The term "vagueness" describes a property of natural concepts, which normally have fuzzy boundaries, admit borderline cases, and are susceptible to Zeno's sorites paradox. We will discuss the psychology of vagueness, especially experiments investigating the judgment of borderline cases and contradictions. In the theoretical part, we will propose a probabilistic model that describes the quantitative characteristics of the experimental finding and extends Alxatib's and Pelletier's () theoretical analysis. The model is based on a Hopfield network for predicting truth values. Powerful as this classical perspective is, we show that it falls short of providing an adequate coverage of the relevant empirical results. In the final part, we will argue that a substantial modification of the analysis put forward by Alxatib and Pelletier and its probabilistic pendant is needed. The proposed modification replaces the standard notion of probabilities by quantum probabilities. The crucial phenomenon of borderline contradictions can be explained then as a quantum interference phenomenon.
The term "vagueness" describes a property of natural concepts, which normally have fuzzy boundaries, admit borderline cases, and are susceptible to Zeno's sorites paradox. We will discuss the psychology of vagueness, especially experiments investigating the judgment of borderline cases and contradictions. In the theoretical part, we will propose a probabilistic model that describes the quantitative characteristics of the experimental finding and extends Alxatib's and Pelletier's () theoretical analysis. The model is based on a Hopfield network for predicting truth values. Powerful as this classical perspective is, we show that it falls short of providing an adequate coverage of the relevant empirical results. In the final part, we will argue that a substantial modification of the analysis put forward by Alxatib and Pelletier and its probabilistic pendant is needed. The proposed modification replaces the standard notion of probabilities by quantum probabilities. The crucial phenomenon of borderline contradictions can be explained then as a quantum interference phenomenon.
Recent work in cognitive psychology has revealed that quantum probability theory provides another method of computing probabilities without falling into the restrictions that classical probability has in regard to modeling cognitive systems and decision-making. This enables the explanation of paradoxical scenarios that are difficult, or even impossible, to explain through classical probability theory. In this work, we perform an overview of the most important quantum models in the literature that are used to make predictions under scenarios where the Sure Thing Principle is being violated (the Quantum-Like Approach, the Quantum Dynamical Model, the Quantum Prospect Theory and Quantum-Like Bayesian Networks). We evaluated these models in terms of three metrics: interference effects, parameter tuning and scalability. The first examines if the analyzed model makes use of any type of quantum interference to explain human decision-making. The second is concerned with the assignment of values to a large number of quantum parameters. The last one consists of analyzing the ability of the models to be extended and generalized to more complex scenarios. We also studied the growth of the quantum parameters when the complexity and the levels of uncertainty of the decision scenario increase. Finally, we compared these quantum models with traditional classical models from the literature. We conclude with a discussion of the manner in which the models addressed in this paper can only deal with very small decision problems and why they do not scale well to larger, more complex decision scenarios.
Uncertainty is an intrinsic part of life; most events, affairs, and questions are uncertain. A key problem in behavioral sciences is how the mind copes with uncertain information. Quantum probability theory offers a set of principles for inference, which align well with intuition about psychological processes in certain cases: cases when it appears that inference is contextual, the mental state changes as a result of previous judgments, or there is interference between different possibilities. We motivate the use of quantum theory in cognition and its key characteristics. For each of these characteristics, we review relevant quantum cognitive models and empirical support. The scope of quantum cognitive models encompasses fallacies in decision-making (such as the conjunction fallacy or the disjunction effect), question order effects, conceptual combination, evidence accumulation, perception, over-/underdistribution effects in memory, and more. Quantum models often formalize psychological ideas previously expressed in heuristic terms, allow unified explanations of previously disparate findings, and have led to several surprising, novel predictions. We also cast a critical eye on quantum models and consider some of their shortcomings and issues regarding their further development.
While classical accounts of identity (‘classical’ here pertaining to both logics and physics) are generally well understood, the advent of quantum theory, specifically quantum statistics, has cast shadow over these conceptions. Dealing with the consequently surfacing problems is a philosophically rich and interesting enterprise. I begin this thesis by providing an exegesis of the roles played by, and features of, identity in logics, classical physics, and quantum physics. Therein I consider how under a quantal description of reality, classical notions of identity and individuality break down. In the second chapter, I address how this problem has launched an arc of thought in analytic metaphysics and formal philosophy motivating the development of non-standard formal frameworks with which philosophical sense can be made of quantal objects. Among these, I explore and critically evaluate quaset theory, quasi-set theory, and non-reflexive Schr¨odinger logics, identifying some significant problems with quaset theory that arise in defining cardinality and later, pointing out a problem with Schr¨odinger logics in their modelling of the continuity between quantal and classical treatments of the world. The queer character of identity in the quantal regime motivates a turn to vagueness which I introduce in the third chapter, providing a brief outline of vagueness and the sorites paradox. Further, I reflect on the fundamental nature of vagueness, outlining and evaluating the semantic and ontic conceptions thereof. In the final chapter, I proceed to explicate and assess notions that identity and quantal objects can be vague. I shall discuss accounts according to which the vagueness of identity and quantum objects is posited as a feature of nature emerging in quantum systems — the ontic vagueness of identity — finding that these ideas are flawed and/or rely on misinterpretations of vagueness. Finally, I present an argument which suggests how the vagueness of identity can arise as an artifact of the differing treatments of identity in the quantal and classical regimes in which the vagueness involved can be semantic rather than ontic.
The quantum cognition research programme concerns the application of quantum probability theory(the rules for how to assign probabilities to events from quantum mechanics, without the physics) tocognitive modeling. We review quantum cognitive models in several areas of psychology, includingconjunction/ disjunction fallacies in probabilistic judgment, conceptual combinations, similarity, order effects on judgments, causal inference, the disjunction effect in decision making, measurement and interference effects on judgments and decisions, memory, perception, and other judgment anddecision-making applications. For each area, we first present the empirical findings that have motivated the application of quantum models, emphasizing any characteristics which are particularly puzzling or have resisted coherent theoretical explanations previously; we then discuss the quantum cognitive models, noting the key features of the models that help explain the empirical data; we finally cast a critical eye on the models and explore comparisons with non-quantum models.
Quantum mechanics emerged as the result of a successful resolution of stringent empirical and profound conceptual conflicts within the development of atomic physics at the beginning of the last century. At first glance, it seems to be bizarre and even ridiculous to apply ideas of quantum physics in order to improve current psychological and linguistic or semantic ideas. However, a closer look shows that there are some parallels in the development of quantum physics and advanced theories of cognitive science. In psychology, geometric models of meaning have a long tradition. However, they suffer from many shortcomings which are illustrated by discussing several puzzles of bounded rationality. In the first part of this article, we argue that the present account of quantum cognition - taking quantum probabilities rather than classical probabilities - can give a more systematic description of these puzzles than the alternate and rather eclectic treatments in the traditional framework of bounded rationality. Unfortunately, the quantum probabilistic treatment does not always and does not automatically provide a deeper understanding and a true explanation of these puzzles. In the second part of this article, we explain the foundational issue from the perspective of Piron, Foulis, Randall, and others, and we apply it to the foundation of quantum cognition. In this connection, we show that quantum probabilities are of (virtual) conceptual necessity if grounded in an abstract algebraic framework of orthomodular lattices. This framework is motivated by assuming partial Boolean algebras (describing particular perspectives) that are combined into a uniform system while considering certain capacity restrictions. It is at this point that one important aspect of the whole idea of bounded rationality directly enters the theoretical scenery of quantum cognition: resource limitation.
It has frequently been suggested that quantum mechanics may provide a genuine case of ontic vagueness or metaphysical indeterminacy. However, discussions of quantum theory in the vagueness literature are often cur- sory and, as I shall argue, have in some respects been mis- guided. Hitherto much of the debate over ontic vagueness and quantum theory has centered on the indeterminate construal of ontic vagueness, and whether the quantum phenomenon of entanglement produces particles whose identity is indeterminate. I argue that this way of framing the debate is mistaken. A more thorough ex- amination of quantum theory and the phenomenon of entanglement reveals that quantum mechanics is best in- terpreted as supporting what I call the property construal of ontic vagueness, where vague properties are understood in terms of determinable properties without the corresponding determinates.