The mass relationships associated with a system of chemical equations are studied in a general way as a linear algebraic structure; initially the linear space is represented in terms of the matrix relations of stoichiometry, and subsequently more abstractly in terms of linear operators working on a carrier space. Various mathematical structures arise naturally so that ultimately the framework might be extended to a Hilbert space. The determination of a consistent set of atomic weights from the directly accessible experimental information recorded in equivalent weights was a notorious indeterminate problem in the nineteenth century. The indeterminacy arises in the present formalism because of the freedom to represent the linear space in terms of any valid basis, while the physical interpretation requires the selection of a privileged representation. It is argued that at a fundamental level this should arise through quantization, and the paper represents a first step in that direction by formulating the stoichiometric equations as a classical linear operator theory.
The mass relationships associated with a system of chemical equations are studied in a general way as a linear algebraic structure; initially the linear space is represented in terms of the matrix relations of stoichiometry, and subsequently more abstractly in terms of linear operators working on a carrier space. Various mathematical structures arise naturally so that ultimately the framework might be extended to a Hilbert space. The determination of a consistent set of atomic weights from the directly accessible experimental information recorded in equivalent weights was a notorious indeterminate problem in the nineteenth century. The indeterminacy arises in the present formalism because of the freedom to represent the linear space in terms of any valid basis, while the physical interpretation requires the selection of a privileged representation. It is argued that at a fundamental level this should arise through quantization, and the paper represents a first step in that direction by formulating the stoichiometric equations as a classical linear operator theory.
The received view in the philosophy of physics is that a quantum theory is given its mathematical formulation in a so-called Hilbert space, with the states of a quantum system given by the elements of this space and observables—measurable quantities of the system—given by so-called operators on this space. But the status of this fundamental postulate becomes threatened when one moves to complex systems, like the quantum fields underlying fundamental particle physics or statistical systems composed of infinite collections of quantum particles. In these more complex cases, one finds many inequivalent Hilbert space representations that appear to be competing quantum theories. In looking for a mathematical structure of the theory to interpret as representing the physical world, one is faced with a choice: either arbitrarily pick one Hilbert space representation (out of the many competing representations) as a Hilbert Space Conservative, or else look for the abstract algebraic structure that all of these competing representations have in common as an Algebraic Imperialist. This dissertation provides an extended argument for the second route.
The commutator of position and momentum operators is first considered in the coordinate and momentum representations, and then in an abstract Hilbert space. The reader is then introduced to canonical operators with the associated canonical quantization of commutation rules, which consists of maps defined on a symplectic space and taking values in the set of unitary operators on a Hilbert space. If the symplectic space is finite-dimensional, all of its irreducible representations are unitarily equivalent. The Weyl exponentiated form of the commutation relations is described and investigated. One then arrives at the definition of Weyl systems, and it is shown how to recover from them the formulation in terms of self-adjoint operators which satisfy a generalized form of commutation relations. Further topics are the Heisenberg representation for temporal evolution and the generalized uncertainty relations. Unitary operators associated with symplectic linear transformations are then considered, and, within this framework, translations, rotations and the harmonic oscillator are considered. The Weyl programme is then reassessed. Lastly, the basic postulates of modern quantum theory are eventually studied: the probabilistic nature of the predictions of results of measurements; the correspondence between observables and self-adjoint operators on Hilbert spaces; the expected result of measuring an observable quantity; and the evolution of the state vector in systems which are not affected by any external influence. The chapter ends with an outline of rigged Hilbert space formalism and its applications. The commutator in wave mechanics In the first part of this book we studied wave mechanics within the framework of the Schrödinger equation.
Quantum theory is the soul of contemporary physics. It was discovered in an adventurous way, under the urge to solve the puzzles posed by atomic spectra and blackbody radiation. But after its invention, it immediately became clear that it was not just a theory of specific physical systems: it was rather a new language of universal applicability. Already in 1928, the theory had received solid mathematical foundations by Hilbert, von Neumann, and Nordheim, and this work was brought to completion in the monumental work of von Neumann, in the form that we still study nowadays. The theory is extraordinarily successful, and its predictions have been confirmed to an astonishing level of precision in a large spectrum of experiments. However, almost 90 years after von Neumann's book, quantum theory remains mysterious. Its mathematical formulation – based on Hilbert spaces and self-adjoint operators – is far from having an intuitive interpretation. The association of physical systems to Hilbert spaces whose unit vectors represent pure states, the representation of transformations by unitary operators and of observables by self-adjoint operators – all such postulates look artificial and ad hoc . A slightly more operational approach is provided by the C * -algebraic formulation of quantum theory – still, this formulation relies on the assumption that observables form an algebra , where the physical meanings of the multiplication and the sum are far from clear. In short, the postulates of quantum theory impose mathematical structures without providing any simple reason for this choice: the mathematics of Hilbert spaces is adopted as a magic blackbox that “works well” at producing experimental predictions. However, in a satisfactory axiomatization of a physical theory the mathematical structures should emerge as a consequence of postulates that have a direct physical interpretation. By this we mean postulates referring, e.g., to primitive notions like physical system, measurement, or process, rather than notions like, e.g., Hilbert space, C * -algebra, unit vector, or selfadjoint operator. The crucial question thus remains unanswered: why quantum theory? Which are the principles at the basis of the theory? A case that is often invoked in contrast is that of Special Relativity theory, which directly follows from the simple understandable principle of relativity.
Following previous works by E. Prugovečki [Physica A 91A, 202 (1978) and Stochastic Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Space–time (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986)] on common features of classical and quantum mechanics, we develop a unified mathematical framework for classical and quantum mechanics (based on L2-spaces over classical phase space), in order to investigate to what extent quantum mechanics can be obtained as a simple modification of classical mechanics (on both logical and analytical levels). To obtain this unified framework, we split quantum theory in two parts: (i) general quantum axiomatics (a system is described by a state in a Hilbert space, observables are self-adjoints operators, and so on) and (ii) quantum mechanics proper that specifies the Hilbert space as L2(Rn); the Heisenberg rule [pi,qj]=−iℏδij with p=−iℏ∇, the free Hamiltonian H=−ℏ2Δ/2m and so on. We show that general quantum axiomatics (up to a supplementary “axiom of classicity”) can be used as a nonstandard mathematical ground to formulate physical ideas and equations of ordinary classical statistical mechanics. So, the question of a “true quantization” with “ℏ” must be seen as an independent physical problem not directly related with quantum formalism. At this stage, we show that this nonstandard formulation of classical mechanics exhibits a new kind of operation that has no classical counterpart: this operation is related to the “quantization process,” and we show why quantization physically depends on group theory (the Galilei group). This analytical procedure of quantization replaces the “correspondence principle” (or canonical quantization) and allows us to map classical mechanics into quantum mechanics, giving all operators of quantum dynamics and the Schrödinger equation. The great advantage of this point of view is that quantization is based on concrete physical arguments and not derived from some “pure algebraic rule” (we exhibit also some limit of the correspondence principle). Moreover spins for particles are naturally generated, including an approximation of their interaction with magnetic fields. We also recover by this approach the semi-classical formalism developed by E. Prugovečki [Stochastic Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Space–time (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986)].
Introduction One of the most influencial contributions of H ermann W eyl to mathematical physics has been his paper Gruppentheorie und Quantenmechanik [W e 27] from 1927 and its extended version, the book [W e 28] which was published a year later and carries the same title. The main topic of this part of H ermann W eyl's work is the mathematics of quantum mechanics. After the fundamental papers by H eisenberg and S chrödinger on the foundations of quantum mechanics had appeared in the twenties of the last century this was the central question studied in mathematical physics at that time and which to a certain degree still is present in all attempts to construct mathematically rigorous theories unifying quantum mechanics and general realtivity. In his article Gruppentheorie und Quantenmechanik , H ermann W eyl essentially introduced two novel aspects to the mathematics of quantum mechanics, namely the following: (i) The representation theory of (compact) Lie groups on Hilbert spaces was applied to mathematically determine atomic spectra. (ii) A conceptually clear quantization method was proposed which associates quantum mechanical operators to classical observables which mathematically are represented by appropriate functions of the space and momentum variables. Nowadays, this quantization scheme is named after his inventor Weyl quantization. In this paper I will elaborate only on the second aspect, since the representation theory of compact Lie groups has already been covered in detail in other contributions to these proceedings.
Most philosophical work on quantum physics has concerned simple systems. And for good reason. Even one or two particle systems can exhibit the striking features we have come to associate with quantum physics—features such as entanglement, interference, and nonlocality. But as far as physics goes, such systems barely scrape the surface. In particular, they have only a finite number of degrees of freedom, which means their states are characterized by a finite number of independent parameters. The systems studied in fields such as high-energy particle physics and many-body physics, meanwhile, have uncountably many degrees of freedom. They are far more complicated than the usual philosophical fare.This is not troubling as long as the conceptual heart of quantum physics can be effectively condensed down. But what if philosophers' toy systems are fundamentally different from realistic ones? That would be a problem. And indeed, as Laura Ruetsche convincingly argues in Interpreting Quantum Theories, systems with uncountable degrees of freedom—what Ruetsche collectively calls QM∞—are fundamentally different from the systems that have become the stock and trade of philosophy of physics, in ways that change the interpretational project.Ruetsche's book does two things exceedingly well. The first is to provide a (comparatively) accessible and philosophically oriented introduction to the algebraic approach to quantum physics, which is essential for understanding QM∞. This is a valuable contribution. The algebraic approach is the setting for much recent philosophical work. And yet learning it is notoriously difficult, as even pedagogical texts are aimed at research-level mathematicians. Ruetsche's book is technically demanding, but it works to bring nonmathematicians along. It is, without a doubt, the best place to enter this literature.Second, the book sets the agenda for future work on QM∞, by effectively and judiciously drawing important foundational questions out of a sprawling and difficult physics literature. In this regard, it is a close cousin to John Earman's (1995) excellent Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers, and Shrieks, which has had a significant influence on subsequent philosophy of spacetime physics. Philosophers of physics will be addressing the questions Ruetsche has raised, in many cases for the first time, for years to come.Interpreting Quantum Theories centers on what might be called the problem of inequivalent representations. The quantum theories that philosophers are accustomed to are set in a mathematical structure known as a (separable) Hilbert space, which is an at-most countably infinite dimensional complex vector space. Rays in a Hilbert space represent possible states of a physical system, and self-adjoint operators on that Hilbert space correspond to properties of the system.To treat QM∞, meanwhile, physicists pass to a generalization of this formalism. Now one begins with an abstract algebra of operators corresponding to the various properties associated with the system. States in this more general framework are linear functionals on the algebra whose value at each operator is interpreted as the expectation value of a measurement of that property in that state.The trouble with this more general framework is that the interpretational tools of Hilbert space quantum theories do not directly apply. Some solace comes from recognizing that any (appropriate) algebra of operators admits a representation in terms of the operators on a Hilbert space. This suggests that one can always move back to the more familiar Hilbert space formalism. But this is a pyrrhic victory. In general these Hilbert space representations are neither unique nor empirically equivalent. In particular, these inequivalent representations, interpreted in the familiar way, yield disagreements about which algebraic states are physically realizable.Faced with this situation, Ruetsche presents several principled options—what she calls “pristine” interpretations of QM∞. The two most significant are what she calls “Hilbert Space Conservatism” and “Algebraic Imperialism.” The Conservative claims that, for a given system, there is one true Hilbert space representation, which should be interpreted in the familiar ways. The Imperialist, meanwhile, insists that only the abstract algebra matters: the physical states are the algebraic states, properties correspond to the operators in the algebra, and if our old methods do not apply, so much the worse for our methods.At this level of description, Imperialists may appear to have the advantage, since they need not fret over which representation to choose. But there's a catch. As we have seen, there is a sense in which Imperialists generally recognize a broader range of possible physical states. But Conservatives allow for more properties. This is because when one represents the abstract algebra as operators on a Hilbert space, the operators in the representation naturally approximate additional operators on that Hilbert space, in a way that is unavailable in the abstract setting. Thus each interpretation suffers from limitations that the other does not.To adjudicate between the interpretations, Ruetsche takes them to the trenches, to see which provides the resources to support the actual explanatory and representational practices of physics. After a masterful survey, she concludes that neither interpretation has all of the requisite resources. In particular, she argues, physicists regularly make essential use of operators that are only available to Conservatives, while making equally essential use of multiple inequivalent representations—which only Imperialists can support. More, the particular mix of Conservatism and Imperialism varies between applications, apparently ruling out a stable interpretation of the formalism that can be articulated independently of the messy details. We are left with what Ruetsche calls “adulterated” interpretations.Philosophers' practice notwithstanding, it might seem unsurprising that we cannot separate our interpretation of physical theories from the pragmatics of their application to the world. After all, we are interested in these theories only insofar as they are successfully applied. But Ruetsche believes the problem is more acute. It is not merely that pragmatic considerations enter the debate between Conservatives and Imperialists. Ruetsche argues that there may not be any consistent, general interpretation of QM∞ compatible with practice. And this, she claims, makes realism about QM∞ untenable.The idea that the applications of a broad class of our best physical theories undermine their consistent interpretation in a way that renders realism incoherent is striking. Insofar as Ruetsche's case is convincing, it should have serious repercussions for general philosophy of science—both because it bears on important debates and because it shows how generalist questions depend on the details of particular scientific theories and their applications. Indeed, Ruetsche's skepticism about the terms of the realism debate and her radical particularism should influence general philosophy of science. But that said, her argument ultimately leaves room for disagreement.Ruetsche's basic claim is that Conservatism and Imperialism each support practices that the other cannot and that both kinds of practice are essential. But there is an important asymmetry here. Conservatives suffer because they fail to represent putative physical possibilities appealed to in practice. Imperialists, meanwhile, need to justify that in certain applications, they may limit attention to a subset of the physical possibilities their interpretation admits, and then use resources that only make sense in those limited regimes.The trouble is that the Imperialists' opportunism is neither unusual in physics nor difficult to motivate. In spacetime physics, for instance, properties such as the total mass of the universe or global time can be defined only in very special cases. And yet such properties are used in practice, because often the salient spacetimes are precisely the ones in which these quantities make (approximate) sense. To make her case that adulteration in QM∞ undermines realism, Ruetsche would need to establish that the representation-dependent quantities used in applications of QM∞ are different in kind from analogous quantities that appear throughout physics. And here it is not clear that she succeeds.None of this undercuts the importance of the book, however. Indeed, Ruetsche acknowledges that her argument may depend on how one understands idealization in physics. And even if one takes the view just described, there is a great deal of work to do on how Imperialism can support the practices Ruetsche identifies—work that will surely proceed within the framework Ruetsche has laid out, by addressing questions Ruetsche has raised. And so, wherever our study of QM∞ takes us, Ruetsche's book is sure to play a central role.