not) be explained by referring to such hidden common causes? To answer this question, one has to realize first that it is not quite obvious how to link the Common Cause Principle to quantum mechanics because Reichenbach's notion of common cause was defined in terms of classical probability theory (Chapter 2), not in terms of quantum probability theory.