Toward a micro realistic version of quantum mechanics. Part I

Nicholas Maxwell

H. J. Spencer

This report investigates the flawed foundations of standard quantum theory based on a misunderstanding of the role of measurement. The report is major part of a research programme (UET) based on a new theory of the electromagnetism (EM), centered exclusively on the interaction between electrons. All the previous papers to date in this series have presented a realistic view of the dynamics of two or more electrons as they interact only between themselves. This paper now posits a theory of how this microscopic activity is perceived by human beings in attempting to extract information about atomic systems. The standard theory of quantum mechanics (QM) is constructed on only how the micro-world appears to macro measurements - as such, it cannot offer any view of how the foundations of the world are acting when humans are not observing it (the vast majority of the time) - this has generated almost 100 years of confusion and contradiction at the very heart of physics. All human beings (and all our instruments) are vast collections of electrons, our information about atomic-scale can only be obtained destructively and statistically. This theory now extends the realistic model of digital electrons by adding an explicit measurement model of how our macro instruments interfere with nature's micro-systems when such attempts result in human-scale information. The focus here is on the connection between the micro-world (when left to itself) and our mental models of this sphere of material reality, via the mechanism of atomic measurements. The mathematics of quantum mechanics reflects the eigenvalues of the combined target system plus equipment used for measurement together. Therefore, QM has constructed a theory that inseparably conflates the ontological and epistemological views of nature. This standard approach fails to examine isolated target systems alone. It is metaphysically deficient. This investigation concludes that the Quantum State function (Ψ) is not a representation of physical reality, within a single atom, but a generator function for producing the average statistical results on many atoms of this type. In contrast, the present theory builds on the physical reality of micro-states of single atoms, where (in the case of hydrogen), a single electron executes a series of fixed segments (corresponding to the micro-states) across the atom between a finite number of discrete interactions between the electron and one of the positrons in the nucleus. The set of serial segments form closed trajectories with real temporal periods, contra to Heisenberg’s ‘papal’ decree banning such reality because of his need to measure position and momentum at all times. This is the first paper in the multi-paper series (UET7n), which is dedicated to analyzing, criticizing and replacing existing theories of quantum mechanics.

Giuseppe Boscarino

Nicholas Maxwell

I put forward a micro realistic, probabilistic version of quantum theory, which specifies the precise nature of quantum entities thus solving the quantum wave/particle dilemma, and which both reproduces the empirical success of orthodox quantum theory, and yields predictions that differ from orthodox quantum theory for as yet unperformed experiments.

Carl Frederick

Christopher Norris

In this essay, I offer a critical evaluation of Hilary Putnam's writings on epistemology and philosophy of science, in particular his engagement with interpretative problems in quantum mechanics. I trace the development of his thinking from the late 1960s when he adopted a strong causal-realist position on issues of meaning, reference, and truth, via the "internal realist" approach of his middle-period writings, to the various forms of pragmatist, naturalized, or "commonsense" epistemology proposed in his latest books. My contention is that Putnam's retreat from a full-fledged realist outlook has been prompted in large part by his belief that it cannot possibly be reconciled with the implications of quantum mechanics for our understanding of processes and events in the subatomic domain. However, I suggest, this response should be seen as premature given the range of as-yet unresolved problems with quantum mechanics on the orthodox (Copenhagen) interpretation and also the existence of an alternative account - David Bohm's hidden-variables theory - which perfectly matches the established predictive-observational results while providing a credible realist ontology. I also examine Putnam's case for adopting a nonstandard (three-valued) "quantum logic" in relation to the thinking of other philosophers - Michael Dummett among them - who have espoused a more global or doctrinaire version of anti-realism. I conclude that Putnam's early (causal-realist) position is by no means untenable in light of the various arguments that he now takes as counting decisively against it.