1. I appreciate the careful reply which Dirac, Peierls and Pryce (hereafter referred to as DPP) have made to my criticism of the usual theory of the eigen-functions of a hydrogen atom. Their paper will be generally welcomed because there has not, I think, previously been available an authoritative and clear statement of what is assumed and the grounds for assuming it. Their defence, which is partly on lines I had not expected, has required very serious consideration. But the result of making the arguments more explicit is two-fold. The theory is perhaps more self-consistent than it had appeared to be; but on the other hand, the pressing need for amendment becomes too plain to be overlooked. I have endeavoured to show in the last twelve years that this amendment opens out very fertile extensions.
I appreciate the careful reply which Dirac, Peierls and Pryce (hereafter referred to as DPP) have made to my criticism of the usual theory of the eigen-functions of a hydrogen atom. Their paper will be generally welcomed because there has not, I think, previously been available an authoritative and clear statement of what is assumed and the grounds for assuming it. Their defence, which is partly on lines I had not expected, has required very serious consideration. But the result of making the arguments more explicit is two-fold. The theory is perhaps more self-consistent than it had appeared to be; but on the other hand, the pressing need for amendment becomes too plain to be overlooked. I have endeavoured to show in the last twelve years that this amendment opens out very fertile extensions.
In a recent paper, Eddington raises an objection against the customary use of the Lorentz transformation in quantum mechanics, as for instance when applied to the theory of the hydrogen atom or the behaviour of a degenerate gas. This objection seems to us to be mainly based on a misunderstanding, and our purpose here is to show that the practice of theoretical physicists on this point is quite consistent. The issue is a little confused because Eddington's system of mechanics is in many important respects completely different from quantum mechanics, and although Eddington's objection is to an alleged illogical practice in quantum mechanics he occasionally makes use of concepts which have no place there. Such arguments will not have any bearing on the question whether or not the practice in quantum mechanics is logically consistent—although they may have bearing on which of the two systems describes physical phenomena better.
Surely, after 62 years, we should have an exact formulation of some serious part of quantum mechanics? By ‘exact’ I do not of course mean ‘exactly true’. I mean only that the theory should be fully formulated in mathematical terms, with nothing left to the discretion of the theoretical physicist...until workable approximations are needed in applications. By ‘serious’ I mean that some substantial fragment of physics should be covered. Nonrelativistic ‘particle’ quantum mechanics, perhaps with the inclusion of the electromagnetic field and cut-off interaction, is serious enough. For it covers ‘a large part of physics and the whole of chemistry’ (P A M Dirac 1929 Proc. R. Soc.A 123 714). I mean too, by ‘serious’, that ‘apparatus’ should not be separated off from the rest of the world into black boxes, as if it were not made of atoms and not ruled by quantum mechanics.
… I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics. Richard Feynman Science and experiment Science is a special kind of explanation of the things we see around us. It starts with a problem and curiosity. Something strikes the scientist as odd. It doesn't fit in with the usual explanation. Maybe harder thinking or more careful observation will resolve the problem. If it remains a puzzle, it stimulates the scientist's imagination. Perhaps a completely new way of looking at things is needed? Scientists are perpetually trying to find better explanations – better in the sense that any new explanation must not only explain the new puzzle, but also be consistent with all of the previous explanations that still work well. The hallmark of any scientific explanation or ‘theory’ is that it must be able to make successful predictions. In other words, any decent theory must be able to say what will happen in any given set of circumstances. Thus, any new theory will only become generally accepted by the scientific community if it is able not only to explain the observations that scientists have already made, but also to foretell the results of new, as yet unperformed, experiments. This rigorous testing of new scientific ideas is the key feature that distinguishes science from other fields of intellectual endeavour -such as history or even economics – or from a pseudoscience such as astrology.
Surely, after 62 years, we should have an exact formulation of some serious part of quantum mechanics? By ‘exact’ I do not of course mean ‘exactly true’. I mean only that the theory should be fully formulated in mathematical terms, with nothing left to the discretion of the theoretical physicist … until workable approximations are needed in applications. By ‘serious’ I mean that some substantial fragment of physics should be covered. Non-relativistic ‘particle’ quantum mechanics, perhaps with the inclusion of the electromagnetic field and a cut-off interaction, is serious enough. For it covers ‘a large part of physics and the whole of chemistry’. I mean too, by ‘serious’, that ‘apparatus’ should not be separated off from the rest of the world into black boxes, as if it were not made of atoms and not ruled by quantum mechanics. The question, ‘… should we not have an exact formulation …?’, is often answered by one or both of two others. I will try to reply to them: Why bother? Why not look it up in a good book ? Why bother? Perhaps the most distinguished of ‘why bother?’ers has been Dirac. He divided the difficulties of quantum mechanics into two classes, those of the first class and those of the second. The second-class difficulties were essentially the infinities of relativistic quantum field theory. Dirac was very disturbed by these, and was not impressed by the ‘renormalisation’ procedures by which they are circumvented. Dirac tried hard to eliminate these second-class difficulties, and urged others to do likewise.