The Reality question gained prominence within the professional scientific community mainly after the advent of quantum mechanics (QM) and its alleged incompleteness', supposedly proved by the 1935 Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) paper, followed by a powerful rejoinder by Bohr himself. The Bohr-Einstein controversy may be viewed as a disagreement about the proper interpretation of the standard formalism of QM. QM is non-atomist holism, while Einstein's view is atomistic. QM is a kind of non-atomist holism in a unique sense in the atomism of the Jainas or the logical atomism of Wittgenstein as presented in his Tractatus (TLP) are atomistic, yet a form of holism at the same time. In short, QM rejects the notion of pure objectivity as a myth, whereas for Einstein, the notion of an objective reality, free of all traces of subjectivism in it, is the prime requirement of a sound scientific methodology.
The Reality question gained prominence within the professional scientific community mainly after the advent of quantum mechanics (QM) and its alleged incompleteness', supposedly proved by the 1935 Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) paper, followed by a powerful rejoinder by Bohr himself. The Bohr-Einstein controversy may be viewed as a disagreement about the proper interpretation of the standard formalism of QM. QM is non-atomist holism, while Einstein's view is atomistic. QM is a kind of non-atomist holism in a unique sense in the atomism of the Jainas or the logical atomism of Wittgenstein as presented in his Tractatus (TLP) are atomistic, yet a form of holism at the same time. In short, QM rejects the notion of pure objectivity as a myth, whereas for Einstein, the notion of an objective reality, free of all traces of subjectivism in it, is the prime requirement of a sound scientific methodology.
The Bohr-Einstein debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics may be viewed as a discussion on the epistemological status of knowledge gained by physics. It is shown that in fact the advent of quantum theory has led, in a new context, to an old philosophical controversy between epistemological realism (held by Einstein) and phenomenalism (held by Bohr). An inquiry into this controversy, taking into account the contemporary understanding of quantum mechanics based on the axiomatic study of its foundations, leads to the conclusion that contrary to widespread opinion, it is perfectly possible to formulate quantum mechanics in an entirely realistic manner according to the postulate of Einstein. We demonstrate that Bohr's episteme-logy, in which the role of experimental arrangements in the physical description is taken as a starting point, does not necessarily imply phenomenlism, but may be justifiably considered as a complementary standpoint to the realistic epistemology of Einstein, which is based on the notion of a mental construction which pictures reality.
According to the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics (Bohr being its leading voice), the attributes of a physical object (position, momentum, spin, etc.) can be assigned only when they have been measured. Einstein advocated the local realist viewpoint that an object had definite attributes whether they had been measured or not. The Copenhagen school view that measurement actually produces an object’s property would imply that the measurement of one part of an entangled quantum state can instantaneously fix the value of another part, no matter how far the two parts have been separated. Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen devised a thought experiment to shine a light on this “spooky action-at-a-distance” feature; its discussion and debate have illuminated the meaning of quantum mechanics (QM). It led later to Bell’s theorem showing that these seemingly philosophical questions can lead to observable results. The experimental vindication of the orthodox theory has sharpened our appreciation of the nonlocal features of quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, the counter-intuitive QM picture of objective reality still troubles many, leaving one to wonder whether quantum mechanics is ultimately a complete theory.
The final form of quantum physics, in the particular case of wave mechanics, was established in the years 1925–1927 by Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Born and others, but the synthesis was the work of Bohr who gave an epistemological interpretation of all the technicalities built up over those years; this interpretation will be examined briefly in Chapter 10. Although Einstein acknowledged the success of quantum mechanics in atomic, molecular and solid state physics, he disagreed deeply with Bohr’s interpretation. For many years, he tried to find flaws in the formulation of quantum theory as it had been more or less accepted by a large majority of physicists, but his objections were brushed away by Bohr. However, in an article published in 1935 with Podolsky and Rosen, universally known under the acronym EPR, Einstein thought he had identified a difficulty in the by then standard interpretation. Bohr’s obscure, and in part beyond the point, answer showed that Einstein had hit a sensitive target. Nevertheless, until 1964, the so-called Bohr–Einstein debate stayed uniquely on a philosophical level, and it was actually forgotten by most physicists, as the few of them aware of it thought it had no practical implication. In 1964, the Northern Irish physicist John Bell realized that the assumptions contained in the EPR article could be tested experimentally. These assumptions led to inequalities, the Bell inequalities, which were in contradiction with quantum mechanical predictions: as we shall see later on, it is extremely likely that the assumptions of the EPR article are not consistent with experiment, which, on the contrary, vindicates the predictions of quantum physics. In Section 3.2, the origin of Bell’s inequalities will be explained with an intuitive example, then they will be compared with the predictions of quantum theory in Section 3.3, and finally their experimental status will be reviewed in Section 3.4. The debate between Bohr and Einstein goes much beyond a simple controversy, which is after all almost eighty years old and has been settled today. In fact, the concept introduced in this debate, that of entanglement, lies at the heart of many very important developments of modern quantum physics, in particular all those linked to quantum information (Chapter 8). Moreover, we shall see that the phenomenon of non-local correlations compels us to revise in depth our space-time representation of quantum processes. These are the two reasons why a whole chapter is devoted to this debate.
The EPR controversy between Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr about the completeness of the quantum mechanics is one of the most essential contemporary debates in physics with respect to the issue of realism. Initially considered as a though-experiment, the EPR paradox was meant to evidence the inadequacy of quantum mechanics with respect to the traditional leading principle of physics such as locality, independence of the system elements of reality with respect to the observer or semantic reference of theories to elements of the reality in itself. Bell’s mathematical inquiry opened the possibility to empirically discriminate between the view of Bohr and Einstein through the so-called Bell’s inequalities. Based on these inequalities, the experimental test provided in particular by the work of Alain Aspect settled the debate in favor of Bohr and the completeness of quantum mechanics. The previously evident assumption that physical theories are describing the reality in it-self can thus be questioned. Several approaches have been proposed to face that challenge, such as the orthodox quantum physics formulation coupled with the interpretation of Bernard d’Espagnat , the non-local theory of De Broglie-Bohm or the quantum mechanics approach with extended probability of James B. Hartle . In this paper, we consider the idea according to which the field of experiments and measurements on quantum systems is a research context where several epistemic values traditionally leading the scientific activity are in conflict. Instead of conceiving the transition from classical to quantum physics along Thomas Kuhns’ theory of revolutionary paradigm change , characterized by a strong incommensurability between the old and the new approaches, we argue that this epistemological shift could be rationally understood as an incremental evolution of the epistemic values leading scientific activity. As the analysis in this paper aims to show, such a rational reconstruction shows a process of gradual change, where core epistemic values are maintained, while others are broadened to account for the new scientific approaches. The settling of the EPR controversy could be understood as the indication that the previously assumed epistemic values cannot be consistently held together in the quantum context. The values of logical consistency and empirical adequacy remained universally shared, but the controversy leads to question the other traditionally admitted principles, such as the locality, the requirement of semantic references to the reality in itself and the independence of experimental results with respect to the observer, all tightly connected with the realistic conceptions of the world. This first part of the paper characterizes the selected contemporary approaches in quantum context with respect to the modification of the epistemic principles they adopt to restore their consistency. While the de Broglie-Bohm theory explicitly follows the requirement of referring to the reality in itself at the expense of the locality principle, the approaches of d’Espagnat and of Hartle give priority to the values of theoretical framework simplicity and predictive power. In the case of d’Espagnat, the descriptive purpose of the scientific activity remains, but only in a weak objectivity perspective, restricted to the “empirical reality” in which the observer is involved. In the case of Hartle, the extended probability formulation of quantum mechanics is conceived as “an extension of familiar probability theory that incorporates negative probabilities”6, which relies on the Bayesian conception of “probabilities as instruction for betting” (negative probability is thus associated to the instruction “don’t bet”). In a second part, the paper uses this reconstruction of the various theories in order to address the epistemic status of the principles of descriptive power and of independence of the observed system with respect to the observer. In particular, our analysis aims to assess if a reference to the observer is part of the reality description or if such reference is avoidable. This is of prior interest in exploring the main characteristics of a realistic approach that would be applicable in the context of experiments and measurements on quantum systems. In that perspective, we argue that the direct holistic realism, developed by Hilary Putnam in The Threefold Cord , could be a promising intermediate option between a classical realism, which assumes that theoretical structures are describing the reality in it-self, and a more instrumentalist view, focusing mainly on the modeling of the empirical reality as a result of experimental operations while rejecting access to the reality in itself.
After summarising a previously given analysis of Bohr's reply to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR), this chapter endorses the claim made by Everett himself that Everettian quantum mechanics `in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr'. On the one hand, it shows how Everett's theory provides a reconstruction of Bohr's viewpoint of complementarity as applied to the EPR case and a justi�cation of his criticism of EPR's `criterion of reality'. On the other hand, it includes a notion of physical reality that is independent of any observational context, and suggests a remaining shortcoming of Bohr's reply.
The 1935 debate opposing Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen to Bohr elicited so many comments and developments, both theoretical and experimental, until this day, that the main point at stake at that time can be overlooked by modern readers, especially students. This paper draws the reader's attention to the historical background of Einstein's paper and Bohr's reply. We show that Einstein's definition of a complete physical theory is taken from Mach's criticism of atomic theory based upon classical-mechanical views. As for Bohr's definition of physical reality, it can be simply understood by reference to classical physics although it was embedded in the quantum-mechanical formalism.