There is increasing evidence that information may be the basic stuff of the universe. We consider this proposition in the light of Bohm and Hiley's (1993) quantum potential, the work of the ANPA group on the combinatorial hierarchy, and the natural philosophies of G. Kron (1963) and M. Jessel (1962). We compare and contrast the philosophical backgrounds of both these and the more conventional Copenhagen interpretation. In conclusion, we suggest that our approach should be termed 'constructive postmodern physics'.>
There is increasing evidence that information may be the basic stuff of the universe. We consider this proposition in the light of Bohm and Hiley's (1993) quantum potential, the work of the ANPA group on the combinatorial hierarchy, and the natural philosophies of G. Kron (1963) and M. Jessel (1962). We compare and contrast the philosophical backgrounds of both these and the more conventional Copenhagen interpretation. In conclusion, we suggest that our approach should be termed 'constructive postmodern physics'.>
There is increasing evidence that information may be the basic stuff of the Universe. We consider this proposition in the light of Bohm and Hiley's Quantum Potential, the work of the ANPA group on the Combinatorial Hierarchy, and the Natural Philosophies of Gabriel Kron and Maurice Jassel. We compare and contrast the philosophical backgrounds of both these and the more conventional Copenhagen interpretation. In conclusion we suggest that our approach should be termed Constructive Postmodern Physics.
This study offers a comprehensive analysis of David Bohm’s article “A New Theory of the Relationship of Mind and Matter” (Philosophical Psychology, 1990) — one of the most original attempts of the twentieth century to overcome Cartesian dualism on a physical foundation. The paper proceeds in sequence through the historical context of the mind–body problem, the physical basis of the causal interpretation of quantum mechanics, the central concept of active information, and the implicate order. Bohm’s framework is then compared with several major contemporary approaches: Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Hameroff & Penrose, 2014), the holographic brain model (Pribram, 1991), Integrated Information Theory (Tononi, 2004), and the Global Workspace model (Baars, 1988; Dehaene, 2014). A dedicated section examines the relationship between Bohm’s ideas and Rovelli’s Relational Quantum Mechanics (Rovelli, 1996), as well as Loop Quantum Gravity (Rovelli, 2004; Rovelli & Smolin, 1995), and Qbism, developed by Christopher Fuchs, Rüdiger Schack, and Carlton Caves (Fuchs, 2002; Fuchs et al., 2014). The concluding section evaluates the compatibility of Bohm’s ideas with quantum field theory and modern quantum information science. The principal conclusion is that Bohm’s 1990 article does not constitute a complete theory of consciousness, yet it anticipates with remarkable prescience the information-ontological tendencies of the twenty-first century and may best be understood as a philosophical-physical metatheory whose relevance has only grown since its publication.
Introduction Many philosophers and physicists have expressed great hope that quantum information theory will help us understand the nature of the quantum world. The general problem is that there is no widespread agreement on what quantum information is. Hence, such pronouncements regarding quantum information theory as the savior of the philosophy of physics are hard to evaluate. Much work has been done producing and evaluating concepts of information. In I have defended and articulated the Schumacher concept of quantum information. Roughly speaking, quantum information is construed as the statistical behavior associated with the measurement of a quantum system. Hence it is a coarse-grained operational description of quantum systems, with no recourse to the fundamental ontological features of quantum systems responsible for such behavior. From this perspective, construing quantum mechanics as a theory of quantum information departs from the traditional interpretive endeavors of philosophers and physicists. The question is whether there is any motivation for taking such a view. The theorem of Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson (CBH) provides just such a motivation. The theorem guarantees that, if a theory T satisfies certain conditions, there will exist an empirically equivalent C *-algebraic theory that has a concrete representation in Hilbert space, which it is notoriously difficult to interpret as a constructive or mechanical theory. In such a case, any underlying ontologies philosophers develop that are compatible with T will be undermined by the C*-algebraic equivalent. Bub suggests in light of this in-principle uncertainty regarding ontology that we re-conceive of quantum mechanics as a theory about quantum information.
Though the truths of logic and pure mathematics are objective and independent of any contingent facts or laws of nature, our knowledge of these truths depends entirely on our knowledge of the laws of physics. Recent progress in the quantum theory of computation has provided practical instances of this, and forces us to abandon the classical view that computation, and hence mathematical proof, are purely logical notions independent of that of computation as a physical process. Henceforward, a proof must be regarded not as an abstract object or process but as a physical process, a species of computation, whose scope and reliability depend on our knowledge of the physics of the computer concerned.
We discuss the emergence of topology from a consideration of set extensions in General Systems Theory. Boundaries arise in a natural way, separating independent elements or regions of the system. Our aim is a unification of Etter theory, Kron's method of Tearing and Jessel's formulation of Huygens' Principle. This should make explicit the equivalence between the objective, structural, holographic and the subjective, relative definitions of information, sought in Bowden (1994b), reprinted in this Special Issue. It connects the abstract generalisations of Schrodinger's equation and Bom's rule derived in probabilistic Etter theory with the real world of electrical and other physical phenomena in General Physical Systems Theory. This paper can be considered as a continuation of Bowden (1990; 1994a) and as a response to Bowden (1994b), reprinted in this issue. We review the ideas behind Kron's Method of Tearing and Jessel's Principle of Secondary sources (both special cases of the above theory) and their equivalence. We follow Hiley's argument in Hiley (1996) to show how Schrodinger's equation can be thought of as specifying the evolution of (a series of) tearings in continuous space. These can be shown on a commutative diagram as a series of similarity transforms. We compare this with Etter's derivation (Etter, 1998). We describe briefly a recently published derivation of Maxwell's equations from a non-commutative algebra and show how they fit onto a related commutative diagram. Finally we make some comments on applications of the general theory to computer systems. This paper is a series of vignettes of work in progress. It is designed to point the direction of work to come in Constructive Physics.
Abstract The paper investigates David Bohm’s philosophy of science as a form of fallibilist realism that underpins his causal interpretation of quantum mechanics Bohm (Bohm 1952a, 1952b, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990; Bohm and Hiley 1975, 1984, 1993). Bohm’s central aim is to establish the superiority of his interpretation over the standard Copenhagen framework, particularly in contrast to that of Niels Bohr. Whereas Bohr asserts that knowledge of quantum phenomena is restricted to the statistical outcomes of measurement, Bohm’s approach is distinctly realist in orientation. Responding to the challenges posed by Einstein and other physicists, Bohm relies on extra-empirical criteria such as determinism, objectivity and intelligibility. The paper develops what will be termed the methodology of intuitive intelligibility (II), consisting of four stages: (1) reformulation of the standard quantum equations, (2) physical interpretation of the mathematical symbols, (3) drawing analogies with classical laws, and (4) drawing analogies with common experience. It is argued that Bohm applies the (II) methodology consistently, with the notable exception of the ontological status of the wave function and quantum potential. In attempting to explain causal relations from a 3N-dimensional configuration space (where N is the number of particles) to familiar three-dimensional space through an appeal to ‘information’, Bohm arguably commits a category mistake. A proposed resolution—drawing on Bohm’s own holistic analogies—is supported by the recent multi-field interpretation (Romano Multi-field and Bohm’s theory. Synthese, 198(30), 10587–10609, 2021). The term fallibilist realism aptly characterizes Bohm’s stance in the philosophy of science: he repeatedly emphasizes that the causal interpretation is not intended as a final theory. Nevertheless, holism constitutes a substantive ontological commitment that he is unwilling to abandon.