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arXiv:1605.07531

Event ontology in quantum mechanics and downward causation

Rodolfo Gambini, Jorge A. Pullin

Published May 24, 2016• 1 citation
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We show that several interpretations of quantum mechanics admit an ontology of objects and events. This ontology reduces the breach between mind and matter. When humans act, their actions do not appear explainable in mechanical terms but through mental activity: motives, desires or needs that propel them to action. These are examples of what in the last few decades have come to be called "downward causation". Basically, downward causation is present when the disposition of the whole to behave in a certain way cannot be predicted from the dispositions of the parts. The event ontology of quantum mechanics allow us to show that systems in entangled states present emergent new properties and downward causation.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1605.07531

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We show that several interpretations of quantum mechanics admit an ontology of objects and events. This ontology reduces the breach between mind and matter. When humans act, their actions do not appear explainable in mechanical terms but through mental activity: motives, desires or needs that propel them to action. These are examples of what in the last few decades have come to be called "downward causation". Basically, downward causation is present when the disposition of the whole to behave in a certain way cannot be predicted from the dispositions of the parts. The event ontology of quantum mechanics allow us to show that systems in entangled states present emergent new properties and downward causation.
We introduce an ontology of objects and events that is particularly well suited for several interpretations of quantum mechanics. It leads to an important revision of the notion of matter and its implications. Within this context one can show that systems in entangled states present emergent new properties and downward causation where certain behavior of parts of the system are only determined by the state of the whole. Interpretations of quantum mechanics that admit such an event ontology solve the problem of emergence.
Which way does causation proceed? The pattern in the material world seems to be upward: particles to molecules to organisms to brains to mental processes. In contrast, the principles of quantum mechanics allow us to see a pattern of downward causation. These new ideas describe sets of multiple levels in which each level influences the levels below it through generation and selection. Top-down causation makes exciting sense of the world: we can find analogies in psychology, in the formation of our minds, in locating the source of consciousness, and even in the possible logic of belief in God.
Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it.
This chapter focuses specifically on the notion of causation. Unless a causal interpretation can be given of quantum mechanics, there is a fundamental discontinuity between the quantum realm and everything else in the world. The quantum-theoretical dualism of waves and particles makes the same entity appear both as matter and as force. There are of course challenges to other basic ontological categories that come from quantum physics, such as to notions of continuity and identity. Both in philosophy and physics, there is a frequent assumption that causation is the provider or vehicle of determinism, via causal necessitation. The indeterminism of quantum physics leaves people with a more practical concern about causation. A feature of causation that makes predictions fallible is that causal processes are extremely sensitive to a change in context. The genuine interaction of multiple factors should therefore be seen as a symptom of causation rather than as something that needs to be analysed away by theoretical abstraction.
In an event ontology, matter is 'made up of' events. This provides a distinctive foil to the standard view of a quantum state in terms of properties possessed by a system. Here I provide an argument against the standard view and suggest instead a way to conceive of quantum mechanics in terms of probabilities for the occurrence of events localized in space and time. To that end I construct an appropriate probability space for these events and give a way to calculate them as conditional probabilities. I suggest that these probabilities can be usefully thought of as Lewisian objective chances.
Abstract. After some suggestions about how to clarify the confused metaphysical distinctions between dispositional and non-dispositional or categorical properties, I review some of the main interpretations of QM in order to show that – with the relevant exception of Bohm’s minimalist interpretation – quantum ontology is irreducibly dispositional. Such an irreducible character of dispositions must be explained differently in different interpretations, but the reducibility of the contextual properties in the case of Bohmian mechanics is guaranteed by the fact that the positions of particles play the role of the categorical basis, a role that in other interpretations cannot be filled by anything else. In Bohr’s and Everett-type interpretations, dispositionalism is instrumentalism in disguise.