Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange in the Standard Model

Zheng Yang

Published Jan 1, 2013• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Nowadays many crucial network applications rely on the existence of a confidential channel established by authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols over public networks.With the rapid development of cyber technology, novel attacks to cryptosystem emerge in an endless stream.This has also led to the development of AKE solutions to provide increasingly stronger security guarantees.In this thesis we focus on provision of practical constructions for AKE protocols which are provably secure in a strong sense without resorting to random oracles.We first we present three new efficient compilers to generically turn passively secure key exchange protocols (KE) into authenticated key exchange protocols (AKE) where security also holds in the presence of active adversaries.Our compilers are not only a useful tool for the design of new AKE systems with many additional security properties in a modular and less error-prone fashion, but they also help to relax the assumptions on existing, practical key exchange mechanisms which are not known to be provably secure AKE protocols.Security of our compilers is shown in a strong modified CK model where the adversary is allowed to reveal either long-term secret key or state information of the protocol participants.On the second, we study the open problem on constructing eCK secure two party AKE protocol without random oracles and NAXOS trick.A generic construction satisfying those requirements is given based on well-known cryptographic primitives following the guideline of efficiency.Then a concrete protocol is proposed which is the first eCK secure protocol in the standard model under both standard assumptions and post-specified peer setting (i.e.without knowing any cryptographic information about its communication peer).Both proposed schemes can be more efficiently implemented with secure device than previous works which are eCK secure in the standard model, where the secure device might be normally used to store the long-term private key and to implement codes of protocol which need to be resilience of state leakage.Finally, we generalize our one-round two party AKE construction to group case that yields an efficient tripartite AKE protocol based on bilinear maps and a candidate group AKE protocol (with more than three members) based on multilinear maps.Up to now they are the first solutions which can be proved secure in the g-eCK model without random oracles.Meanwhile we make first step to show how to simplify the security proof for one-round group AKE under g-eCK model.i

Related papers

Efficient eCK-secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols in the Standard Model.

Zheng Yang

The extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security models, are widely used to provide security arguments for authenticated key exchange protocols that capture leakage of various kinds of secret information like the long-term private key and session-specific secret state. In this paper, we study the open problem on constructing eCK secure AKE protocol without random oracles and NAXOS like trick. A generic construction GC-KKN satisfying those requirements is first given relying on standard cryptographic primitives following the guideline of efficiency. On the second a concrete protocol is proposed which is the first eCK secure protocol in the standard model under both standard assumptions and post-specified peer setting. Both proposed schemes can be more efficiently implemented with secure device than previous eCK secure protocols in the standard model, where the secure device might be normally used to store the long-term private key and implement algorithms of protocol which require to be resilience of state leakage.

•Jan 1, 2013•0 citations

Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol in the Standard Model under Weaker Assumptions

Janaka Alawatugoda

A two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol allows each of the two parties to share a common secret key over insecure channels, even in the presence of active adversaries who can actively control and modify the exchanged messages. To capture the malicious behaviors of the adversaries, there have been many efforts to define security models. Amongst them, the extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security model is considered one of the strongest security models and has been widely adopted. In this paper, we present a simple construction of a pairing-based eCK-secure AKE protocol in the standard model. Our protocol can be instantiated with a suitable signature scheme (i.e., an existentially unforgeable signature scheme against adaptive chosen message attacks). The underlying assumptions of our construction are the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption and the existence of a pseudorandom function. Note that the previous eCK-secure protocol constructions either relied on random oracles for their security or used somewhat strong assumptions, such as the existence of strong-pseudorandom functions, target collision-resistant functions, etc., while our protocol construction uses fewer and more-standard assumptions in the standard model. Furthermore, preserving the same security argument, our protocol can be instantiated with any appropriate signature scheme that comes in the future with better efficiency.

Cryptography•Jan 5, 2023•2 citations

An eCK-secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Without Random Oracles

Daisuke Moriyama, Tatsuaki Okamoto

Two-party key exchange protocol is a mechanism in which two parties communicate with each other over an insecure channel and output the same session key.A key exchange protocol that is secure against an active adversary who can control and modify the exchanged messages is called authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol.LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin presented a strong security definition for public key infrastructure (PKI) based two-pass protocol, which we call the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security model, and some researchers have provided eCK-secure AKE protocols in recent years.However, almost all protocols are provably secure in the random oracle model or rely on a special implementation technique so-called the NAXOS trick.In this paper, we present a PKI-based two-pass AKE protocol that is secure in the eCK security model.The security of the proposed protocol is proven without random oracles (under three assumptions), and does not rely on implementation techniques such as the NAXOS trick.

KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems•Jan 1, 2011•11 citations

Strongly Secure One-round Group Authenticated Key Exchange in the Standard Model.

Yong Li, Zheng Yang

One-round group authenticated key exchange (GAKE) protocols typically provide implicit authentication and appealing bandwidth efficiency. As a special case of GAKE – the pairing-based one-round tripartite authenticated key exchange (3AKE), recently gains much attention of research community due to its strong security. Several pairing-based one-round 3AKE protocols have recently been proposed to achieve provable security in the g-eCK model. In contrast to earlier GAKE models, the g-eCK model particularly formulates the security properties regarding resilience to the leakage of various combinations of long-term key and ephemeral session state, and provision of weak perfect forward secrecy in a single model. However, the g-eCK security proofs of previous protocols are only given under the random oracle model. In this work, we give a new construction for pairing-based one-round 3AKE protocol which is provably secure in the g-eCK model without random oracles. Security of proposed protocol is reduced to the hardness of Cube Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (CBDDH) problem for symmetric pairing. We also extend the proposed 3AKE scheme to a GAKE scheme with more than three group members, based on multilinear maps. We prove g-eCK security of our GAKE scheme in the standard model under the natural multilinear generalization of the CBDDH assumption.

•Jan 1, 2013•0 citations

A practical strongly secure one‐round authenticated key exchange protocol without random oracles

Zheng Yang, Yang Wu

Abstract Most recently, a variant of extended Canetti–Krawczyk model called aseCKwis introduced to provide stronger security than previous eCK models. NamelyeCKwmodels formulate a stronger notion regarding weak perfect forward secrecy than other eCK models. In particular, anyeCKwsecure protocols can be generally transformed to achieve full provide perfect forward secrecy without requiring additional round. So far, there is no protocol which has been proven secure in theeCKwmodel without random oracles. In this paper, we study the open problem on constructingeCKwsecure AKE protocol in the standard model. A new one‐round AKE protocol is introduced relying on standard cryptographic primitives and a variant of bilinear decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption. The main advantage of our proposal is its high efficiency in key exchange in contrast to the previous eCK secure protocols without random oracles and under post‐specified peer setting. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Security and Communication Networks•Sep 9, 2014•3 citations

One-round Protocols for Two-Party Authenticated Key Exchange

Ik-Rae Jeong, Donghoon Lee

Abstract. Cryptographic protocol design in a two-party setting has often ignored the possibility of simultaneous message transmission by each of the two parties (i.e., using a duplex channel). In particular, most protocols for two-party key exchange have been designed assuming that parties alternate sending their messages (i.e., assuming a bidirectional half-duplex channel). However, by taking advantage of the communication characteristics of the network it may be possible to design protocols with improved latency. This is the focus of the present work. We present a number of provably-secure protocols for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) which require only a single round. Our first protocol provides key independence only, and is analyzed in the random oracle model. This scheme matches the most efficient AKE protocols among those found in the literature. Our second scheme additionally provides forward secrecy, and is also analyzed in the random oracle model. Our final protocol provides the same strong security guarantees, but is proven secure in the standard model. This scheme is only slightly less efficient (from a computational perspective) than the previous ones. These last two schemes are the first provably-secure one-round protocols for authenticated 2-party key exchange which provide forward secrecy.

Jeongbo gwahaghoe nonmunji. si'seu'tem mich i'lon•Jan 1, 2006•1 citation
Nowadays many crucial network applications rely on the existence of a confidential channel established by authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols over public networks.With the rapid development of cyber technology, novel attacks to cryptosystem emerge in an endless stream.This has also led to the development of AKE solutions to provide increasingly stronger security guarantees.In this thesis we focus on provision of practical constructions for AKE protocols which are provably secure in a strong sense without resorting to random oracles.We first we present three new efficient compilers to generically turn passively secure key exchange protocols (KE) into authenticated key exchange protocols (AKE) where security also holds in the presence of active adversaries.Our compilers are not only a useful tool for the design of new AKE systems with many additional security properties in a modular and less error-prone fashion, but they also help to relax the assumptions on existing, practical key exchange mechanisms which are not known to be provably secure AKE protocols.Security of our compilers is shown in a strong modified CK model where the adversary is allowed to reveal either long-term secret key or state information of the protocol participants.On the second, we study the open problem on constructing eCK secure two party AKE protocol without random oracles and NAXOS trick.A generic construction satisfying those requirements is given based on well-known cryptographic primitives following the guideline of efficiency.Then a concrete protocol is proposed which is the first eCK secure protocol in the standard model under both standard assumptions and post-specified peer setting (i.e.without knowing any cryptographic information about its communication peer).Both proposed schemes can be more efficiently implemented with secure device than previous works which are eCK secure in the standard model, where the secure device might be normally used to store the long-term private key and to implement codes of protocol which need to be resilience of state leakage.Finally, we generalize our one-round two party AKE construction to group case that yields an efficient tripartite AKE protocol based on bilinear maps and a candidate group AKE protocol (with more than three members) based on multilinear maps.Up to now they are the first solutions which can be proved secure in the g-eCK model without random oracles.Meanwhile we make first step to show how to simplify the security proof for one-round group AKE under g-eCK model.i
The extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security models, are widely used to provide security arguments for authenticated key exchange protocols that capture leakage of various kinds of secret information like the long-term private key and session-specific secret state. In this paper, we study the open problem on constructing eCK secure AKE protocol without random oracles and NAXOS like trick. A generic construction GC-KKN satisfying those requirements is first given relying on standard cryptographic primitives following the guideline of efficiency. On the second a concrete protocol is proposed which is the first eCK secure protocol in the standard model under both standard assumptions and post-specified peer setting. Both proposed schemes can be more efficiently implemented with secure device than previous eCK secure protocols in the standard model, where the secure device might be normally used to store the long-term private key and implement algorithms of protocol which require to be resilience of state leakage.
A two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol allows each of the two parties to share a common secret key over insecure channels, even in the presence of active adversaries who can actively control and modify the exchanged messages. To capture the malicious behaviors of the adversaries, there have been many efforts to define security models. Amongst them, the extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security model is considered one of the strongest security models and has been widely adopted. In this paper, we present a simple construction of a pairing-based eCK-secure AKE protocol in the standard model. Our protocol can be instantiated with a suitable signature scheme (i.e., an existentially unforgeable signature scheme against adaptive chosen message attacks). The underlying assumptions of our construction are the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption and the existence of a pseudorandom function. Note that the previous eCK-secure protocol constructions either relied on random oracles for their security or used somewhat strong assumptions, such as the existence of strong-pseudorandom functions, target collision-resistant functions, etc., while our protocol construction uses fewer and more-standard assumptions in the standard model. Furthermore, preserving the same security argument, our protocol can be instantiated with any appropriate signature scheme that comes in the future with better efficiency.
Two-party key exchange protocol is a mechanism in which two parties communicate with each other over an insecure channel and output the same session key.A key exchange protocol that is secure against an active adversary who can control and modify the exchanged messages is called authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol.LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin presented a strong security definition for public key infrastructure (PKI) based two-pass protocol, which we call the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security model, and some researchers have provided eCK-secure AKE protocols in recent years.However, almost all protocols are provably secure in the random oracle model or rely on a special implementation technique so-called the NAXOS trick.In this paper, we present a PKI-based two-pass AKE protocol that is secure in the eCK security model.The security of the proposed protocol is proven without random oracles (under three assumptions), and does not rely on implementation techniques such as the NAXOS trick.
One-round group authenticated key exchange (GAKE) protocols typically provide implicit authentication and appealing bandwidth efficiency. As a special case of GAKE – the pairing-based one-round tripartite authenticated key exchange (3AKE), recently gains much attention of research community due to its strong security. Several pairing-based one-round 3AKE protocols have recently been proposed to achieve provable security in the g-eCK model. In contrast to earlier GAKE models, the g-eCK model particularly formulates the security properties regarding resilience to the leakage of various combinations of long-term key and ephemeral session state, and provision of weak perfect forward secrecy in a single model. However, the g-eCK security proofs of previous protocols are only given under the random oracle model. In this work, we give a new construction for pairing-based one-round 3AKE protocol which is provably secure in the g-eCK model without random oracles. Security of proposed protocol is reduced to the hardness of Cube Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (CBDDH) problem for symmetric pairing. We also extend the proposed 3AKE scheme to a GAKE scheme with more than three group members, based on multilinear maps. We prove g-eCK security of our GAKE scheme in the standard model under the natural multilinear generalization of the CBDDH assumption.
Abstract Most recently, a variant of extended Canetti–Krawczyk model called aseCKwis introduced to provide stronger security than previous eCK models. NamelyeCKwmodels formulate a stronger notion regarding weak perfect forward secrecy than other eCK models. In particular, anyeCKwsecure protocols can be generally transformed to achieve full provide perfect forward secrecy without requiring additional round. So far, there is no protocol which has been proven secure in theeCKwmodel without random oracles. In this paper, we study the open problem on constructingeCKwsecure AKE protocol in the standard model. A new one‐round AKE protocol is introduced relying on standard cryptographic primitives and a variant of bilinear decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption. The main advantage of our proposal is its high efficiency in key exchange in contrast to the previous eCK secure protocols without random oracles and under post‐specified peer setting. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Abstract. Cryptographic protocol design in a two-party setting has often ignored the possibility of simultaneous message transmission by each of the two parties (i.e., using a duplex channel). In particular, most protocols for two-party key exchange have been designed assuming that parties alternate sending their messages (i.e., assuming a bidirectional half-duplex channel). However, by taking advantage of the communication characteristics of the network it may be possible to design protocols with improved latency. This is the focus of the present work. We present a number of provably-secure protocols for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) which require only a single round. Our first protocol provides key independence only, and is analyzed in the random oracle model. This scheme matches the most efficient AKE protocols among those found in the literature. Our second scheme additionally provides forward secrecy, and is also analyzed in the random oracle model. Our final protocol provides the same strong security guarantees, but is proven secure in the standard model. This scheme is only slightly less efficient (from a computational perspective) than the previous ones. These last two schemes are the first provably-secure one-round protocols for authenticated 2-party key exchange which provide forward secrecy.