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Foundations of Physics Letters

?Anti-realism?: answer to phil Dowe

O. Costa de Beauregard

Published Oct 1, 1993• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bf00682794

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Scientific realism about spin is easily motivated. But what does it amount to? To answer this question, Chapter 3 contrasts in general terms two epistemological conceptions of realism—truth-content vs. progress realism—before problematizing truth-content realism in the context of quantum physics. After articulating the challenge faced by truth-content realism, the chapter argues that progress realism avoids it, offering a stable middle ground between anti-realism and traditional truth-content realism.
The framework of a simple opposition realism – anti-realism is not enough to analyze the views on the reality of unobservable objects of quantum theory. First, it is necessary to distinguish between realism in relation to the theory and realism in relation to the theory’s objects. Secondly, realism in relation to classical objects can be combined, both with realism and with anti-realism in relation to quantum objects. Third, the concept of “existence” and “to exist objectively” can have different meanings. To take into account these factors, the article describes three approaches: classical realism, quantum anti-realism, and quantum realism. I show that the debate around quantum reality has intensified in recent decades due to a series of new quantum experiments. The current stage of the debate is caused by the second quantum revolution relating to the transfer and processing of quantum information. Classical realism and old versions of quantum anti-realism have become insufficiently effective to explain the results of a series of experiments. Proponents of quantum realism, in turn, refer to the possibility of using the wave function to manipulate quantum objects before their measurement. In conclusion, I assume that not only theoretical discussions but also experiments and new technologies can have a major impact on the seemingly purely philosophical debate about reality.