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HYLE

Are Orbitals Observable?

Peter Mulder, HYLE Publications

Published Jan 1, 2011• 21 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper I discuss the question whether orbitals can be observed or not. I argue that the answer depends on how the terms ‘orbitals’ and ‘observed’ are understood. The fact that different authors take radically different stances on the issue is caused by their employing different uses of either of the two terms. I furthermore discuss a recent argument by Labarca and Lombardi to the effect that the orbital concept in chemistry is discontinuous with that in quantum mechanics. I argue that, quite to the contrary, there is continuity between the two.

DOI
10.5840/hyle20111712

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In this paper I discuss the question whether orbitals can be observed or not. I argue that the answer depends on how the terms ‘orbitals’ and ‘observed’ are understood. The fact that different authors take radically different stances on the issue is caused by their employing different uses of either of the two terms. I furthermore discuss a recent argument by Labarca and Lombardi to the effect that the orbital concept in chemistry is discontinuous with that in quantum mechanics. I argue that, quite to the contrary, there is continuity between the two.
The main thrust of the paper involves a theoretical and philosophical analysis of the claim made in September 1999 that atomic orbitals have been directly imaged for the first time. After a brief account of the recent claims the paper reviews the development of the orbit and later orbital concepts and analyzes the theoretical status of atomic orbitals. The conclusion is that contrary to these claims, atomic orbitals have not in fact been observed. The non-referring nature of modern atomic orbitals is discussed in the context of Laudan's writings on realism, the success of theories, and whether or not scientific terms refer. I conclude that the failure to observe orbitals is a good prima facie case for divorcing the success of theories from the question of whether their central terms refer. The added relevance of this case is that it concerns a current and highly successful theory. Finally, the relevance of this ‘floating model’ to contemporary discussions on scientific models is briefly considered.
The aim of the present paper is to analyze the problem of the relationship between\nchemistry and physics, by focusing on the widely discussed case of the atomic orbitals.\nWe will begin by remembering the difference between the physical and the chemical interpretation\nof the concept of orbital. Then, we will refer to the claim made in 1999 that\natomic orbitals have been directly imaged for the first time. On this basis, we will analyze\nthe problem from a new approach, by comparing the concept of orbital used in physics with\nthe concept of orbital used in chemistry. Such an analysis will allow us to argue for an ontological\npluralism that admits the coexistence of different ontologies without priorities or\nmetaphysical privileges. From this philosophical framework, the concepts of chemical orbital\nand physical orbital correspond to two different ontologies. As a consequence, chemical orbitals\nare real entities belonging to the ontology of molecular chemistry, and can be observed\nlike any other entity not belonging to the quantum mechanical ontology.
I claim that the question of whether chemistry is reduced to quantum mechanics is more ambiguous and multi-faceted than generally supposed. For example, chemistry appears to be both reduced and not reduced at the same time depending on the perspective that one adopts. Similarly, I argue that some conceptual issues in quantum mechanics are ambiguous and can only be laid to rest by embracing paradox and ambiguity rather than regarding them as obstacles to be overcome. Recent work in the reduction of chemistry is also reviewed, including discussions of the ontological reduction of chemistry and the question of the emergence of chemistry from physics.
I claim that the question of whether chemistry is reduced to quan- tum mechanics is more ambiguous and multi-faceted than generally supposed. For example, chemistry appears to be both reduced and not reduced at the same time depending on the perspective that one adopts. Similarly, I argue that some conceptual issues in quantum mechanics are ambiguous and can only be laid to rest by embracing paradox and ambiguity rather than regarding them as obstacles to be overcome. Recent work in the reduction of chemistry is also reviewed, including discussions of the ontological reduction of chemis- try and the question of the emergence of chemistry from physics.
The concept of atomic and molecular orbitals has been a fundamental pillar in modern chemistry, shedding light on the structures and reactivity of chemical compounds. This article examines the evolution and significance of orbital theory, its applications in chemistry, and the ongoing debate about the existence of orbitals from both physics and chemistry perspectives. Philosophical aspects related to the ontology of orbitals are explored, emphasizing the complex interplay between mathematical abstractions and tangible reality. The multifaceted nature of orbitals, their role in quantum mechanics, and their implications for understanding the quantum realm are discussed. While the debate surrounding the ontological status of orbitals remains ongoing, it highlights the profound nature of inquiries into the fundamental essence of reality. This exploration underscores the significance of continuous research and discourse in advancing our understanding of these fundamental constituents of the quantum world.
This article focuses on three themes concerning determinism and indeterminism. The first is observational equivalence between deterministic and indeterministic models. The article discusses several results about observational equivalence and presents an argument on how to choose between deterministic and indeterministic models involving indirect evidence. The second is whether Newtonian physics is indeterministic. The article argues that the answer depends on what one takes Newtonian mechanics to be and highlights how contemporary debates on this issue differ from those in the nineteenth century. The third theme is how the method of arbitrary functions can be used to make sense of deterministic probabilities. The article discusses various ways of interpreting the initial probability distributions and argues that they are best understood as physical, biological, and other quantities characterizing the particular situation. The fact that the method of arbitrary functions deserves more attention than it has received so far is also emphasized.