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Acta Physica Sinica

Analysis of differential-phase-shift keying protocol for a two-way quantum-key-distribution system

Rongzhen Jiao, Feng Chen-Xu, 北京邮电大学理学院，北京 100876

Published Jan 1, 2008• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The performance of a two-way quantum-key-distribution (QKD) system are analyzed using the differential-phase-shift keying (DPSK) protocol. The comparison is based on the secure communication rate as a function of distance for three QKD protocols: the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the Bennett-Brassard-Mermin 1992, and the coherent differential-phase-shift keying protocols. We discussed the security of DPSK protocol against any type of individual photon splitting attack and concluded that the simple and efficient DPSK protocol allows for more than 200km of secure communication distance with high communication rates.

DOI
10.7498/aps.57.685

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The performance of a two-way quantum-key-distribution (QKD) system are analyzed using the differential-phase-shift keying (DPSK) protocol. The comparison is based on the secure communication rate as a function of distance for three QKD protocols: the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the Bennett-Brassard-Mermin 1992, and the coherent differential-phase-shift keying protocols. We discussed the security of DPSK protocol against any type of individual photon splitting attack and concluded that the simple and efficient DPSK protocol allows for more than 200km of secure communication distance with high communication rates.
The analysis is based on the error rate and the secure communication rate as functions of distance for three quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocols: the Bennett–Brassard 1984, the Bennett–Brassard–Mermin 1992, and the coherent differential-phase-shift keying (DPSK) protocols. We consider the secure communication rate of the DPSK protocol against an arbitrary individual attack, including the most commonly considered intercept-resend and photon-number splitting attacks, and concluded that the simple and efficient differential-phase-shift-keying protocol allows for more than 200 km of secure communication distance with high communication rates.
We compare the performance of various quantum-key-distribution (QKD) systems using 1550nm up-conversion single-photon detectors. The analysis is based on the error rate and the secure communication rate as a function of distance for three QKD protocols: the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the Beruiett-Brassard-Vlerinin 1992, and the coherent differential-phase-shift keying (DPSK) protocols. We discussed that the security of DPSK protocol against any type of individual photon splitting attack and concluded that the simple and efficient DPSK protocol allows for more than 200km of secure communication distance with high communication rates.
The performance of the differential-phase-shift keying (DPSK) protocol applying a 1310 nm up-conversion single-photon detector is analysed. The error rate and the communication rate as a function of distance for three quantum key distribution protocols, the Bennett–Brassard 1984, the Bennett–Brassard–Mermin 1992, and the DPSK, are presented. Then we compare the performance of these three protocols using the 1310nm up-conversion detector. We draw the conclusion that the DPSK protocol applying the detector has significant advantage over the other two protocols. Longer transmission distance and lower error rate can be achieved.
The properties of 1.55 mum up-conversion single-photon detector are analyzed using the differential-phase-shift keying (DPSK) protocol. We compare the error rate and the communication rate as a function of distance for three quantum key distribution QKD protocols: the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the Bennett-Brassard-Mermin 1992, and the DPSK. We show that the significant advantage of the up-conversion detector than the commonly used InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiode (APD), and the properties of QKD can be greatly improved by using this detector.
A photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack against differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) is described. In the conventional 1984 Bennett-Brassard protocol, using weak laser light, the PNS attacks, which involve installing a lossless transmission line and blocking pulses from which extra photons cannot be picked up, impose a limit on the transmission distance. In contrast, use of a coherent pulse train in DPS QKD prevents the PNS attack and removes the distance limitation imposed by it. We carried out a DPS QKD experiment that simulated the situation where some pulses are blocked. The result showed that extra bit errors are induced in an eavesdropped condition, indicating the robustness of DPS QKD against PNS attacks.
Quantum-key distribution has been studied as an ultimate method for secure communications, and now it is emerging as a technology that can be deployed in real fiber networks. Here, we present our QKD experiments based on the differential- phase-shift QKD protocol. A DPSQKD system has a simple configuration that is easy to implement with conventional optical communication components, and it is suitable for a high-clock rate system. Moreover, although the DPS-QKD system is implemented with an attenuated laser source, it is inherently secure against strong eavesdropping attacks called photon number-splitting attacks, which pose a serious threat to conventional QKD systems with attenuated laser sources. We also describe three types of single-photon detectors that are suitable for high-speed, long-distance QKD: an up-conversion detector, a superconducting single-photon detector, and a sinusoidally gated InGaAs avalanche photodiode. We present our recordsetting QKD experiments that employed those detectors.