We have analyzed the feasibility of performing Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), in earth-satellite and intersatellite links, with four quantum cryptography protocols: BB84 and SARG04 with and without decoy states. In order to facilitate the protocols comparison we have computed the rates using the optimal mean photon number for each protocol and for each distance. Furthermore, we have formulate a lower bound on the key generation rate of SARG04 with a finite number of decoy states, and we have obtained all numerical results using realistic values for optical hardware and accounting for realistic atmospheric effects. The results of the analysis indicate that the maximum rate and transmit distance are obtained when the proposed method is applied, and it is possible to establish QKD with LEO (Low Earth Orbit) and MEO (Medium Earth Orbit) satellites.
We have analyzed the feasibility of performing Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), in earth-satellite and intersatellite links, with four quantum cryptography protocols: BB84 and SARG04 with and without decoy states. In order to facilitate the protocols comparison we have computed the rates using the optimal mean photon number for each protocol and for each distance. Furthermore, we have formulate a lower bound on the key generation rate of SARG04 with a finite number of decoy states, and we have obtained all numerical results using realistic values for optical hardware and accounting for realistic atmospheric effects. The results of the analysis indicate that the maximum rate and transmit distance are obtained when the proposed method is applied, and it is possible to establish QKD with LEO (Low Earth Orbit) and MEO (Medium Earth Orbit) satellites.
In this paper we analyze the feasibility of performing Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), in Earth-satellite up and downlinks and in intersatellite links, with two quantum cryptography protocols: BB84 and SARG04, and with two implementation options: with and without decoy states. As real measurements in these scenarios are not possible yet, the objective is to obtain results as realistic as possible to support the design of future satellite missions performing QKD. Therefore, we use realistic values for the optical hardware and take into account usual atmospheric conditions. In the same line, we assume specific types of attacks, namely the photon number splitting and the intercept-resend with unambiguous discrimination attacks, which could likely be the main threat to the first satellite-based QKD applications. A lower bound on the key generation rate of SARG04 with two decoy states is presented. The optimum signal- and decoy-states mean photon numbers for each protocol and each distance are also computed. The resulting values for the signal-state are larger than those often employed. We show that it may be possible to establish QKD with LEO (Low Earth Orbit) and, under certain circumstances, with MEO (Medium Earth Orbit) satellites, but not with GEO (Geostationary) ones. Furthermore, we obtain that the optimum signal-state mean photon number for SARG04 with two decoy states is almost independent of the link distance, which greatly facilitates its use in a real scenario.
This study aims at extending the concept of QKD to the optical free-space quantum communications domain. Moreover, the feasibility of a global satellite based quantum key distribution, in the low earth orbit (LEO) is investigated. Inline with this, three different link scenarios, including ground-to-ground, ground-to-satellite and satellite-to-satellite are considered. Moreover, system performance is analysed to show the sensitivity of the link to effect such as atmospheric attenuation, turbulence and detector noise. Generally, these factors are assumed to impair system performance by causing an overall increase in the systems quantum bit error rate (QBER), let alone limiting the communication bit rate and transmission distance of the link. The obtained results reveal the feasibility of satellite-based quantum key distribution in the LEO platform, a concept which could be potentially extended to geostationary earth orbit (GEO).
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has gained a lot of attention over the past few years, but the implementation of quantum security applications is still challenging to accomplish with the current technology. Towards a global-scale quantum-secured network, satellite communications seem to be a promising candidate to successfully support the quantum communication infrastructure (QCI) by delivering quantum keys to optical ground terminals. In this research, we examined the feasibility of satellite-to-ground QKD under daylight and nighttime conditions using the decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol. We evaluated its performance on a hypothetical constellation with 10 satellites in sun-synchronous Low Earth Orbit (LEO) that are assumed to communicate over a period of one year with three optical ground stations (OGSs) located in Greece. By taking into account the atmospheric effects of turbulence as well as the background solar radiance, we showed that positive normalized secure key rates (SKRs) up to 3.9×10−4 (bps/pulse) can be obtained, which implies that satellite-to-ground QKD can be feasible for various conditions, under realistic assumptions in an existing infrastructure.
This paper proposes and analyzes the potential of a multi-photon tolerant quantum communication protocol to secure satellite communication. For securing satellite communication, quantum cryptography is the only known unconditionally secure method. A number of recent experiments have shown feasibility of satellite-aided global quantum key distribution (QKD) using different methods such as: Use of entangled photon pairs, decoy state methods, and entanglement swapping. The use of single photon in these methods restricts the distance and speed over which quantum cryptography can be applied. Contemporary quantum cryptography protocols like the BB84 and its variants suffer from the limitation of reaching the distances of only Low Earth Orbit (LEO) at the data rates of few kilobits per second. This makes it impossible to develop a general satellite-based secure global communication network using the existing protocols. The method proposed in this paper allows secure communication at the heights of the Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) satellites. The benefits of the proposed method are two-fold: First it enables the realization of a secure global communication network based on satellites and second it provides unconditional security for satellite networks at GEO heights. The multi-photon approach discussed in this paper ameliorates the distance and speed issues associated with quantum cryptography through the use of contemporary laser communication (lasercom) devices. This approach can be seen as a step ahead towards global quantum communication.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic solution that leverages the properties of quantum mechanics to be resistant and secure even against an attacker with unlimited computational power. Satellite-based links are important in QKD because they can reach distances that the best fiber systems cannot. However, links between satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) and ground stations have a duration of only a few minutes, resulting in the generation of a small amount of secure keys. In this context, we investigate the optimization of the information reconciliation step of the QKD post-processing in order to generate as much secure key as possible. As a first step, we build an accurate model of the downlink signal and quantum bit error rate (QBER) during a complete satellite pass, which are time-varying due to three effects: (i) the varying link geometry over time, (ii) the scintillation effect, and (iii) the different signal intensities adopted in the Decoy-State protocol. Leveraging the a-priori information on the instantaneous QBER, we improve the efficiency of information reconciliation (IR) (i.e., the error correction phase) in the Decoy-State BB84 protocol, resulting in a secure key that is almost 3\% longer for realistic scenarios.
Satellite-based free-space quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a practical framework for achieving secure global communication beyond the limitations of optical fibers. In this work, the quantum bit error rate (QBER) and secure key rate of four representative protocols-BB84, B92, BBM92, and E91 are investigated over low earth orbit (LEO) links in both uplink and downlink configurations. The optical link is modeled using a Gaussian beam formalism, incorporating the effects of diffraction, pointing errors, atmospheric turbulence, and background noise contributions. The protocols are examined under day and night-time operating conditions, and their dependence on the zenith angle is analyzed. The findings show that downlink links generally exhibit lower QBER and higher secure key rates than uplinks, and among prepare-and-measure schemes, BB84 consistently outperforms B92, while in entanglement-based approaches, BBM92 achieves higher key rates than E91.