What becomes of our clearest theories of explanation, when faced with the unpalatable quantum phenomena that seem to undermine the direct conceptual connection between the fundamental material entities and the self-standing material objects of everyday parlance? The general explanatory theory advocates unification of explanatory concepts with everyday discourse, identification of essentially similar characteristics between direct experience and the hypothesised explanatory ontology, and a conceptualisation of phenomena in terms of objects enduring causally regulated change. On the other hand quantum theory feeds anti-realist suspicions about the worth of (metaphysical) realist explanatory endeavour with examples of phenomena in which the structure of material separation and individuation based on spatial extension is insufficient for construction of deeper explanatory narratives. An example from history of science, that of Newton’s law-constitutive definition of objects in response to Descartes problem of bodies is used to suggest a possible strategy for explanations unifying the quantum and common-sense conceptual domains, provided the anti-realist challenge to such enterprise is read as questioning the epistemological justification of interpretation of experience in both cases. \n(IN CROATIAN: Što se događa s najjasnijim dostupnim teorijama objašnjenja kada se suoče s problematičnim kvantnim pojavama koje naizgled potkopavaju neposrednu konceptualnu poveznicu između fundamentalnih materijalnih entiteta i samoopstojnih materijalnih predmeta iz svakodnevnog govora? Opća teorija objašnjenja preporuča objedinjenje teoretskih eksplanatornih pojmova sa svakodnevnim govorom, određenje esencijalno sličnih karakteristika između neposrednog iskustva i hipotetske eksplanatorne ontologije te konceptualizaciju pojava kroz predmete koji istraju kroz uzročno regulirane promjene. S druge strane, kvantna teorija potkrjepljuje antirealistične sumnje o valjanosti eksplanatornog nastojanja (metafizičkog) realizma primjerima pojava u kojima je struktura materijalne razdvojenosti i individuacije temeljene na prostornoj protežnosti nedovoljna za izgradnju dubljih eksplanatornih narativa. Primjerom iz povijesti znanosti, Newtonovom definicijom predmeta temeljenom na zakonima kao odgovorom na Descartesov problem materijalnih tijela, daje se moguća strategija izgradnje objašnjenja koja objedinjuju kvantne i “zdravorazumske” konceptualne domene, ukoliko se antirealistična kritika te izgradnje u oba slučaja shvati kao propitivanje epistemološkog opravdanja tumačenja iskustva.)
What becomes of our clearest theories of explanation, when faced with the unpalatable quantum phenomena that seem to undermine the direct conceptual connection between the fundamental material entities and the self-standing material objects of everyday parlance? The general explanatory theory advocates unification of explanatory concepts with everyday discourse, identification of essentially similar characteristics between direct experience and the hypothesised explanatory ontology, and a conceptualisation of phenomena in terms of objects enduring causally regulated change. On the other hand quantum theory feeds anti-realist suspicions about the worth of (metaphysical) realist explanatory endeavour with examples of phenomena in which the structure of material separation and individuation based on spatial extension is insufficient for construction of deeper explanatory narratives. An example from history of science, that of Newton’s law-constitutive definition of objects in response to Descartes problem of bodies is used to suggest a possible strategy for explanations unifying the quantum and common-sense conceptual domains, provided the anti-realist challenge to such enterprise is read as questioning the epistemological justification of interpretation of experience in both cases. \n(IN CROATIAN: Što se događa s najjasnijim dostupnim teorijama objašnjenja kada se suoče s problematičnim kvantnim pojavama koje naizgled potkopavaju neposrednu konceptualnu poveznicu između fundamentalnih materijalnih entiteta i samoopstojnih materijalnih predmeta iz svakodnevnog govora? Opća teorija objašnjenja preporuča objedinjenje teoretskih eksplanatornih pojmova sa svakodnevnim govorom, određenje esencijalno sličnih karakteristika između neposrednog iskustva i hipotetske eksplanatorne ontologije te konceptualizaciju pojava kroz predmete koji istraju kroz uzročno regulirane promjene. S druge strane, kvantna teorija potkrjepljuje antirealistične sumnje o valjanosti eksplanatornog nastojanja (metafizičkog) realizma primjerima pojava u kojima je struktura materijalne razdvojenosti i individuacije temeljene na prostornoj protežnosti nedovoljna za izgradnju dubljih eksplanatornih narativa. Primjerom iz povijesti znanosti, Newtonovom definicijom predmeta temeljenom na zakonima kao odgovorom na Descartesov problem materijalnih tijela, daje se moguća strategija izgradnje objašnjenja koja objedinjuju kvantne i “zdravorazumske” konceptualne domene, ukoliko se antirealistična kritika te izgradnje u oba slučaja shvati kao propitivanje epistemološkog opravdanja tumačenja iskustva.)
We begin by surveying the historical positions in different attempts to understand the material world since the rise of modern science, with specific focus on the role of Cartesian primary qualities in explanatory conceptualisation. Moreover the opening chapter argues that although explanatory narratives are essentially epistemological constructions, they require a general metaphysical backing through the explainer's and explainee's commitments to take the concepts and higher structures composed of them as directly referential. Two methodological perspectives on theory construction, Einstein's division into principle and constructive theories, are then delineated along the lines of their metaphysical and explanatory potential, and presented as the research instrument with which to approach the specific-case-study instances of quantum theory reconstruction. A specific strategy of arguing for scientific realism ('the simple transcendental strategy') is then presented and connected to the challenges that the phenomena (EPR correlations and 'teleportation') from the domain of contemporary quantum theory pose for it. The opening chapter concludes with a survey of the general models of explanation and their position with respect to the principle-constructive dichotomy introduced above. Finally, an explanatory model containing extended material-like entities along with further primitives, universal laws of temporal evolution, is argued for. Consequently, in the interest of a wholesome realistic response to the sceptical challenge about the explanatory aims of science, we recommend that even the common sense conceptual framework replaces the extended material structure with 'generalised things' as re-identifiable invariants through change as the fundamental unit of the realist ontology.
Svrha je rada trojaka. Prvo, naglasiti kako je kopenhasko tumacenje kvantne mehanike primarno formulirano kao jedna epistemologija kantovskoga tipa koja se ne bavi toliko objektivno valjanim i nužnim znanjem o atomnome svijetu vec koja vise pita o mogucnostima iskustva toga svijeta. Drugo, kopenhasko tumacenje nije niti je namjeravalo biti ontologijom atomnoga svijeta. Ovo je pojasnjeno shodno kantovskom razumijevanju Bohrova tumacenja, gdje Bohr jasno odjeljuje atomni objekt kao stvar-po-sebi (Kantov noumenon) i objekt kako-se-pojavljuje u kontekstu mjerenja, sto Bohr znakovito u kantovskom stilu nazivlje 'fenomen', nalazeci kako je kvantni objekt smisleno misljen jedino posredstvom fenomena. I trece, namjera je suociti Bohrovu filozofiju s Heisenbergom, koji iako je dijelio ovu pragmaticnu crtu Bohrova tumacenja, također progovara o ontoloskoj dimenziji kvantne mehanike, nalazeci svoje uporiste u Aristotelovim konceptima možnosti (dunamis, potentia) i zbiljnosti (energeia, actus). Geneza i filozofijsko zaleđe ovoga Heisenbergova rjesenja također je promisljeno u opcenitijem okvirima Aristotelove hilemorficke ontologije kao odgovora na Platonovu filozofiju objektivnog idealizma.
As the previous chapter made clear, in the present interpretation quantum mechanics gives a rather specific account of EPR-type correlations and what underlies them. In the present chapter I argue that this account is genuinely explanatory (rather than merely an idle overlay on a simple description of the observed correlations), and that this constitutes a significant advantage of the present interpretation over certain rival interpretations, on which quantum mechanics is unable to offer an adequate explanation of the observed correlations. In order to make this argument it will prove necessary to examine the character of causal explanation in theoretical science, and in particular to develop a coherent metaphysics of a kind of holistic, nonseparable, causal explanation. I take the development of such a coherent metaphysics to constitute a significant task independent of the details of the present interpretation of quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics is a mine of metaphysical insights, and I hope here at least to have exposed a rich seam. The first task is to defend the adequacy of the present account of EPR-type correlations as at least a coherent description of what may underlie the observed correlations. I foresee three main challenges to its descriptive adequacy. The first is to claim that the account is incompatible with the relativistic requirement that there can be no direct causal connection between spacelike-separated events, and must therefore be rejected. A weaker version of this challenge is to claim that although the incompatibility just mentioned may not by itself entail rejection of the account, it does seriously undermine its claim to be genuinely explanatory.
Tradicionalno filozofijsko pitanje o odnosu uma i tvari poprima u kvantnoj mehanici oblik pitanja o odnosu promatranog (kvantnog objekta) i promatraca (umnog subjekta) u mjernome procesu. Dok klasicna fizika postavlja taj odnos u kontekst jednosmjerne pasivne percepcije objekta i njegovih inherentnih svojstava od strane subjekta, pri cemu subjekt ni na koji nacin u konacnici ne ulazi niti u opis svojstava samoga objekta niti procesa njegove percepcije, u okvirima filozofijâ kvantne mehanike gotovo je opce mjesto kako je staticnost subjekt-objekt relacije nesto sto ova teorija dokida na posve radikalan nacin. Međutim, ekstenzivnost dinamike ove relacije jos uvijek je predmetom brojnih rasprava. Poglavito, moguce je postaviti dva temeljna pitanja: je li dinamika subjekt-objekt relacije u kvantoj mehanici nalik onoj blažoj na tragu kopenhaskog tumacenja, gdje se doduse naglasava aktivna uloga mjerne naprave kao posrednika kojim objekt i subjekt stupaju u određen tijesan dodir ali gdje je u konacnici ipak moguce nedvosmisleno odijeliti (klasicni) subjekt od (kvantnog) objekta, ili pak je ta sveza ipak nesto jaceg metafizickog karaktera, kako to predlažu određene intepretacije, na tragu tradicionalnog um-tijelo dualizma interakcijskog tipa? Ova ce se pitanja sagledati kroz dva moguca pristupa, koji se nazivaju noetickih i poietickim.
Quantum mechanics has maintained over the years the reputation of being "the most obscure theory." It works perfectly well, but nobody seems to know why. It has been argued that the difficulty in understanding quantum theory is our failed attempt to force onto it a wrong conceptual scheme, wanting at all costs to think about the objects of the theory as, precisely, objects, i.e., entities having continuously actual spatiotemporal properties. This too restrictive spatiotemporal scheme is most probably at the heart of the problem, as also underlined by the Einsteinian revolution, but then what could be an alternative? Many thinkers have suggested that we must surrender to the fact that our physical world is one of immanent powers and potencies. Aristotle did so ante quantum litteram, followed by scholars like Heisenberg, Primas, Shimony, Piron, Kastner, Kauffman, de Ronde, just to name a few, including the authors, who were both students of Piron in Geneva. However, if on the one hand a potentiality ontology puts the accent on the processes of change, responsible for the incessant shifts between actual and potential properties, on the other hand it does not tell what these changes are all about. In other words, the metaphysical question remains of identifying the nature of the bearer of these potencies, or potentialities, and of the entities that can actualize them. It is the purpose of the present article to emphasize that the above question has found a possible answer in the recent Conceptuality Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, which we believe offers the missing ontology and metaphysics that can make the theory fully intelligible, and even intuitive.
The modern physics is characterized by deeper and deeper penetration into the laws of the world of atoms and other minute particles of matter. These laws require not only new experimental techniques to be developed, but also new notions to formulate them. To describe atomic phenomena new methods that are completely different from those used to investigate larger objects of our world are required. The new problem of description of atomic objects is of particular practical importance since the arising notions could be applied to other fields of knowledge. Therefore on the ground of the modern physics some questions of the philosophical character arise. We are going to consider them here.