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Journal of Computer Security

Generic non-repudiation protocols supporting transparent off-line TTP

Guilin Wang

Published Nov 8, 2006• 29 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A non-repudiation protocol enables the fair exchange of an electronic message and an irrefutable digital receipt between two mistrusting parties over the Internet. That is, at the end of any execution instance of such a protocol, either both parties obtain their expected items or neither party does . In this paper, we first argue that it is really meaningful in practice to exploit generic fair non-repudiation protocols with transparent off-line trusted third party (TTP). Namely, in those protocols, each involved party could use any secure digital signature algorithm to produce non-repudiation evidences; and the issued evidences are the same regardless of whether the TTP is involved or not. Then, we present such a fair non-repudiation protocol to overcome some limitations and shortcomings in previous schemes. Technical discussions are provided to show that our protocol is not only secure but also the most efficient solution, compared with existing non-repudiation protocols. In addition, some potential extensions are also pointed out.

DOI
10.3233/jcs-2006-14504

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A non-repudiation protocol enables the fair exchange of an electronic message and an irrefutable digital receipt between two mistrusting parties over the Internet. That is, at the end of any execution instance of such a protocol, either both parties obtain their expected items or neither party does . In this paper, we first argue that it is really meaningful in practice to exploit generic fair non-repudiation protocols with transparent off-line trusted third party (TTP). Namely, in those protocols, each involved party could use any secure digital signature algorithm to produce non-repudiation evidences; and the issued evidences are the same regardless of whether the TTP is involved or not. Then, we present such a fair non-repudiation protocol to overcome some limitations and shortcomings in previous schemes. Technical discussions are provided to show that our protocol is not only secure but also the most efficient solution, compared with existing non-repudiation protocols. In addition, some potential extensions are also pointed out.
Non-repudiation service is widely employed in information exchange and online transaction. It requires that its participants are unable to deny their involvement in specific protocol. At the same time, the service should keep fairness, which means that no one could take any advantages over the other one. Researchers have introduced a trusted third party (TTP) to realize these demands. Protocols are grouped into several categories according to the degree of TTP's involvement in protocols. Optimistic non-repudiation protocol is the most important method undoubtedly owe to its lower TTP's involvement. There are two questions. One is that whether it is possible to further decrease TTP's involvement or not. A computable optimistic non-repudiation protocol seems to be a good improvement. This is also our paper's basic protocol. The other question is about whether two types of finally evidences that produced by participants (here is Alice and Bob, and we denote this type evidences as the first type evidences) and TTP (or with the help of TTP, and we demote this type evidences as the second type evidences) are identical. If both types of evidences are not exactly the same, then it shows that TTP has taken part in process of protocol. Thus, it is certain that either participants behaved dishonest, or network went wrong. Participants' prestige will be negatively affected more or less. On the contrary, if two types of evidences are identical, then such feelings will be eliminated. This kind of TTP is called transparent TTP. In this paper, we have accomplished an optimistic non-repudiation protocol with the help of transparent TTP based on a computable non-repudiation protocol.
We present protocols for fair exchange of electronic data (digital signatures, payment and confidential data) between two parties A and B. Novel properties of the proposed protocols include: 1) offline trusted third party (TTP), i.e., TTP does not take part in the exchange unless one of the parties behaves improperly; 2) only three message exchanges are required in the normal situation; 3) true fair exchange, i.e., either A and B obtain each other's data or no party receives anything useful; no loss can be incurred to a party no matter how maliciously the other party behaves during the exchange. This last property is in contrast to previously proposed protocols with offline TTP ([1] and [21]), where a misbehaving party may get another party's data while refusing to send his document to the other party, and the TTP can provide affidavits attesting to what happened during the exchange. To our knowledge, the protocols presented here are the first exchange protocols which use offline TTP and at the same time guarantee true fair exchange of digital messages. We introduce a novel cryptographic primitive, called the Certificate of Encrypted Message Being a Signature (CEMBS), as the basic building block of the fair exchange protocols. It is used to prove that an encrypted message is a certain party's signature on a public file, without revealing the signature. We also give two examples to show in detail how the certificate can be constructed.
we propose a new efficient protocol. which allows a pair of potentially mistrusting parties to exchange digital signatures over the Internet in a fair way. The protocol relies on an off-line Trusted Third Party (TTP). which does not take part in the exchange unless any of the parties behaves improperly or other faults occur. Efficiency of the protocol is achieved by using a cryptographic primitive, called designated confirmer signatures. The confirmer commitment schemes and ordinary signatures are combines to form the confirmer signatures. The security of the protocol is analyzed and the fairness of it is guaranteed.
This paper presents an efficient security protocol for certified e-goods delivery with the following features: (1) ensures strong fairness, (2) ensures non-repudiation of origin and non-repudiation of receipt, (3) allows the receiver of an e-goods to verify, during the protocol execution, that the e-goods he is about to receive is the one he is signing the receipt for, (4) does not require the active involvement of a fully trusted third party, but rather an off-line and transparent semi-trusted third party (STTP) only in cases of unfair behaviour by any party, and (5) provides confidentiality protection for the exchanged items from the STTP.
With the development of e-commence and other utilities on internet,a new security service——fair non-repudiation becomes more important and crucial.But,most current protocols depend on trusted third party(TTP),so a fair non-repudiation protocol without TTP is needed.But the existing fair protocols don't have equal security for message originator and receiver,and they can not assure the security of the message originator.In this paper,a new protocol is designed for the prior security of the originator,and a fair non-repudiation protocol without TTP based on entity's computing power is proposed to get rid of the dependence on TTP,to solve the security problems that exist when message originator and receiver's computing power are not equal.