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International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing

Analysis and Improvement of Two-Factor Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols in Public Wireless LANs

Chuangui Ma, Shumin Chen, Qingfeng Cheng

Published Sep 1, 2011• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In 2009, Lee et al. proposed two password authenticated key exchange protocols based on Juang and Wu's protocols. In this paper, we will show that Lee et al.'s protocols cannot resist impersonation attack. It means that the adversary can impersonate the server to cheat the client and break their two protocols trivially. Furthermore, we propose an improvement of their protocols with impersonation attack resilience.

DOI
10.1109/wicom.2011.6040530

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In 2009, Lee et al. proposed two password authenticated key exchange protocols based on Juang and Wu's protocols. In this paper, we will show that Lee et al.'s protocols cannot resist impersonation attack. It means that the adversary can impersonate the server to cheat the client and break their two protocols trivially. Furthermore, we propose an improvement of their protocols with impersonation attack resilience.
Abastract: Many authenticated multiple key exchange protocols were published in recent years. In 2008, Lee et al. presented an authenticated multiple key exchange protocol based on bilinear pairings. However, Vo et al. demonstrated an impersonation attack on the protocol , and it failed to provide authenticity and perfect forward secrecy as they had claimed. Later, Vo et al. proposed their enhancement protocol conforming which conforms to all desirable security properties. But, Vo's protocol required any party had held the public key each other, which required a large amount of storage. In this paper, we propose two new authenticated multiple key exchange protocols based on Lee's protocol, and makes them immune against Vo et al.'s attacks.
Recently, two certificateless three-party authenticated key agreement protocols were proposed, and both protocols were claimed they can meet the desirable security properties including forward security, key compromise impersonation resistance and so on. Through cryptanalysis, we show that one neither meets forward security and key compromise impersonation resistance nor resists an attack by an adversary who knows all users' secret values, and the other cannot resist key compromise impersonation attack. Finally, we propose improved protocols to make up two original protocols' security weaknesses, respectively. Further security analysis shows that our improved protocols can remove such security weaknesses.
Because sensor nodes are deployed in public areas, these sensors are easy to capture by adversaries. Once a sensor is stolen, the sensitive information stored in it is likely to be exposed. Accordingly, designing a secure authentication protocol should consider this issue. Sadri et al. recently proposed a two-factor authentication protocol with anonymity for wireless sensor networks. Unfortunately, we found that their protocol had a design flaw in the user and sensor authentication phase. Besides, their protocol can not resist stolen smart card attacks, sensor capture attacks, and user impersonation attacks. In addition, their protocol does not provide perfect forward security. This paper proposes a provably secure authentication to overcome these weaknesses and flaws. By comparing the security and performance of the proposed protocol with other related protocols, we find that our work has reasonable computation overhead and better security.
Mobile communications (e.g., emails, Snapchat and Facebook) over a wireless connection is a norm in our Internet-connected society. Ensuring the security of communications between devices is an ongoing challenge. A number of authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have been proposed to verify the authenticity of a user and the integrity of messages sent over an insecure wireless communication channel. Recently, Tsai et al. proposed two AKE protocols designed for wireless network systems. In this paper, we demonstrate that their protocols are vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks through presenting concrete attacks, contrary to their claims.
In 2010, Fan et al. proposed a Smart Card-Based Authenticated Key Exchange protocol with CAPTCHAs for wireless mobile networks. In this paper, it is shown that their proposed protocol is vulnerable to Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) and ephemeral key compromise impersonation attacks while it does not provide the key confirmation attribute. Furthermore, it is inefficient due to number redundancy of rounds and computational costs. To overcome these weaknesses, two secure and efficient smart card-based Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols combined with CAPTCHAs are proposed for wireless mobile networks that provide many security attributes while they have a remarkable efficiency when compared with Fan et al.'s protocol in the terms of communication costs and computational complexities.