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International journal of network security

Cryptanalysis of a New Efficient Authenticated Multiple- Key Exchange Protocol from Bilinear Pairings

Qingfeng Cheng

Published Jan 1, 2014• 3 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Multiple-key exchange (MKE) protocols allow two parties to generate two or more shared session keys over insecure networks. In recent years, many MKE protocols have been proposed. However, most of them still have some security flaws. In this letter, we will analyze a new MKE protocol proposed by Farash et al. in 2012, and present two attacks against Farash et al.’s protocol.

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Multiple-key exchange (MKE) protocols allow two parties to generate two or more shared session keys over insecure networks. In recent years, many MKE protocols have been proposed. However, most of them still have some security flaws. In this letter, we will analyze a new MKE protocol proposed by Farash et al. in 2012, and present two attacks against Farash et al.’s protocol.
Abastract: Many authenticated multiple key exchange protocols were published in recent years. In 2008, Lee et al. presented an authenticated multiple key exchange protocol based on bilinear pairings. However, Vo et al. demonstrated an impersonation attack on the protocol , and it failed to provide authenticity and perfect forward secrecy as they had claimed. Later, Vo et al. proposed their enhancement protocol conforming which conforms to all desirable security properties. But, Vo's protocol required any party had held the public key each other, which required a large amount of storage. In this paper, we propose two new authenticated multiple key exchange protocols based on Lee's protocol, and makes them immune against Vo et al.'s attacks.
Multiple key agreement (MKA) protocols allow two parties to generate two or more session keys in one session, which will be used for future secure communications in public network. In recent years, many MKA protocols have been proposed. However, most of them do not consider ephemeral key compromise resilience, and some of them still exists security flaws. In this paper, we analyze the scheme proposed by Dehkordi and Alimoradi in 2011, which is announced with stronger security. We will present ephemeral key compromise attack and impersonation attack against Dehkordi and Alimoradi’s protocol. For overcoming these security flaws, we also propose an improvement of Dehkordi and Alimoradi’s protocol.
All existing two party multiple key exchange protocols cannot resist ephemeral key compromise attack.To solve this problem,a new two party authenticated key exchange protocol based bilinear map is proposed for enhancing the security and efficiency of two party key exchange protocols.Four different session keys can be computed through one session of the proposed protocol.Compared with existing protocols,the new protocol with stronger security can resist ephemeral key compromise attack and provide mutual authentication.
Abstract. Recently, He et al. (Computers and Mathematics with Applications, 2012, 64(6): 1914-1926) proposed a new efficient certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol. They claimed their protocol was provably secure in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. In this paper, we will show that their protocol is insecure. A type I adversary, who obtains one party’s ephemeral private key, can impersonate the party to cheat the other party and compute the shared session key successfully. For overcoming this weakness, we also propose a simple countermeasure.
Secure channels, indispensable to many applications, can be established by using an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol where the involving parties authenticate one another and then share authenticated session keys over insecure networks. In this paper, we introduce a new type of AKE protocols that are especially designed to minimize the damages caused by leakages of stored secrets. Such protocols are called Leakage-Resilient AKE (LR-AKE) protocols, whose motivation, design principles, several constructions, security analysis and applications are explained in detail.