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Lecture notes in computer science

Possibility and Impossibility Results for Encryption and Commitment Secure under Selective Opening

Mihir Bellare Y, Dennis Hofheinz, Scott Yilek

Published Jan 1, 2009• 271 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-01001-9_1

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Selective Opening Security for Receivers.

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In a selective opening (SO) attack an adversary breaks into a subset of honestly created ciphertexts and tries to learn information on the plaintexts of some untouched (but potentially related) ciphertexts. Contrary to intuition, standard security notions do not always imply security against this type of adver-sary, making SO security an important standalone goal. In this paper we study receiver security, where the attacker is allowed to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts. First we study the relation between two existing security definitions, one based on simulation and the other based on indistinguishability, and show that the former is strictly stronger. We continue with feasibility results for both notions which we show can be achieved from (variants of) non-committing encryption schemes. In particular, we show that indistinguishability-based SO security can be achieved from a tweaked variant of non-committing encryption which, in turn, can be instantiated from a variety of basic, well-established, assumptions. We conclude our study by showing that SO security is however strictly weaker than all variants of non-committing encryption that we consider, leaving potentially more efficient constructions as an interesting open problem.

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Semantically-Secure Functional Encryption: Possibility Results, Impossibility Results and the Quest for a General Definition.

Mihir Bellare Y, Adam O’Neill

This paper explains that SS1-secure functional encryption (FE) as defined by Boneh, Sahai and Waters implicitly incorporates security under key-revealing selective opening attacks (SOA-K). This connection helps intuitively explain their impossibility results and also allows us to prove stronger ones. To fill this gap and move us closer to the (laudable) goal of a general and achievable notion of FE security, we seek and provide two “sans SOA-K ” definitions of FE security that we call SS2 and SS3. We prove various possibility results about these definitions. We view our work as a first step towards the challenging goal of a general, meaningful and achievable notion of FE security. 1

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How unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is possible

Horace P. Yuen

Bit commitment involves the submission of evidence from one party to another so that the evidence can be used to confirm a later revealed bit value by the first party, while the second party cannot determine the bit value from the evidence alone. It is widely believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible due to quantum entanglement cheating, which is codified in a general impossibility theorem. In this paper, the scope of this general impossibility proof is analyzed, and gaps are found. Two variants of a bit commitment scheme utilizing anonymous quantum states and decoy states are presented. In the first variant, the exact verifying measurement is independent of the committed bit value, thus the second party can make it before the first party opens, making possible an unconditional security proof based on no-cloning. In the second variant, the impossibility proof fails because quantum entanglement purification of a mixed state does not render the protocol determinate. Whether impossibility holds in this or similar protocols is an open question, although preliminary results already show that the impossibility proof cannot work as it stands.

arXiv:quant-ph/0109055•Sep 13, 2001•0 citations
In a selective opening (SO) attack an adversary breaks into a subset of honestly created ciphertexts and tries to learn information on the plaintexts of some untouched (but potentially related) ciphertexts. Contrary to intuition, standard security notions do not always imply security against this type of adver-sary, making SO security an important standalone goal. In this paper we study receiver security, where the attacker is allowed to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts. First we study the relation between two existing security definitions, one based on simulation and the other based on indistinguishability, and show that the former is strictly stronger. We continue with feasibility results for both notions which we show can be achieved from (variants of) non-committing encryption schemes. In particular, we show that indistinguishability-based SO security can be achieved from a tweaked variant of non-committing encryption which, in turn, can be instantiated from a variety of basic, well-established, assumptions. We conclude our study by showing that SO security is however strictly weaker than all variants of non-committing encryption that we consider, leaving potentially more efficient constructions as an interesting open problem.
This paper explains that SS1-secure functional encryption (FE) as defined by Boneh, Sahai and Waters implicitly incorporates security under key-revealing selective opening attacks (SOA-K). This connection helps intuitively explain their impossibility results and also allows us to prove stronger ones. To fill this gap and move us closer to the (laudable) goal of a general and achievable notion of FE security, we seek and provide two “sans SOA-K ” definitions of FE security that we call SS2 and SS3. We prove various possibility results about these definitions. We view our work as a first step towards the challenging goal of a general, meaningful and achievable notion of FE security. 1
Bit commitment involves the submission of evidence from one party to another so that the evidence can be used to confirm a later revealed bit value by the first party, while the second party cannot determine the bit value from the evidence alone. It is widely believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible due to quantum entanglement cheating, which is codified in a general impossibility theorem. In this paper, the scope of this general impossibility proof is analyzed, and gaps are found. Two variants of a bit commitment scheme utilizing anonymous quantum states and decoy states are presented. In the first variant, the exact verifying measurement is independent of the committed bit value, thus the second party can make it before the first party opens, making possible an unconditional security proof based on no-cloning. In the second variant, the impossibility proof fails because quantum entanglement purification of a mixed state does not render the protocol determinate. Whether impossibility holds in this or similar protocols is an open question, although preliminary results already show that the impossibility proof cannot work as it stands.