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朝陽學報

Tripartite Key Agreement Protocols and Insider Impersonation Attack

Hung‐Yu Chien, Ru-Yu Lin

Published Jun 1, 2005• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Even though several certificate-based tripartite key agreement protocols with pairings have been proposed, the insider impersonation attack was not noticed. This specific threat applies to those key agreement protocols where there are more than two communicating parties. This paper re-examines the previous protocols. We find that both Shim's scheme and the LHL scheme are not secure. The Shim scheme is weak in key-compromise impersonation attack, insider impersonation attack, and replay attack. The LHL tripartite key scheme is vulnerable to insider attack, outsider impersonation attack, and key-compromise impersonation attack. Furthemore, we propose two approaches to improve the security. Our schemes are more efficient than Al-Riyami-Paterson's tripartite key confirmation protocol, which is the most secure one among the referenced works.

DOI
10.30108/jcut.200506.0009

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Even though several certificate-based tripartite key agreement protocols with pairings have been proposed, the insider impersonation attack was not noticed. This specific threat applies to those key agreement protocols where there are more than two communicating parties. This paper re-examines the previous protocols. We find that both Shim's scheme and the LHL scheme are not secure. The Shim scheme is weak in key-compromise impersonation attack, insider impersonation attack, and replay attack. The LHL tripartite key scheme is vulnerable to insider attack, outsider impersonation attack, and key-compromise impersonation attack. Furthemore, we propose two approaches to improve the security. Our schemes are more efficient than Al-Riyami-Paterson's tripartite key confirmation protocol, which is the most secure one among the referenced works.
Key agreement protocols are essential for secure communications in open and distributed environment. The study of tripartite key agreement has great theoretical and practical significance. Shim and Woo pointed out that the four tripartite authenticated key agreement protocols proposed by Al-Riyami and Paterson were insecure. Modifying the communication messages, an active adversary is able to calculate the session key. Therefore, we propose an improved TAK protocol (TAK-V) resisting all known active attacks. Finally, we analyze the security and computation efficiency.
A key agreement protocol is designed for two or more entities to agree upon a shared secret key, which can subsequently be used to preserve confidentiality and data integrity over an open network. Since Joux has pioneered the notion of pairing-based tripartite key agreement protocol, various group key agreement schemes have been proposed after then. In 2003, Liu et al. proposed a tripartite identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol using bilinear pairings. Although the scheme is claimed to be efficient and secure, we discover that it is in fact breakable. In this paper, we highlight the flaw by demonstrating an insider impersonation attack on the scheme and suggest a few enhancements to conquer the defect.
Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) is a new paradigm in public key cryptography which avoids the inherent key escrow problem of identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and yet requires no certificates to guarantee the authenticity of users' public keys. It was first introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson in 2003. Subsequently, several certificateless two-party key agreement protocols were presented. Unfortunately, some of these protocols are not as secure as they were claimed to be. We will show that some existing certificateless key agreement protocols do not satisfy the requirements of key-compromise impersonation security and known session-specific temporary information security. Further more, we present two improved certificateless authenticated two-party key agreement protocols which possess all security attributes of a key agreement protocol.
A tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol is designed for three entities to communicate securely over an open network particularly with a shared key. Recently, we have improved a one-round tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol proposed by Lin-Li due to its vulnerability to the forging attack in our previous report. However, we have later discovered that both the original Lin-Li's scheme and our previous enhanced protocol are vulnerable to the insider replay attack. Moreover, we have also realized that both protocols have falsely claimed the forward secrecy attribute. In this paper, we will revise our improvements and again secure this protocol against these cryptanalytic attacks while recovering the precious perfect forward secrecy property.
A tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol is designed for three entities to communicate securely over an open network particularly with a shared key. Recently, we have improved a one-round tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol proposed by Lin-Li due to its vulnerability to the forging attack in our previous report. However, we have later discovered that both the original Lin-Li’s scheme and our previous enhanced protocol are vulnerable to the insider replay attack. Moreover, we have also realized that both protocols have falsely claimed the forward secrecy attribute. In this paper, we will revise our improvements and again secure this protocol against these cryptanalytic attacks while recovering the precious perfect forward secrecy property. 1.