We introduce an ontology of objects and events that is particularly well suited for several interpretations of quantum mechanics. It leads to an important revision of the notion of matter and its implications. Within this context one can show that systems in entangled states present emergent new properties and downward causation where certain behavior of parts of the system are only determined by the state of the whole. Interpretations of quantum mechanics that admit such an event ontology solve the problem of emergence.
We introduce an ontology of objects and events that is particularly well suited for several interpretations of quantum mechanics. It leads to an important revision of the notion of matter and its implications. Within this context one can show that systems in entangled states present emergent new properties and downward causation where certain behavior of parts of the system are only determined by the state of the whole. Interpretations of quantum mechanics that admit such an event ontology solve the problem of emergence.
We show that several interpretations of quantum mechanics admit an ontology of objects and events. This ontology reduces the breach between mind and matter. When humans act, their actions do not appear explainable in mechanical terms but through mental activity: motives, desires or needs that propel them to action. These are examples of what in the last few decades have come to be called "downward causation". Basically, downward causation is present when the disposition of the whole to behave in a certain way cannot be predicted from the dispositions of the parts. The event ontology of quantum mechanics allow us to show that systems in entangled states present emergent new properties and downward causation.
Quantum mechanics arguably provides the best evidence we have for strong emergence.Entangled pairs of particles apparently have properties that fail to supervene on the properties of the particles taken individually.But at the same time, quantum mechanics is a terrible place to look for evidence of strong emergence: the interpretation of the theory is so contested that drawing any metaphysical conclusions from it is risky at best.I run through the standard argument for strong emergence based on entanglement, and show how it rests on shaky assumptions concerning the ontology of the quantum world.In particular, I consider two objections: that the argument involves Bell's theorem, whose premises are often rejected, and that the argument rests on a contested account of parts and wholes.I respond to both objections, showing that, with some important caveats, the argument for emergence based on quantum mechanics remains intact.
A potentially new interpretation of quantum mechanics posits the state of the universe as a consistent set of facts, such that the relationships between objects in the universe are the information storing and instantiating those facts. A fact (or event) occurs exactly when the number or density of future possibilities decreases, and a quantum superposition exists if and only if the facts of the universe are consistent with the superposition. An example is analyzed in which the number of possibilities of N distinguishable classical objects in a discretized phase space is reduced by the introduction of chronological facts consisting of repelling impacts. It is shown how some facts have the effect of rendering impossible certain measurement outcomes of an object, independently of measurement outcomes of other objects, while some facts have the effect of correlating measurement outcomes of one object to those of another. The potential for further analysis through numerical simulation is discussed, particularly whether quantum uncertainty emerges from the specification of sufficient facts. Implications of and objections to the interpretation are briefly discussed, including the extent to which identity of objects must be preserved, the extent to which entanglement among objects must be universal, and whether this interpretation conflicts with special relativity. This interpretation may show that quantum mechanics, Planck’s constant, and the discretization of spacetime are emergent phenomena that successfully and very accurately approximate a more fundamental ontology.
Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it.
Quantum theory shows that natural laws cannot be understood as ruling single events since the latter occur randomly. Nevertheless, the physical world shows everywhere order whose source cannot be represented by the latter. It is shown that this order is due to the presence of quantum correlations. Since their e↵ect is to reduce the space of the possible events, they can be considered as causal factors. However, being correlations, they do not display the dynamic character that would be required in order to produce a determinate e↵ect. This is why they need additional local factors in order to concur to the production of a certain event. If not so, this would even imply a violation of Einstein’s locality since correlations could be used by themselves to transmit superluminal signals. Due to such a character of correlation, they can be understood as kind of potential reality needing actual (and local) context to be e↵ective. This allows also a distinction that is classically unknown between locality and globality. Such a distinction solves the important problem of measurement showing that ultimately we have irreversible local processes while globally everything is still reversible. In particular, it is a shift of information that can explain this local phenomenon. In fact, quantum systems are essentially information and also the measurement process is ultimately a dealing with information: information processing (preparing a system), information sharing (coupling a system with an apparatus) and information selection (detecting). State, observable and property appear as equivalence classes of these three procedures, respectively. Finally, the distinction between interpreted and uninterpreted ontology is considered in a Kantian perspective, but it is also shown that the approach supported here is rather a critical realism.
We observe that there exists a presumed ontology, on the basis of which a dynamical theory is formulated. Extracting the essence of the ontology underlying classical mechanics, we revise it suitably to accommodate quantum mechanics seamlessly. The revision goes through two stages: First, we elaborate the concept of “state” as the propensity of an object to arouse events on discerners. Second, we integrate the position and momentum spaces into a single entity, related via the Fourier transform. Based on this revised ontology, quantum mechanics is deduced naturally without relying upon any artificial assumptions like the “quantum condition” or mathematical apparatuses like the Hilbert space and self-adjoint operators. In consequence, such thorny issues as the “measurement problem” are shown to either resolve or simply disappear.