Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Information-Theoretic Statistical Mechanics without Landauer’s Principle

Daniel Parker

Published Aug 11, 2011• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This article distinguishes two different senses of information-theoretic approaches to statistical mechanics that are often conflated in the literature: those relating to the thermodynamic cost of computational processes and those that offer an interpretation of statistical mechanics where the probabilities are treated as epistemic. This distinction is then investigated through Earman and Norton’s ([1999]) ‘sound’ and ‘profound’ dilemma for information-theoretic exorcisms of Maxwell’s demon. It is argued that Earman and Norton fail to countenance a ‘sound’ information-theoretic interpretation and this paper describes how the latter inferential interpretations can escape the criticisms of Earman and Norton ([1999]) and Norton ([2005]) by adopting this ‘sound’ horn. This article considers a standard model of Maxwell’s demon to illustrate how one might adopt an information-theoretic approach to statistical mechanics without a reliance on Landauer’s principle, where the incompressibility of the probability distribution due to Liouville’s theorem is taken as the central feature of such an interpretation. 1 Introduction 2 Information-Theoretic SM 3 A Dilemma? 4 Maxwell’s Demon 5 The Cogency of the IT Account 6 Does Landauer’s Principle Save the Second Law? 7 Conclusion

DOI
10.1093/bjps/axr015

Related papers

Maxwell’s Demon and the Second Law

Harvey S. Leff

Maxwell’s demon emanates from a thought experiment proposed by James Clerk Maxwell in 1867 to illustrate the statistical nature of the second law of thermodynamics. Subsequently researchers wondered whether such a demon could in fact violate the second law. Leon Brillouin argued that the entropy produced during the demon’s measurement precluded such a violation. Years later Oliver Penrose and Charles Bennett observed (independently) that a Maxwell’s demon gathers information and stores it in a memory. Penrose showed that erasure of such a memory sends sufficient entropy to the environment to preclude violation of the second law. Notably this is so even when measurement produces arbitrarily little entropy. Bennett obtained the same result using Rolf Landauer’s seminal research on the thermodynamics of computation. The stunning shift in focus from measurement to erasure provided the impetus to better understand the role of information in quantum mechanics and thermodynamics. Indeed the linkage of information with physics is the principal legacy of Maxwell’s demon. Szilard’s one‐particle classical “gas” model and its quantum mechanical extension, together with postulated connections between entropy and algorithmic information, have provided useful insights. We review the long history of Maxwell’s demon and assess the current status of the second law in the context of the demon’s operations.

AIP conference proceedings•Jan 1, 2002•4 citations

Maxwell’s Demon Is Foiled by the Entropy Cost of Measurement, Not Erasure

Ruth E. Kastner

I dispute the conventional claim that the second law of thermodynamics is saved from a “Maxwell’s demon” by the entropy cost of information erasure and show that instead it is measurement that incurs the entropy cost. Thus, Brillouin, who identified measurement as savior of the second law, was essentially correct, and putative refutations of his view, such as Bennett’s claim to measure without entropy cost, are seen to fail when the applicable physics is taken into account. I argue that the tradition of attributing the defeat of Maxwell’s demon to erasure rather than to measurement arose from unphysical classical idealizations that do not hold for real gas molecules, as well as a physically ungrounded recasting of physical thermodynamical processes into computational and information-theoretic conceptualizations. I argue that the fundamental principle that saves the second law is the quantum uncertainty principle applying to the need to localize physical states to precise values of observables in order to effect the desired disequilibria aimed at violating the second law. I obtain the specific entropy cost for localizing a molecule in the Szilard engine and show that it coincides with the quantity attributed to Landauer’s principle. I also note that an experiment characterized as upholding an entropy cost of erasure in a “quantum Maxwell’s demon” actually demonstrates an entropy cost of measurement.

arXiv:2503.18186•Foundations•May 22, 2025•2 citations

Maxwell’s Demon Does not Compute

John D. Norton

Must a Maxwell demon must fail to reverse the second law of thermodynamics? Standard attempts to show it must fail make use of notions of information and computation. None of these attempts have succeeded. Worse they have distracted both supporters and opponents of these attempts from a much simpler demonstration of the necessary failure of a Maxwell's demon that employs no notions of information or computation. It requires only Liouville's theorem and its quantum analog.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•May 17, 2018•6 citations

Maxwell’s Demon

Meir Hemmo, Orly Shenker

Demon, the famous thought experiment of James Clerk Maxwell, has been devised in 1867 as a counter example for the Second Law of thermodynamics. During the 140 years since the Demon was first suggested, numerous attempts have been made to counter Maxwell's argument. The attempts have been to show that Maxwell was wrong, since his Demon cannot work for one reason or another (see Leff and Rex 2003 for details and references). In this paper we show (following an argument by Albert 2000, Ch. 5.) that Maxwell was basically right, in the sense that his thought experiment is compatible with the laws of mechanics as well as with central principles of statistical mechanics. We then derive some (weak) restrictions on the Demon's efficiency. Finally, we prove that the Demon's cycle of operation can be completed (in particular, the Demon's memory can be erased) without increasing the total entropy of the universe. We draw some conclusions about the way to understand the meaning and role of probability in classical statistical mechanics

Oxford University Press eBooks•Mar 7, 2016•36 citations

Maxwell's Demon

Orly Shenker, Meir Hemmo

"Maxwell's Demon", the famous thought experiment of James Clerk Maxwell, has been devised in 1867 as a counter example for the Second Law of thermodynamics. During the 140 years since the Demon was first suggested, numerous attempts have been made to counter Maxwell's argument. The attempts have been to show that Maxwell was wrong, since his Demon cannot work for one reason or another (see Leff and Rex 2003 for details and references). In this paper we show (following an argument by Albert 2000, Ch. 5.) that Maxwell was basically right, in the sense that his thought experiment is compatible with the laws of mechanics as well as with central principles of statistical mechanics. We then derive some (weak) restrictions on the Demon's efficiency. Finally, we prove that the Demon's cycle of operation can be completed (in particular, the Demon's memory can be erased) without increasing the total entropy of the universe. We draw some conclusions about the way to understand the meaning and role of probability in classical statistical mechanics

•Dec 1, 2006•0 citations

On the lack of relation between physics and "Quantum discord and Maxwell's demons"

Elias P. Gyftopoulos

The information-theoretic arguments presented in a recent publication on "Quantum discord and Maxwell's demons" are discussed, and found not to address the problem specified by Maxwell. Two interrelated and definitive exorcisms of the demon, one purely thermodynamic, and the other quantum-thermodynamic are briefly discussed. For each of the two exorcisms, the demon is shown to be incapable to accomplish his assignment neither because of limitations arising from information-theoretic tools at his disposal, nor because of the value of his IQ. The limitations are due to the physics of the state of the system on which he is asked to perform his demonic acts.

arXiv:0706.1966•Jun 13, 2007•1 citation
This article distinguishes two different senses of information-theoretic approaches to statistical mechanics that are often conflated in the literature: those relating to the thermodynamic cost of computational processes and those that offer an interpretation of statistical mechanics where the probabilities are treated as epistemic. This distinction is then investigated through Earman and Norton’s ([1999]) ‘sound’ and ‘profound’ dilemma for information-theoretic exorcisms of Maxwell’s demon. It is argued that Earman and Norton fail to countenance a ‘sound’ information-theoretic interpretation and this paper describes how the latter inferential interpretations can escape the criticisms of Earman and Norton ([1999]) and Norton ([2005]) by adopting this ‘sound’ horn. This article considers a standard model of Maxwell’s demon to illustrate how one might adopt an information-theoretic approach to statistical mechanics without a reliance on Landauer’s principle, where the incompressibility of the probability distribution due to Liouville’s theorem is taken as the central feature of such an interpretation. 1 Introduction 2 Information-Theoretic SM 3 A Dilemma? 4 Maxwell’s Demon 5 The Cogency of the IT Account 6 Does Landauer’s Principle Save the Second Law? 7 Conclusion
Maxwell’s demon emanates from a thought experiment proposed by James Clerk Maxwell in 1867 to illustrate the statistical nature of the second law of thermodynamics. Subsequently researchers wondered whether such a demon could in fact violate the second law. Leon Brillouin argued that the entropy produced during the demon’s measurement precluded such a violation. Years later Oliver Penrose and Charles Bennett observed (independently) that a Maxwell’s demon gathers information and stores it in a memory. Penrose showed that erasure of such a memory sends sufficient entropy to the environment to preclude violation of the second law. Notably this is so even when measurement produces arbitrarily little entropy. Bennett obtained the same result using Rolf Landauer’s seminal research on the thermodynamics of computation. The stunning shift in focus from measurement to erasure provided the impetus to better understand the role of information in quantum mechanics and thermodynamics. Indeed the linkage of information with physics is the principal legacy of Maxwell’s demon. Szilard’s one‐particle classical “gas” model and its quantum mechanical extension, together with postulated connections between entropy and algorithmic information, have provided useful insights. We review the long history of Maxwell’s demon and assess the current status of the second law in the context of the demon’s operations.
I dispute the conventional claim that the second law of thermodynamics is saved from a “Maxwell’s demon” by the entropy cost of information erasure and show that instead it is measurement that incurs the entropy cost. Thus, Brillouin, who identified measurement as savior of the second law, was essentially correct, and putative refutations of his view, such as Bennett’s claim to measure without entropy cost, are seen to fail when the applicable physics is taken into account. I argue that the tradition of attributing the defeat of Maxwell’s demon to erasure rather than to measurement arose from unphysical classical idealizations that do not hold for real gas molecules, as well as a physically ungrounded recasting of physical thermodynamical processes into computational and information-theoretic conceptualizations. I argue that the fundamental principle that saves the second law is the quantum uncertainty principle applying to the need to localize physical states to precise values of observables in order to effect the desired disequilibria aimed at violating the second law. I obtain the specific entropy cost for localizing a molecule in the Szilard engine and show that it coincides with the quantity attributed to Landauer’s principle. I also note that an experiment characterized as upholding an entropy cost of erasure in a “quantum Maxwell’s demon” actually demonstrates an entropy cost of measurement.
Demon, the famous thought experiment of James Clerk Maxwell, has been devised in 1867 as a counter example for the Second Law of thermodynamics. During the 140 years since the Demon was first suggested, numerous attempts have been made to counter Maxwell's argument. The attempts have been to show that Maxwell was wrong, since his Demon cannot work for one reason or another (see Leff and Rex 2003 for details and references). In this paper we show (following an argument by Albert 2000, Ch. 5.) that Maxwell was basically right, in the sense that his thought experiment is compatible with the laws of mechanics as well as with central principles of statistical mechanics. We then derive some (weak) restrictions on the Demon's efficiency. Finally, we prove that the Demon's cycle of operation can be completed (in particular, the Demon's memory can be erased) without increasing the total entropy of the universe. We draw some conclusions about the way to understand the meaning and role of probability in classical statistical mechanics
"Maxwell's Demon", the famous thought experiment of James Clerk Maxwell, has been devised in 1867 as a counter example for the Second Law of thermodynamics. During the 140 years since the Demon was first suggested, numerous attempts have been made to counter Maxwell's argument. The attempts have been to show that Maxwell was wrong, since his Demon cannot work for one reason or another (see Leff and Rex 2003 for details and references). In this paper we show (following an argument by Albert 2000, Ch. 5.) that Maxwell was basically right, in the sense that his thought experiment is compatible with the laws of mechanics as well as with central principles of statistical mechanics. We then derive some (weak) restrictions on the Demon's efficiency. Finally, we prove that the Demon's cycle of operation can be completed (in particular, the Demon's memory can be erased) without increasing the total entropy of the universe. We draw some conclusions about the way to understand the meaning and role of probability in classical statistical mechanics
The information-theoretic arguments presented in a recent publication on "Quantum discord and Maxwell's demons" are discussed, and found not to address the problem specified by Maxwell. Two interrelated and definitive exorcisms of the demon, one purely thermodynamic, and the other quantum-thermodynamic are briefly discussed. For each of the two exorcisms, the demon is shown to be incapable to accomplish his assignment neither because of limitations arising from information-theoretic tools at his disposal, nor because of the value of his IQ. The limitations are due to the physics of the state of the system on which he is asked to perform his demonic acts.