Many Worlds Interpretation(MWI)

астрономия Физика

Howard Barnum

This unpublished 1990 preprint argues that a crucial distinction in discussions of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) is that between versions of the interpretation positing a physical multiplicity of worlds, and those in which the multiplicity is merely psychological, and due to the splitting of consciousness upon interaction with amplified quantum superpositions. It is argued that Everett's original version of the MWI belongs to the latter class, and that most of the criticisms leveled against the MWI, in particular that it is illogical or incoherent, are not valid against such "psychological-multiplicity" versions. Attempts to derive the quantum-mechanical probabilities from the many-worlds interpretation are reviewed, and Everett's initial derivation is extended in an attempt to show that these are the unique possible probabilities. But there remains a challenge for proponents of the MWI: to show that their interpretation requires probabilities, rather than merely nonprobabilistic indeterminacy. A 2002 preface, revised in 2004, briefly discusses the extent to which I still agree with the claims in the paper. While its derivation of probabilities used, and failed to justify, noncontextuality, I still agree with the paper's general interpretation of the MWI, though not with the MWI itself.

M. A. B. Whitaker

The basic contributions to the concept of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics are analysed. It is found necessary to divide them into two classes corresponding to (a) the relative-states interpretation (RSI), which avoids problems of measurement, but is found generally unconvincing, and (b) the many-worlds interpretation (MWI), which is more comprehensible, but has all the problems of the von Neumann scheme. The EPR problem is tackled using each interpretation. The RSI finds no problem, while the MWI meets the same difficulties as conventional interpretations.

David Z. Albert, Barry Loewer

Amir Abbass Varshovi

The many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics is studied from an unprecedented ontological perspective based on the reality of (semi-) deterministic parallel worlds in the interpretation. It is demonstrated that with thanks to the uncertainty principle there would be no consistent way to specify the correct ontology of the Universe, hence the MWI is subject to an inherent contradiction which claims that the world where we live in is unreal.