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Chinese Physics B

Attacking a high-dimensional quantum key distribution system with wavelength-dependent beam splitter*

Ge-Hai Du, Hong-Wei Li, Yang Wang, Wan‐Su Bao

Published Jul 24, 2019• 6 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The unconditional security of quantum key distribution (QKD) can be guaranteed by the nature of quantum physics. Compared with the traditional two-dimensional BB84 QKD protocol, high-dimensional quantum key distribution (HD-QKD) can be applied to generate much more secret key. Nonetheless, practical imperfections in realistic systems can be exploited by the third party to eavesdrop the secret key. The practical beam splitter has a correlation with wavelength, where different wavelengths have different coupling ratios. Using this property, we propose a wavelength-dependent attack towards time-bin high-dimensional QKD system. What is more, we demonstrate that this attacking protocol can be applied to arbitrary d-dimensional QKD system, and higher-dimensional QKD system is more vulnerable to this attacking strategy.

DOI
10.1088/1674-1056/ab343c

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The unconditional security of quantum key distribution (QKD) can be guaranteed by the nature of quantum physics. Compared with the traditional two-dimensional BB84 QKD protocol, high-dimensional quantum key distribution (HD-QKD) can be applied to generate much more secret key. Nonetheless, practical imperfections in realistic systems can be exploited by the third party to eavesdrop the secret key. The practical beam splitter has a correlation with wavelength, where different wavelengths have different coupling ratios. Using this property, we propose a wavelength-dependent attack towards time-bin high-dimensional QKD system. What is more, we demonstrate that this attacking protocol can be applied to arbitrary d-dimensional QKD system, and higher-dimensional QKD system is more vulnerable to this attacking strategy.
It is well known that the unconditional security of quantum-key distribution (QKD) can be guaranteed by quantum mechanics. However, practical QKD systems have some imperfections, which can be controlled by the eavesdropper to attack the secret key. With current experimental technology, a realistic beam splitter, made by fused biconical technology, has a wavelength-dependent property. Based on this fatal security loophole, we propose a wavelength-dependent attacking protocol, which can be applied to all practical QKD systems with passive state modulation. Moreover, we experimentally attack a practical polarization encoding QKD system to obtain all the secret key information at the cost of only increasing the quantum bit error rate from 1.31.31.3 to 1.41.4%1.4.
It is known that practical quantum key distribution system, because of the imperfect of devices, has sort of loopholes, so Eve can attack through these loopholes. The proposition of measurement device independent quantum key distribution protocol claimed to solve all the loopholes at the detector side. However the proof of MDI-QKD is based on the Hong-Ou-Mandel effect at 50:50 beam splitter. And with current experimental technology, a realistic beam splitter, made by fused biconical technology, has a wavelength-dependent property. Based on this fatal security loophole, the author propose a wavelength-dependent attacking protocol, which can be applied to practical MDI-QKD systems. Through this attacking protocol the author theoretical estimated that the eavesdropper could get 70% of the encoding information with a QBER of only 0.04.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an unconditionally secure way of sharing secret cryptographic keys on a public channel. Recently, high dimension QKD protocols have gained focus to achieve better security against various attack models. Here, we focus on the robustness of high dimensional QKD protocol against two realistic attack models, i.e. photon number splitting (PNS) attack and beam splitter (BS) attack. We present the high dimensional quantum key distribution system that incorporates a decoy-state scheme with complex structured light (OAM modes) using the KMB09 protocol. The complete QKD system design with experimental setup details and evaluation results are presented. The experimental results show that our proposed decoy-state scheme is robust against both PNS and BS attacks.
Imperfect devices in commercial quantum key distribution systems open security loopholes that an eavesdropper may exploit. An example of one such imperfection is the wavelength-dependent coupling ratio of the fiber beam splitter. Utilizing this loophole, the eavesdropper can vary the transmittances of the fiber beam splitter at the receiver's side by inserting lights with wavelengths different from what is normally used. Here, we propose a wavelength attack on a practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution system using homodyne detection. By inserting light pulses at different wavelengths, this attack allows the eavesdropper to bias the shot-noise estimation even if it is done in real time. Based on experimental data, we discuss the feasibility of this attack and suggest a prevention scheme by improving the previously proposed countermeasures.
Recently, to bridge the gap between security of Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) and a high key rate, a novel protocol, the so-called detector-device-independent QKD (DDI-QKD), has been independently proposed by several groups and has attracted great interest. A higher key rate is obtained, since a single photon bell state measurement (BSM) setup is applied to DDI-QKD. Subsequently, Qi has proposed two attacks for this protocol. However, the first attack, in which Bob's BSM setup is assumed to be completely a "black box", is easily prevented by using some additional monitoring devices or by specifically characterizing the BSM. The second attack, which combines the blinding attack and the detector wavelength-dependent efficiency, is not explicitly discussed, and its feasibility is not experimentally confirmed. Here, we show that the second attack is not technically viable because of an intrinsically wavelength-dependent property of a realistic beam splitter, which is an essential component in DDI-QKD. Moreover, we propose a feasible attack that combines a well-known attack-detector blinding attack with intrinsic imperfections of single-photon detectors. The experimental measurement and proof-of-principle test results confirm that our attack can allow Eve to get a copy of quantum keys without being detected and that it is feasible with current technology.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has attracted much attention due to its unconditional security. High-dimensional quantum key distribution (HD-QKD) is a brand-new type of QKD protocol that has many excellent advantages. Nonetheless, practical imperfections in realistic devices that are not considered in the theoretical security proof may have an impact on the practical security of realistic HD-QKD systems. In this paper, we research the influence of a realistic intensity modulator on the practical security of HD-QKD systems with the decoy-state method and finite-key effects. We demonstrate that there is a certain impact in the secret key rate and the transmission distance when taking practical factors into security analysis.