There is increasing evidence that information may be the basic stuff of the Universe. We consider this proposition in the light of Bohm and Hiley's Quantum Potential, the work of the ANPA group on the Combinatorial Hierarchy, and the Natural Philosophies of Gabriel Kron and Maurice Jassel. We compare and contrast the philosophical backgrounds of both these and the more conventional Copenhagen interpretation. In conclusion we suggest that our approach should be termed Constructive Postmodern Physics.
There is increasing evidence that information may be the basic stuff of the Universe. We consider this proposition in the light of Bohm and Hiley's Quantum Potential, the work of the ANPA group on the Combinatorial Hierarchy, and the Natural Philosophies of Gabriel Kron and Maurice Jassel. We compare and contrast the philosophical backgrounds of both these and the more conventional Copenhagen interpretation. In conclusion we suggest that our approach should be termed Constructive Postmodern Physics.
There is increasing evidence that information may be the basic stuff of the universe. We consider this proposition in the light of Bohm and Hiley's (1993) quantum potential, the work of the ANPA group on the combinatorial hierarchy, and the natural philosophies of G. Kron (1963) and M. Jessel (1962). We compare and contrast the philosophical backgrounds of both these and the more conventional Copenhagen interpretation. In conclusion, we suggest that our approach should be termed 'constructive postmodern physics'.>
This study offers a comprehensive analysis of David Bohm’s article “A New Theory of the Relationship of Mind and Matter” (Philosophical Psychology, 1990) — one of the most original attempts of the twentieth century to overcome Cartesian dualism on a physical foundation. The paper proceeds in sequence through the historical context of the mind–body problem, the physical basis of the causal interpretation of quantum mechanics, the central concept of active information, and the implicate order. Bohm’s framework is then compared with several major contemporary approaches: Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Hameroff & Penrose, 2014), the holographic brain model (Pribram, 1991), Integrated Information Theory (Tononi, 2004), and the Global Workspace model (Baars, 1988; Dehaene, 2014). A dedicated section examines the relationship between Bohm’s ideas and Rovelli’s Relational Quantum Mechanics (Rovelli, 1996), as well as Loop Quantum Gravity (Rovelli, 2004; Rovelli & Smolin, 1995), and Qbism, developed by Christopher Fuchs, Rüdiger Schack, and Carlton Caves (Fuchs, 2002; Fuchs et al., 2014). The concluding section evaluates the compatibility of Bohm’s ideas with quantum field theory and modern quantum information science. The principal conclusion is that Bohm’s 1990 article does not constitute a complete theory of consciousness, yet it anticipates with remarkable prescience the information-ontological tendencies of the twenty-first century and may best be understood as a philosophical-physical metatheory whose relevance has only grown since its publication.
Though the truths of logic and pure mathematics are objective and independent of any contingent facts or laws of nature, our knowledge of these truths depends entirely on our knowledge of the laws of physics. Recent progress in the quantum theory of computation has provided practical instances of this, and forces us to abandon the classical view that computation, and hence mathematical proof, are purely logical notions independent of that of computation as a physical process. Henceforward, a proof must be regarded not as an abstract object or process but as a physical process, a species of computation, whose scope and reliability depend on our knowledge of the physics of the computer concerned.
Abstract The paper investigates David Bohm’s philosophy of science as a form of fallibilist realism that underpins his causal interpretation of quantum mechanics Bohm (Bohm 1952a, 1952b, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990; Bohm and Hiley 1975, 1984, 1993). Bohm’s central aim is to establish the superiority of his interpretation over the standard Copenhagen framework, particularly in contrast to that of Niels Bohr. Whereas Bohr asserts that knowledge of quantum phenomena is restricted to the statistical outcomes of measurement, Bohm’s approach is distinctly realist in orientation. Responding to the challenges posed by Einstein and other physicists, Bohm relies on extra-empirical criteria such as determinism, objectivity and intelligibility. The paper develops what will be termed the methodology of intuitive intelligibility (II), consisting of four stages: (1) reformulation of the standard quantum equations, (2) physical interpretation of the mathematical symbols, (3) drawing analogies with classical laws, and (4) drawing analogies with common experience. It is argued that Bohm applies the (II) methodology consistently, with the notable exception of the ontological status of the wave function and quantum potential. In attempting to explain causal relations from a 3N-dimensional configuration space (where N is the number of particles) to familiar three-dimensional space through an appeal to ‘information’, Bohm arguably commits a category mistake. A proposed resolution—drawing on Bohm’s own holistic analogies—is supported by the recent multi-field interpretation (Romano Multi-field and Bohm’s theory. Synthese, 198(30), 10587–10609, 2021). The term fallibilist realism aptly characterizes Bohm’s stance in the philosophy of science: he repeatedly emphasizes that the causal interpretation is not intended as a final theory. Nevertheless, holism constitutes a substantive ontological commitment that he is unwilling to abandon.
Western philosophy and science have a strongly dualistic tradition regarding the mental and physical aspects of reality, which makes it difficult to understand their possible causal relations. In recent debates in cognitive neuroscience it has been common to claim on the basis of neural experiments that conscious experiences are causally inefficacious. At the same time there is much evidence that consciousness does play an important role in guiding behavior. The author explores whether a new way of understanding the causal role of mental states and consciousness could be provided by the ontological interpretation of the quantum theory (Bohm and Hiley, Phys. Rep. 144:323–348, 1987; Bohm and Hiley, The undivided universe: An ontological interpretation of quantum theory. Routledge: London, 1993). This interpretation radically changes our notion of matter by suggesting that a new type of active information plays a causal role at the quantum level of reality. The author thus considers to what extent the alleged causal powers of consciousness involve information, and then moves on to consider whether information in (conscious) mental states can be connected to the information at the level of quantum physics. In this way he sketches how quantum theory might help to throw light upon one of the grand challenges facing the social sciences and the humanities, namely the question of whether consciousness plays any genuine causal role in the physical world.