In a recent paper, Eddington raises an objection against the customary use of the Lorentz transformation in quantum mechanics, as for instance when applied to the theory of the hydrogen atom or the behaviour of a degenerate gas. This objection seems to us to be mainly based on a misunderstanding, and our purpose here is to show that the practice of theoretical physicists on this point is quite consistent. The issue is a little confused because Eddington's system of mechanics is in many important respects completely different from quantum mechanics, and although Eddington's objection is to an alleged illogical practice in quantum mechanics he occasionally makes use of concepts which have no place there. Such arguments will not have any bearing on the question whether or not the practice in quantum mechanics is logically consistent—although they may have bearing on which of the two systems describes physical phenomena better.
In a recent paper, Eddington raises an objection against the customary use of the Lorentz transformation in quantum mechanics, as for instance when applied to the theory of the hydrogen atom or the behaviour of a degenerate gas. This objection seems to us to be mainly based on a misunderstanding, and our purpose here is to show that the practice of theoretical physicists on this point is quite consistent. The issue is a little confused because Eddington's system of mechanics is in many important respects completely different from quantum mechanics, and although Eddington's objection is to an alleged illogical practice in quantum mechanics he occasionally makes use of concepts which have no place there. Such arguments will not have any bearing on the question whether or not the practice in quantum mechanics is logically consistent—although they may have bearing on which of the two systems describes physical phenomena better.
Thus far I have been primarily concerned with how an interpretation of quantum mechanics might, or might not, be local. This question is traditionally not sharply distinguished from the question of whether quantum mechanics is consistent with the theory of relativity. However, the two questions are indeed quite distinct, and should be recognized as such explicitly. The theory of relativity What does relativity require? As a first approximation, we may make the distinction by noting that the requirements of the theory of relativity are themselves unclear. Minimally, relativity seems to require that there be no way to distinguish one reference frame from another – i.e., that there be no experimental procedure that can determine which of two inertial observers is ‘really’ moving, or more generally that there be no way to discover an observer's absolute velocity. Most authors are willing to find in (special) relativity a stronger requirement: namely, Lorentz-invariance. They say that relativity requires that in fact there is no such thing as absolute velocity. This requirement goes beyond the minimum – it might be that there is an absolute rest frame (so that absolute velocities are given by motion relative to this frame) while there is no way to find it. (As I will discuss in chapter 9, exactly this situation occurs in Bohm's theory.)
IntroductionPhysics has always had several different domains of application in on-going development, and physicists have always striven for unification among its different domains.Unification is usually achieved through development of so-called 'covering theories'.In the nineteenth century, the stunning example was Maxwell's Electrodynamics (MED), which unified electricity and magnetism as one domain of theory.Another major domain of theory then present was Newton's Mechanics (NM), which in the eighteenth century had really launched modern physics as a mathematical discipline.At the turn of the twentieth century, NM and MED were well in place, and were fulfilling many technologically important requirements.But there seemed to be an incompatibility between them.The problem concerned their invariance with respect to choice of reference frame: NM exhibited invariance if the allowed reference frames were all connected through Galilean transformations, whereas MED exhibited invariance if the allowed reference frames were all connected through Lorentz transformations.It looked as though one of these two theories must be more nearly correct than the other, but it was not clear which one was the better one.That problem seemed resolved with the advent of Einstein's Special Relativity Theory (SRT).SRT was believed to capture the true meaning of MED concerning the behavior of light signals, and SRT was certainly an endorsement of Lorentz transformation, so SRT was believed to offer the one possible revision of NM that could make mechanics fully consistent with MED.But meanwhile, new phenomena were being discovered at the micro scale of physics, and they often seemed inexplicable with any known theory, whether NM, SRT, or MED.These were phenomena suggesting quantization of light, quantized atomic states, atomic, molecular and crystal structures, radioactivity, etc.So at almost the same time as one problem seemed to be resolved, other problems were emerging.Since the earlier situation between NM and MED had demanded that Physics allow two seemingly discordant theories to co-exist until some good argument could replace one of them, the situation then presented by the new phenomena being discovered naturally invited the development of another potentially discordant theory: Quantum Mechanics (QM).The discovery of the photoelectric effect, and the introduction of the idea of the photon, initiated QM.Almost immediately, QM was developed to handle the Hydrogen atom, and the ground state thereof, the stability of which was thought to be impossible with MED.www.intechopen.
1. I appreciate the careful reply which Dirac, Peierls and Pryce (hereafter referred to as DPP) have made to my criticism of the usual theory of the eigen-functions of a hydrogen atom. Their paper will be generally welcomed because there has not, I think, previously been available an authoritative and clear statement of what is assumed and the grounds for assuming it. Their defence, which is partly on lines I had not expected, has required very serious consideration. But the result of making the arguments more explicit is two-fold. The theory is perhaps more self-consistent than it had appeared to be; but on the other hand, the pressing need for amendment becomes too plain to be overlooked. I have endeavoured to show in the last twelve years that this amendment opens out very fertile extensions.
The compatibility of special relativity and Quantum Mechanics has been questioned by several authors. The origin of this tension can be traced back mainly to the introduction of the measurement processes and the corresponding wave function reduction, which play a crucial role in Quantum Mechanics. We approach this problem with the help of a recent proposal for a model of Quantum Mechanics, where the measurement is explicitly described as a specific stochastic process. This implements ordinary Quantum Mechanics, where measurement and reduction are treated as phenomenological events of unknown origin without any physical justification. To state clearly the question in general, we first discuss and establish the effect of a Lorentz transformation on a generic wave function in space-time. Alongside the analysis we formulate the relativistic version of the model. We then consider few thought experiments in order to analyze to what extent Quantum Mechanics follows relativistic invariance and find the specific critical points where non invariance possibly occurs. The analysis can shade light to the interpretation of the existing experimental observations.
Abstract—Since the beginning, quantum mechanics has raised major foundational and interpretative problems. Foundational research has been an important factor in the development of quantum cryptography, quantum information theory and, per-haps one day, practical quantum computers. Many believe that, in turn, quantum information theory has bearing on foundational research. This is largely related to the so-called epistemic view of quantum states, which maintains that the state vector represents information on a system and which has led to the suggestion that quantum theory needs no interpretation. I will argue that this and related approaches fail to take into consideration two different explanatory functions of quantum mechanics, that of accounting for classically unexplainable correlations between classical phenomena and that of explaining the microscopic structure of classical objects. The epistemic view provides no answer to what constitutes the main question of interpretation: How can the world be for quantum mechanics to be true? I will then review three different approaches to understanding quan-tum mechanics, namely, Bohmian mechanics, Everett’s relative states, and Cramer’s transactional interpretation. I will show that these approaches answer the above question, as well as other foundational ones. This paper is written from the perspective that different logically consistent interpretations, far from leading to confusion, in fact contribute to increased understanding of the theory. I.