Information-theoretic security offered by the wiretap channel model has been extensively studied for various scenarios recently. One scenario that has not received much attention is secrecy for systems with memory in the form of input constraints or inter-symbol interference (ISI). In this work, we consider finite state wiretap channels (FSWCs), which model the scenario of secrecy with memory. Using results on secrecy capacity for arbitrary wiretap channels, we first arrive at the secrecy capacity of a FSWC. Then, we develop a stochastic algorithm for computing tight lower bounds on the secrecy capacity of a less-noisy FSWC, and illustrate the computation through examples. Our results provide numerical comparisons between secrecy capacities with and without memory, and provide specific targets for code design.
Information-theoretic security offered by the wiretap channel model has been extensively studied for various scenarios recently. One scenario that has not received much attention is secrecy for systems with memory in the form of input constraints or inter-symbol interference (ISI). In this work, we consider finite state wiretap channels (FSWCs), which model the scenario of secrecy with memory. Using results on secrecy capacity for arbitrary wiretap channels, we first arrive at the secrecy capacity of a FSWC. Then, we develop a stochastic algorithm for computing tight lower bounds on the secrecy capacity of a less-noisy FSWC, and illustrate the computation through examples. Our results provide numerical comparisons between secrecy capacities with and without memory, and provide specific targets for code design.
In this paper, we study the secrecy capacity of Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels (WTCs) with a finite memory, subject to a per-symbol average power constraint on the MIMO channel input. MIMO channels with finite memory are very common in wireless communications as well as in wireline communications (e.g., in communications over power lines). To derive the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MIMO WTC with finite memory, we first construct an asymptotically equivalent block-memoryless MIMO WTC, which is then transformed into a set of parallel, independent, memoryless MIMO WTCs in the frequency domain. The secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MIMO WTC with finite memory is obtained as the secrecy capacity of the set of parallel, independent, memoryless MIMO WTCs, and is expressed as maximization over the input covariance matrices in the frequency domain. Finally, we detail two applications of our result: First, we show that the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian scalar WTC with finite memory can be achieved by waterfilling, and obtain a closed-form expression for this secrecy capacity. Then, we use our result to characterize the secrecy capacity of narrowband powerline channels, thereby resolving one of the major open issues for this channel model.
In this work we study the secrecy capacity of Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels (WTCs) with a finite memory, subject to a per-symbol average power constraint on the MIMO channel input. MIMO channels with finite memory are very common in wireless communications as well as in wireline communications (e.g., in communications over power lines). To derive the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MIMO WTC with finite memory we first construct an asymptotically-equivalent block-memoryless MIMO WTC, which is then transformed into a set of parallel, independent, memoryless MIMO WTCs in the frequency domain. The secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MIMO WTC with finite memory is obtained as the secrecy capacity of the set of parallel independent memoryless MIMO WTCs, and is expressed as a maximization over the input covariance matrices in the frequency domain. Lastly, we detail two applications of our result: First, we show that the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian scalar WTC with finite memory can be achieved by waterfilling, and obtain a closed-form expression for this secrecy capacity. Then, we use our result to characterize the secrecy capacity of narrowband powerline channels, thereby resolving one of the major open issues for this channel model.
The strong secrecy transmission problem of the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWC) with input and state constraints is investigated in this paper. First, a stochastic-encoder code lower bound of the strong secrecy capacity is established by applying the type argument and Csiszár’s almost independent coloring lemma. Then, a superposition stochastic-encoder code lower bound of the secrecy capacity is provided. The superposition stochastic-encoder code lower bound can be larger than the ordinary stochastic-encoder code lower bound. Random code lower and upper bounds of the secrecy capacity of the AVWC with constraints are further provided. Based on these results, we further consider a special case of the model, namely severely less noisy AVWC, and give the stochastic-encoder code and random code capacities. It is proved that the stochastic-encoder code capacity of the AVWC with constraints is either equal to or strictly smaller than the corresponding random code capacity, which is consistent with the property of the ordinary AVC. Finally, some numerical examples are presented to better illustrate our capacity results. Compared to the soft covering lemma that requires the codewords to be generated i.i.d., our method has more relaxed requirements regarding codebooks. It is proved that the good codebooks for secure transmission can be generated by choosing codewords randomly from a given type set, which is critical when considering the AVWC with constraints.
We consider reliable and secure communication over intersymbol interference wiretap channels (ISI-WTCs). In particular, we first derive an achievable secure rate for ISI-WTCs without imposing any constraints on the input distribution. Afterwards, we focus on the setup where the input distribution of the ISI-WTC is constrained to be a time-invariant finite-order Markov chain. Optimizing the parameters of this Markov chain toward maximizing the achievable secure rates is a computationally intractable problem in general, and so, toward finding a local maximum, we propose an iterative algorithm that at every iteration replaces the secure rate function with a suitable surrogate function whose maximum can be found efficiently. Although the secure rates achieved in the unconstrained setup are potentially larger than the secure rates achieved in the constrained setup, the latter setup has the advantage of leading to efficient algorithms for estimating and optimizing the achievable secure rates, and also has the benefit of being the basis of efficient coding schemes.
Privacy is a critical issue when communicating over shared mediums. A fundamental model for the information-theoretic analysis of secure communications is the wiretap channel (WTC), which consists of a communicating pair and an eavesdropper. In this work we study the secrecy capacity of Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) WTCs with finite memory. These channels are very common in wireless communications as well as in wireline communications (e.g., in power line communications). We derive a closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian WTC with finite memory via the analysis of an equivalent block-memoryless model, which is transformed into a set of parallel independent memoryless MIMO WTCs. The secrecy capacity is expressed as the maximization over the input covariance matrices in the frequency domain. Finally, we show that for the Gaussian scalar WTC with finite memory, the secrecy capacity can be obtained by waterfilling.
In this thesis, we consider a class of information protection problems requiring confidentiality (secrecy) from eavesdropping and integrity (reliability) from jamming in an information-theoretic context. For this purpose, we introduce the arbitrarily varying wire-tap channel (AVWTC) model consisting of a family of wiretap channels indexed by some state that is selected by the jammer in an arbitrary and time-varying manner. We study this model for traditional wiretap codes and randomized wiretap codes, and develop insights about the corresponding secrecy capacity and randomized-code secrecy capacity, respectively. We characterize a lower bound on the randomized-code secrecy capacity of the AVWTC that suggests the secrecy is mainly dictated by a worst-case scenario. Additionally, we establish two upper bounds on the randomized-code secrecy capacity that suggest a single bad ``averaged' state can preclude secure communication, while certain superiorities of the legitimate receiver over the eavesdropper in all ``averaged' states result in a positive secrecy capacity. Finally, we prove that the secrecy capacity of the AVWTC is either zero or equal to its randomized-code secrecy capacity. We show that a ``two-layer' wiretap code is appropriate for combatting the two non-colluding jamming and eavesdropping adversaries.