Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences

Do mental events cause neural events analogously to the probability fields of quantum mechanics?

John Carew Eccles

Published May 22, 1986• 186 citations
Publisher

Abstract

If non-material mental events, such as the intention to carry out an action, are to have an effective action on neural events in the brain, it has to be at the most subtle and plastic level of these events. In the first stage of our enquiry an introduction to conventional synaptic theory leads on to an account of the manner of operation of the ultimate synaptic units. These units are the synaptic boutons that, when excited by an all-or-nothing nerve impulse, deliver the total contents of a single synaptic vesicle, not regularly, but probabilistically. This quantal emission of the synaptic transmitter molecules (about 5000-10 000) is the elementary unit of the transmission process from one neuron to another. In the second stage this refined physiological analysis leads on to an account of the ultrastructure of the synapse, which gives clues as to the manner of its unitary probabilistic operation. The essential feature is that the effective structure of each bouton is a paracrystalline presynaptic vesicular grid with about 50 vesicles, which acts probabilistically in vesicular (quantal) release. In the third stage it is considered how a non-material mental event, such as an intention to move, could influence the subtle probabilistic operations of synaptic boutons. On the biological side, attention is focused on the paracrystalline presynaptic vesicular grids as the targets for non-material mental events. On the physical side, attention is focused on the probabilistic fields of quantum mechanics which carry neither mass nor energy, but which nevertheless can exert effective action at microsites. The new light on the mind-brain problem came from the hypothesis that the non-material mental events, the 'World 2' of Popper, relate to the neural events of the brain (the 'World 1' of matter and energy) by actions in conformity with quantum theory. This hypothesis that mental events act on probabilistic synaptic events in a manner analogous to the probability fields of quantum mechanics seems to open up an immense field of scientific investigation both in quantum physics and in neuroscience.

DOI
10.1098/rspb.1986.0031

Related papers

Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology: a neurophysical model of mind–brain interaction

Jeffrey M. Schwartz, Henry Pierce Stapp, Mario Beauregard

Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behaviour generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus, terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g. 'feeling', 'knowing' and 'effort') are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three-quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classic physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, owing to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analysing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classic-physics-based predecessor, is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics. It is able to represent more adequately than classic concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences•Jun 29, 2005•305 citations

Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology: A neurophysicalmodel of the mind/brain interaction

Jeffrey M. Schwartz, Henry Pierce Stapp, Mario Beauregard

Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behavior generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g., ''feeling,'' ''knowing,'' and ''effort'') are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classical physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, due to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analyzing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classical-physics-based predecessor is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics, and is able to represent more adequately than classical concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.

•Sep 21, 2004•0 citations

Theory of Neural Synapse from Quantum Amplitudes and Conditional Probabilities

Huber Nieto–Chaupis

If neural synapse is a probabilistic event, then one would expect that this is the result of a chain of subprocesses that takes place in axon. Thus, one can adjudicate probabilistic quantities to each one of event previous to the releasing of neurotransmitters from synaptic vesicles. Indeed, one can argue that electrical interactions are responsible of neurotransmitters dynamics before them pass to cleft. Because this, the present paper has employed the formalism of quantum probabilities. Thus, quantum mechanics would apply to describe the entire process of synapse. Finally, it was associated a set of conditional probabilities that would led to state that neural synapse is a kind of conjunction of quantum events and conditional probabilities. Finally, probabilities are estimated exhibiting a logic agreement to common knowledge of synapse.

Asia Conference on Cognitive Engineering and Intelligent Interaction (CEII)•Dec 14, 2024•0 citations

Quantum Effects in Synaptic Activity: Challenging the Deterministic Model of Neural Processes

In this study, we explore the impact of quantum effects on synaptic activity and their implications for the deterministic model of neural processes. By simulating synaptic events in a large-scale neural network, we demonstrate how small probabilistic quantum events can accumulate and introduce variability in neural behavior. Our model incorporates Dirac delta functions to simulate sudden changes in synaptic probabilities, creating a non-linear, seesaw effect in the cumulative synaptic activity curve. The results reveal that even minimal quantum effects, when scaled to the vast number of synapses in the human brain, can lead to significant dissociations in neural activity. These findings challenge the traditional deterministic view, suggesting that neural processes—and by extension, decision-making and movements—may inherently incorporate elements of randomness. This probabilistic perspective aligns with theories of free will and underscores the need for further empirical research to validate the role of quantum mechanics in neuroscience. Our study provides a theoretical framework for understanding the complex interplay between quantum effects and neural dynamics, opening new avenues for exploring the nature of consciousness and the fundamental principles governing reality.

International Journal of Media and Networks•Jul 22, 2024•0 citations

Probabilistic Neural Synapse Based in Quantum Mechanics

Huber Nieto–Chaupis

The process of synaptic transmission is projected onto the territory of quantum mechanics. Thus, the electric interactions are seen as probabilistic events more than a deterministic one. In this manner, the neurotransmitter would obey quantum laws and their dynamics is governed by the evolution operator. Thus, synapse seen as an action of propagation would encompasses well to that the spatial propagator or Green function that might model the dyanamics of neurotransmitters along the cleft. This turns out to be instantaneous in coherence to the concept of neural transmission. Indeed under the quantum mechnics scenario it is found that the eigenvalues of energies of Hamiltonian consist in electric potentials between electrically charged neurotransmitters and receptors at the ion channels.

ACIS International Conference on Software Engineering, Artificial Intelligence, Networking and Parallel/Distributed Computing (SNPD)•Dec 7, 2022•1 citation

Quantum Physics in Neuroscience and Psychology: A New Theory With Respect to Mind/Brain Interaction

Jeffrey M. Schwartz, Henry Pierce Stapp, M. Beauregard

The cognitive frame in which most neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behavior is conducted contains the assumption that brain mechanisms per se fully suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms must therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. One consequence of this stance is that psychological terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (terms such as "feeling," "knowing," and "effort") have not been included as primary causal factors in neuropsychological research: insofar as properties are not described in material terms they are deemed irrelevant to the causal mechanisms underlying brain function. However, the origin of this demand that experiential realities be excluded from the causal base is a theory of nature that has been known for more that three quarters of a century to be fundamentally incorrect. It is explained here why it is consequently scientifically unwarranted to assume that material factors alone can in principle explain all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience. More importantly, it is explained how a key quantum effect can be introduced into brain dynamics in a simple and practical way that provides a rationally coherent, causally formulated, physics-based way of understanding and using the psychological and physical data derived from the growing set of studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.

arXiv:q-bio/0401019•Jan 14, 2004•5 citations
If non-material mental events, such as the intention to carry out an action, are to have an effective action on neural events in the brain, it has to be at the most subtle and plastic level of these events. In the first stage of our enquiry an introduction to conventional synaptic theory leads on to an account of the manner of operation of the ultimate synaptic units. These units are the synaptic boutons that, when excited by an all-or-nothing nerve impulse, deliver the total contents of a single synaptic vesicle, not regularly, but probabilistically. This quantal emission of the synaptic transmitter molecules (about 5000-10 000) is the elementary unit of the transmission process from one neuron to another. In the second stage this refined physiological analysis leads on to an account of the ultrastructure of the synapse, which gives clues as to the manner of its unitary probabilistic operation. The essential feature is that the effective structure of each bouton is a paracrystalline presynaptic vesicular grid with about 50 vesicles, which acts probabilistically in vesicular (quantal) release. In the third stage it is considered how a non-material mental event, such as an intention to move, could influence the subtle probabilistic operations of synaptic boutons. On the biological side, attention is focused on the paracrystalline presynaptic vesicular grids as the targets for non-material mental events. On the physical side, attention is focused on the probabilistic fields of quantum mechanics which carry neither mass nor energy, but which nevertheless can exert effective action at microsites. The new light on the mind-brain problem came from the hypothesis that the non-material mental events, the 'World 2' of Popper, relate to the neural events of the brain (the 'World 1' of matter and energy) by actions in conformity with quantum theory. This hypothesis that mental events act on probabilistic synaptic events in a manner analogous to the probability fields of quantum mechanics seems to open up an immense field of scientific investigation both in quantum physics and in neuroscience.
Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behaviour generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus, terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g. 'feeling', 'knowing' and 'effort') are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three-quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classic physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, owing to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analysing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classic-physics-based predecessor, is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics. It is able to represent more adequately than classic concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.
Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behavior generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g., ''feeling,'' ''knowing,'' and ''effort'') are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classical physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, due to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analyzing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classical-physics-based predecessor is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics, and is able to represent more adequately than classical concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.
If neural synapse is a probabilistic event, then one would expect that this is the result of a chain of subprocesses that takes place in axon. Thus, one can adjudicate probabilistic quantities to each one of event previous to the releasing of neurotransmitters from synaptic vesicles. Indeed, one can argue that electrical interactions are responsible of neurotransmitters dynamics before them pass to cleft. Because this, the present paper has employed the formalism of quantum probabilities. Thus, quantum mechanics would apply to describe the entire process of synapse. Finally, it was associated a set of conditional probabilities that would led to state that neural synapse is a kind of conjunction of quantum events and conditional probabilities. Finally, probabilities are estimated exhibiting a logic agreement to common knowledge of synapse.
In this study, we explore the impact of quantum effects on synaptic activity and their implications for the deterministic model of neural processes. By simulating synaptic events in a large-scale neural network, we demonstrate how small probabilistic quantum events can accumulate and introduce variability in neural behavior. Our model incorporates Dirac delta functions to simulate sudden changes in synaptic probabilities, creating a non-linear, seesaw effect in the cumulative synaptic activity curve. The results reveal that even minimal quantum effects, when scaled to the vast number of synapses in the human brain, can lead to significant dissociations in neural activity. These findings challenge the traditional deterministic view, suggesting that neural processes—and by extension, decision-making and movements—may inherently incorporate elements of randomness. This probabilistic perspective aligns with theories of free will and underscores the need for further empirical research to validate the role of quantum mechanics in neuroscience. Our study provides a theoretical framework for understanding the complex interplay between quantum effects and neural dynamics, opening new avenues for exploring the nature of consciousness and the fundamental principles governing reality.
The process of synaptic transmission is projected onto the territory of quantum mechanics. Thus, the electric interactions are seen as probabilistic events more than a deterministic one. In this manner, the neurotransmitter would obey quantum laws and their dynamics is governed by the evolution operator. Thus, synapse seen as an action of propagation would encompasses well to that the spatial propagator or Green function that might model the dyanamics of neurotransmitters along the cleft. This turns out to be instantaneous in coherence to the concept of neural transmission. Indeed under the quantum mechnics scenario it is found that the eigenvalues of energies of Hamiltonian consist in electric potentials between electrically charged neurotransmitters and receptors at the ion channels.
The cognitive frame in which most neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behavior is conducted contains the assumption that brain mechanisms per se fully suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms must therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. One consequence of this stance is that psychological terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (terms such as "feeling," "knowing," and "effort") have not been included as primary causal factors in neuropsychological research: insofar as properties are not described in material terms they are deemed irrelevant to the causal mechanisms underlying brain function. However, the origin of this demand that experiential realities be excluded from the causal base is a theory of nature that has been known for more that three quarters of a century to be fundamentally incorrect. It is explained here why it is consequently scientifically unwarranted to assume that material factors alone can in principle explain all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience. More importantly, it is explained how a key quantum effect can be introduced into brain dynamics in a simple and practical way that provides a rationally coherent, causally formulated, physics-based way of understanding and using the psychological and physical data derived from the growing set of studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.