Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Optical Fiber Communication Conference

DPSK Based Eavesdropper Vulnerability in Two-Code Keyed O-CDMA Systems

Daniel E. Leaird, Chen‐Bin Huang, Zhi Liang Jiang, Sang‐Gyu Park, Andrew M. Weiner

Published Feb 1, 2008• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The use of a DPSK de-modulator by an eavesdropper to extract the data stream of a two-code keyed O-CMDA transmitter is experimentally explored. A possible scheme for masking this vulnerability is also presented.
DOI
10.1109/ofc.2008.4528656

Related papers

Experimental Investigation of Security Issues in O-CDMA

Zhi Jiang, Daniel E. Leaird, Andrew M. Weiner

In this paper, two vulnerabilities that allow an eavesdropper to extract data from an isolated user in a two-code-keying spectrally phase-coded optical-code-division-multiple-access (O-CDMA) system are experimentally demonstrated. One of these vulnerabilities stems from spectral dips that result from phase-to-amplitude conversion in the encoding process, which allows eavesdropping by using a narrowband tunable optical filter and a simple energy detector. A modified O-CDMA transmitter scheme that masks this vulnerability is demonstrated. A second, especially serious, vulnerability allows eavesdropping by using a differential-phase-shift-keying receiver. Both of these vulnerabilities arise from a structure in the coding and signaling schemes that allow an eavesdropper to recover data, with relatively simple hardware and without attempting to learn the codes

Journal of Lightwave Technology•Nov 1, 2006•68 citations

DPSK Vulnerability and Counter-Measure in Code-Switched O-CDMA

Daniel E. Leaird, Chen‐Bin Huang, Zhi Liang Jiang +2 more

Vulnerability, based on a DPSK receiver, permitting an eavesdropper access to code-switched transmission without knowledge of the phase code in an O-CDMA system is explored. A scheme to block this vulnerability is also presented.

IEEE Lasers and Electro-Optics Society Annual Meeting (LEOS)•Oct 1, 2007•0 citations

Experimental investigation on security of temporal phase coding OCDMA system with code-shift keying and differential phase-shift keying

Bo Dai, Zhensen Gao, Xu Wang +2 more

We experimentally demonstrate security vulnerability in the temporal phase coding single-user DPSK- and CSK-OCDMA systems with a DPSK demodulator. In the systems without proper decoding, error free BER performance and clear open eye diagrams indicate the eavesdropping possibility for both systems. We also discuss the principle of DPSK demodulation attack.

Asia Communications and Photonics Conference•Dec 1, 2010•3 citations

Experimental investigation on security of temporal phase coding OCDMA system with code-shift keying and differential phase-shift keying

Bo Dai, Zhensen Gao, Xu Wang +2 more

We experimentally demonstrate the security vulnerability in the temporal phase coding single-user differential phase-shift keying (DPSK) and code-shift keying (CSK) OCDMA systems with a DPSK demodulator. In the experiment, we build up the 2.5Gbit/s DPSK- and CSK-OCDMA systems. In the systems, we use two 31-chip 640 Gchip/s superstructured fiber Bragg grating encoders for the signal encoding. In the receiving side, we remove the decoders and utilize the DPSK demodulator to detect the encoded signals directly. We successfully achieve the error-free BER performance and obtaine the clear open eye diagrams using the detection without the proper decoding. It indicates the existence of the eavesdropping vulnerability in the both systems. Furthermore, we also discuss the principle of DPSK demodulation attack.

Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE•Dec 26, 2010•7 citations

Experimental Investigation on Security of Temporal Phase Coding OCDMA System with Code-Shift Keying and Differential Phase-Shift Keying

Bo Dai, Zhensen Gao, Xu Wang +2 more

We experimentally demonstrate the security vulnerability in the temporal phase coding single-user differential phase-shift keying (DPSK) and code-shift keying (CSK) OCDMA systems with a DPSK demodulator. In the experiment, we build up the 2.5Gbit/s DPSK- and CSK-OCDMA systems. In the systems, we use two 31-chip 640 Gchip/s superstructured fiber Bragg grating encoders for the signal encoding. In the receiving side, we remove the decoders and utilize the DPSK demodulator to detect the encoded signals directly. We successfully achieve the error-free BER performance and obtaine the clear open eye diagrams using the detection without the proper decoding. It indicates the existence of the eavesdropping vulnerability in the both systems. Furthermore, we also discuss the principle of DPSK demodulation attack.

Optical Transmission Systems, Switching, and Subsystems•Jan 1, 2010•0 citations

Security Enhancement of SPECTS O-CDMA Through Concealment Against Upstream DPSK Eavesdropping

Yixue Du, Fei Xue, S. J. Ben Yoo +1 more

This paper presents a simple and effective security enhancement mechanism for spectral phase-encoded time spread (SPECTS) optical code-division multiple-access (O-CDMA) users against eavesdroppers tapping at the isolated single-user uplink stream. Traditional SPECTS O-CDMA users apply pseudorandom spectral phase codes to spread ON-OFF keyed ultrashort optical pulses in time. Isolated single-user upstream transmission is prone to energy detection by eavesdroppers, even those without code knowledge. In addition, it has been shown that the use of a pair of (bright/dark) codes to represent binary data transmission is still susceptible to differential phase shift keying (DPSK) eavesdroppers without code knowledge. To remedy this security weakness, we introduce a new type of O-CDMA data modulation with memory. This new method not only effectively defeats DPSK eavesdropping but also can provide good detection performance for authorized users. We successfully demonstrate the concealment of information from DPSK eavesdroppers with different levels of modulation information.

Journal of Lightwave Technology•Sep 1, 2007•14 citations
In this paper, two vulnerabilities that allow an eavesdropper to extract data from an isolated user in a two-code-keying spectrally phase-coded optical-code-division-multiple-access (O-CDMA) system are experimentally demonstrated. One of these vulnerabilities stems from spectral dips that result from phase-to-amplitude conversion in the encoding process, which allows eavesdropping by using a narrowband tunable optical filter and a simple energy detector. A modified O-CDMA transmitter scheme that masks this vulnerability is demonstrated. A second, especially serious, vulnerability allows eavesdropping by using a differential-phase-shift-keying receiver. Both of these vulnerabilities arise from a structure in the coding and signaling schemes that allow an eavesdropper to recover data, with relatively simple hardware and without attempting to learn the codes
We experimentally demonstrate the security vulnerability in the temporal phase coding single-user differential phase-shift keying (DPSK) and code-shift keying (CSK) OCDMA systems with a DPSK demodulator. In the experiment, we build up the 2.5Gbit/s DPSK- and CSK-OCDMA systems. In the systems, we use two 31-chip 640 Gchip/s superstructured fiber Bragg grating encoders for the signal encoding. In the receiving side, we remove the decoders and utilize the DPSK demodulator to detect the encoded signals directly. We successfully achieve the error-free BER performance and obtaine the clear open eye diagrams using the detection without the proper decoding. It indicates the existence of the eavesdropping vulnerability in the both systems. Furthermore, we also discuss the principle of DPSK demodulation attack.
We experimentally demonstrate the security vulnerability in the temporal phase coding single-user differential phase-shift keying (DPSK) and code-shift keying (CSK) OCDMA systems with a DPSK demodulator. In the experiment, we build up the 2.5Gbit/s DPSK- and CSK-OCDMA systems. In the systems, we use two 31-chip 640 Gchip/s superstructured fiber Bragg grating encoders for the signal encoding. In the receiving side, we remove the decoders and utilize the DPSK demodulator to detect the encoded signals directly. We successfully achieve the error-free BER performance and obtaine the clear open eye diagrams using the detection without the proper decoding. It indicates the existence of the eavesdropping vulnerability in the both systems. Furthermore, we also discuss the principle of DPSK demodulation attack.
This paper presents a simple and effective security enhancement mechanism for spectral phase-encoded time spread (SPECTS) optical code-division multiple-access (O-CDMA) users against eavesdroppers tapping at the isolated single-user uplink stream. Traditional SPECTS O-CDMA users apply pseudorandom spectral phase codes to spread ON-OFF keyed ultrashort optical pulses in time. Isolated single-user upstream transmission is prone to energy detection by eavesdroppers, even those without code knowledge. In addition, it has been shown that the use of a pair of (bright/dark) codes to represent binary data transmission is still susceptible to differential phase shift keying (DPSK) eavesdroppers without code knowledge. To remedy this security weakness, we introduce a new type of O-CDMA data modulation with memory. This new method not only effectively defeats DPSK eavesdropping but also can provide good detection performance for authorized users. We successfully demonstrate the concealment of information from DPSK eavesdroppers with different levels of modulation information.