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International Conference on Computer, Communications and Information Technology (CCIT)

A Solution for Beam Splitter Attack on BB84 Protocol

Huiyao An, Dunwei Liu, Tao Yu

Published Jan 1, 2014• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

In the practical Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems, the Fused Biconical Taper (FTP) technology beam splitter (BS) has wavelength dependent property.So Eve will get almost all of the secret information without being discovered in the beam splitter attack.This paper proposes a solution to solve the beam splitter attack.It uses three beam splitters to remove the incredible photons which could have been attacked by Eve. Bob gets a proper three-beam-splitter group, so Eve can't catch any secret information without being found.

DOI
10.2991/ccit-14.2014.49

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In the practical Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems, the Fused Biconical Taper (FTP) technology beam splitter (BS) has wavelength dependent property.So Eve will get almost all of the secret information without being discovered in the beam splitter attack.This paper proposes a solution to solve the beam splitter attack.It uses three beam splitters to remove the incredible photons which could have been attacked by Eve. Bob gets a proper three-beam-splitter group, so Eve can't catch any secret information without being found.
In the practical Quantum Key Distribution(QKD)systems,the beam splitter which made by the Fused Biconical Taper(FTP)technology has wavelength dependent property.So Eve will get almost all of the secret information without being discovered in this way.In this paper,we proposed a solution for beating the beam splitter attack.Quantum Bit Error Rate(QBER)could increase with Rayleigh scattering effect in the fiber channel,but in our schemes this effect could do very less by different wavelength photos.Wavelength Division Multiplexing(WDM)would separate photos by their different wavelength,and Bob can choose some reliable photos for QKD.Eve won't catch anything about the secret information.
It is known that practical quantum key distribution system, because of the imperfect of devices, has sort of loopholes, so Eve can attack through these loopholes. The proposition of measurement device independent quantum key distribution protocol claimed to solve all the loopholes at the detector side. However the proof of MDI-QKD is based on the Hong-Ou-Mandel effect at 50:50 beam splitter. And with current experimental technology, a realistic beam splitter, made by fused biconical technology, has a wavelength-dependent property. Based on this fatal security loophole, the author propose a wavelength-dependent attacking protocol, which can be applied to practical MDI-QKD systems. Through this attacking protocol the author theoretical estimated that the eavesdropper could get 70% of the encoding information with a QBER of only 0.04.
It is well known that the unconditional security of quantum-key distribution (QKD) can be guaranteed by quantum mechanics. However, practical QKD systems have some imperfections, which can be controlled by the eavesdropper to attack the secret key. With current experimental technology, a realistic beam splitter, made by fused biconical technology, has a wavelength-dependent property. Based on this fatal security loophole, we propose a wavelength-dependent attacking protocol, which can be applied to all practical QKD systems with passive state modulation. Moreover, we experimentally attack a practical polarization encoding QKD system to obtain all the secret key information at the cost of only increasing the quantum bit error rate from 1.31.31.3 to 1.41.4%1.4.
The unconditional security of quantum key distribution (QKD) can be guaranteed by the nature of quantum physics. Compared with the traditional two-dimensional BB84 QKD protocol, high-dimensional quantum key distribution (HD-QKD) can be applied to generate much more secret key. Nonetheless, practical imperfections in realistic systems can be exploited by the third party to eavesdrop the secret key. The practical beam splitter has a correlation with wavelength, where different wavelengths have different coupling ratios. Using this property, we propose a wavelength-dependent attack towards time-bin high-dimensional QKD system. What is more, we demonstrate that this attacking protocol can be applied to arbitrary d-dimensional QKD system, and higher-dimensional QKD system is more vulnerable to this attacking strategy.
The wavelength attack utilizes the dependence of beam splitters (BSs) on wavelength to cause legitimate users Alice and Bob to underestimate their excess noise so that Eve can steal more secret keys without being detected. Recently, the wavelength attack on Gaussian-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) has been researched in both fiber and atmospheric channels. However, the wavelength attack may also pose a threat to the case of ocean turbulent channels, which are vital for the secure communication of both ocean sensor networks and submarines. In this work, we propose two wavelength attack schemes on underwater discrete modulated (DM) CV-QKD protocol, which is effective for the case with and without local oscillator (LO) intensity monitor, respectively. In terms of the transmittance properties of the fused biconical taper (FBT) BS, two sets of wavelengths are determined for Eve's pulse manipulation, which are all located in the so-called blue-green band. The derived successful criterion shows that both attack schemes can control the estimated excess noise of Alice and Bob close to zero by selecting the corresponding condition parameters based on channel transmittance. Additionally, our numerical analysis shows that Eve can steal more bits when the wavelength attack controls the value of the estimated excess noise closer to zero.
Recently, to bridge the gap between security of Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) and a high key rate, a novel protocol, the so-called detector-device-independent QKD (DDI-QKD), has been independently proposed by several groups and has attracted great interest. A higher key rate is obtained, since a single photon bell state measurement (BSM) setup is applied to DDI-QKD. Subsequently, Qi has proposed two attacks for this protocol. However, the first attack, in which Bob's BSM setup is assumed to be completely a "black box", is easily prevented by using some additional monitoring devices or by specifically characterizing the BSM. The second attack, which combines the blinding attack and the detector wavelength-dependent efficiency, is not explicitly discussed, and its feasibility is not experimentally confirmed. Here, we show that the second attack is not technically viable because of an intrinsically wavelength-dependent property of a realistic beam splitter, which is an essential component in DDI-QKD. Moreover, we propose a feasible attack that combines a well-known attack-detector blinding attack with intrinsic imperfections of single-photon detectors. The experimental measurement and proof-of-principle test results confirm that our attack can allow Eve to get a copy of quantum keys without being detected and that it is feasible with current technology.