Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Physical review. D. Particles, fields, gravitation, and cosmology/Physical review. D. Particles and fields

Quantum mechanics near closed timelike lines

David Deutsch

Published Nov 15, 1991• 356 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The methods of the quantum theory of computation are used to analyze the physics of closed timelike lines. This is dominated, even at the macroscopic level, by quantum mechanics. In classical physics the existence of such lines in a spacetime imposes "paradoxical" constraints on the state of matter in their past and also provides means for knowledge to be created in ways that conflict with the principles of the philosophy of science. In quantum mechanics the first of these pathologies does not occur. The second is mitigated, and may be avoidable without such spacetimes being ruled out. Several novel and distinctive (but nonparadoxical) quantum-mechanical effects occur on and near closed timelike lines, including violations of the correspondence principle and of unitarity. It becomes possible to "clone" quantum systems and to measure the state of a quantum system. A new experimental test of the Everett interpretation against all others becomes possible. Consideration of these and other effects sheds light on the nature of quantum mechanics.

DOI
10.1103/physrevd.44.3197

Related papers

Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics (2nd edition)

G. Mahler

Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.

Journal of Physics A Mathematical and General•Jun 17, 2004•4 citations

The Quantum Mechanics of Closed Systems

James B. Hartle

A pedagogical introduction is given to the quantum mechanics of closed systems, most generally the universe as a whole. Quantum mechanics aims at predicting the probabilities of alternative coarse-grained time histories of a closed system. Not every set of alternative coarse-grained histories that can be described may be consistently assigned probabilities because of quantum mechanical interference between individual histories of the set. In the quantum mechanics of closed systems, containing both observer and observed, probabilities are assigned to those sets of alternative histories for which there is negligible interference between individual histories as a consequence of the system's initial condition and dynamics. Such sets of histories are said to decohere. Typical mechanisms of decoherence that are widespread in our universe are illustrated. Copenhagen quantum mechanics is an approximation to the more general quantum framework of closed subsystems. It is appropriate when there is an approximately isolated subsystem that is a participant in a measurement situation in which (among other things) the decoherence of alternative registrations of the apparatus can be idealized as exact. Since the quantum mechanics of closed systems does not posit the existence of the quasiclassical domain of everyday experience, the domain of the approximate aplicability of classical physics must be explained. We describe how a quasiclassical domain described by averages of densities of approximately conserved quantities could be an emergent feature of an initial condition of the universe that implies the approximate classical behavior of spacetime on accessible scales.

arXiv:gr-qc/9210006•Oct 13, 1992•0 citations

Ontology, Epistemology, Consciousness; And Closed, Timelike Curves

Fred Wolf

How should we think about subjective states vs. objective states? Is it a question of the meaning associated with a state? Recent work on this question arose in consideration of closed timelike curves (CTCs) and their possible role in quantum computers. The issue of ontic and epistemic states is particularly important when considering CTCs because, as one may argue, the interpretation of quantum states as either ontic or epistemic will naturally lead to different assumptions about how quantum systems behave in the presence of CTCs. For example, David Deutsch studied various time travel scenarios in a classical model and then in a quantum model motivated by a strictly ontic interpretation of quantum states. While in the classical model, CTCs could produce paradoxes, however Deutsch argued that no paradoxes can occur in his parallel universes (modified Everett interpretation) quantum treatment. Although all paradoxes are resolved in this way, the resulting theory is not standard quantum theory, but a new nonlinear theory. Many implications can arise using Deutsch's model and I shall discuss some of them in particular. These assumptions are particularly unconventional in part because they require that mixed quantum states are ontic. Pure quantum states can be interpreted as ontic, however most interpretations view mixed states as epistemic, i.e., reflecting an observer's lack of knowledge. I shall here consider an alternative proposal-pure quantum states, represented by density matrices containing off-diagonal elements, are possibly epistemic (since we never actually see them) while mixed quantum states arising in CTCs are always ontic representing the action of consciousness in observers (we do see them). Paradoxically my argument is based on the well-known experiences of gaining knowledge in classical physics; couching this in quantum physics terms, classical mixed states (represented by diagonal density matrices in quantum physics) are just what arise when an "observation" is said to occur resulting in a so-called reduction of the quantum wave function and the appearance of a classical world. In brief, Deutsch's CTC nonlinear post quantum physics model may represent the action of a conscious mind.

Cosmos and history•Mar 25, 2017•0 citations

Of Blind Men and an Elephant: The Schism of Physics and Philosophy and Non-Empirical Validation

Daniel F. Young

Great revolutions in the study of nature in the past century have brought forth an onslaught of philosophical complications to the clarity of the classical perspective to which natural science was espoused prior to the twentieth century. The objective, intuitive principles by which we determined the reality of the world were beset by the ontological implications that flowed out of quantum mechanics and relativistic law. Wary of philosophical problems, a great number of the physical sciences lodge themselves in the comfort of empirical dogmatism as its only means of progression. But in light of the success of quantum systems, the ambiguity that buds must be taken into greater consideration. This paper discusses the background, development, objections, and interpretations of quantum mechanics and concurrent ontological premises to argue that such a philosophical tenet is inherent to nature, and, as such, is capable of producing results and predictions consistent with its physical and mathematical counterparts. To do so, the properties of measurement and the premises of causality are treated in terms of their physical terminology and foundations. The frameworks of Carroll, Everett, Heisenberg, Popper, and others analyze established interpretations and abstractions of quantum mechanics; its ties to the metaphysical and ontological descriptions of an existing entity are explored by means of the contrived spacetime allegory, which in principle determines the parameters that bound real systems. It is evident that ontological accounts for physical phenomena are not only viable and admissible but are necessary as our ability to describe the universe surpasses our ability to test and quantify these descriptions. These realizations allow us to better understand our world and move beyond empirical data when it is technologically unattainable, enabling us to build on statistical bases and approach the structure of realism through its essence of ambiguity.

•Jan 1, 2020•0 citations

The Quantum Mechanics of Closed Systems

James B. Hartle

A pedagogical introduction is given to the quantum mechanics of closed systems, most generally the universe as a whole. Quantum mechanics aims at predicting the probabilities of alternative coarse-grained time histories of a closed system. Not every set of alternative coarse-grained histories that can be described may be consistently assigned probabilities because of quantum mechanical interference between individual histories of the set. In “Copenhagen” quantum mechanics, probabilities can be assigned to histories of a subsystem that have been “measured”. In the quantum mechanics of closed systems, containing both observer and observed, probabilities are assigned to those sets of alternative histories for which there is negligible interference between individual histories as a consequence of the system's initial condition and dynamics. Such sets of histories are said to decohere. We define decoherence for closed systems in the simplified case when quantum gravity can be neglected and the initial state is pure. Typical mechanisms of decoherence that are widespread in our universe are illustrated. Copenhagen quantum mechanics is an approximation to the more general quantum framework of closed subsystems. It is appropriate when there is an approximately isolated subsystem that is a participant in a measurement situation in which (among other things) the decoherence of alternative registrations of the apparatus can be idealized as exact. Since the quantum mechanics of closed systems does not posit the existence of the quasiclassical domain of everyday experience, the domain of the approximate aplicability of classical physics must be explained.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jul 22, 1993•72 citations

The Quantum Mechanics of Closed Systems

James B. Hartle

A pedagogical introduction is given to the quantum mechanics of closed systems, most generally the universe as a whole. Quantum mechanics aims at predicting the probabilities of alternative coarse-grained time histories of a closed system. Not every set of alternative coarse-grained histories that can be described may be consistently assigned probabilities because of quantum mechanical interference between individual histories of the set. In “Copenhagen ” quantum mechanics, probabilities can be assigned to histories of a subsystem that have been “measured”. In the quantum mechanics of closed systems, containing both observer and observed, probabilities are assigned to those sets of alternative histories for which there is negligible interference between individual histories as a consequence of the system’s initial condition and dynamics. Such sets of histories are said to decohere. We define decoherence for closed systems in the simplified case when quantum gravity can be neglected and the initial state is pure. Typical mechanisms of decoherence that are widespread in our universe are illustrated. Copenhagen quantum mechanics is an approximation to the more general quantum framework of closed subsystems. It is appropriate when there is an approximately isolated subsystem that is a participant in a measurement situation in which (among other things) the decoherence of alternative registrations of the apparatus can be idealized as exact. Since the quantum mechanics of closed systems does not posit the existence of the quasiclassical domain of everyday experience, the domain of the approximate aplicability of classical physics must be explained. We describe how a quasiclassical domain described by averages of densities of approximately conserved quantities could be an emergent feature of an initial condition of the universe that implies the approximate classical behavior of spacetime on accessible scales.

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•Dec 9, 2020•12 citations
The methods of the quantum theory of computation are used to analyze the physics of closed timelike lines. This is dominated, even at the macroscopic level, by quantum mechanics. In classical physics the existence of such lines in a spacetime imposes "paradoxical" constraints on the state of matter in their past and also provides means for knowledge to be created in ways that conflict with the principles of the philosophy of science. In quantum mechanics the first of these pathologies does not occur. The second is mitigated, and may be avoidable without such spacetimes being ruled out. Several novel and distinctive (but nonparadoxical) quantum-mechanical effects occur on and near closed timelike lines, including violations of the correspondence principle and of unitarity. It becomes possible to "clone" quantum systems and to measure the state of a quantum system. A new experimental test of the Everett interpretation against all others becomes possible. Consideration of these and other effects sheds light on the nature of quantum mechanics.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
A pedagogical introduction is given to the quantum mechanics of closed systems, most generally the universe as a whole. Quantum mechanics aims at predicting the probabilities of alternative coarse-grained time histories of a closed system. Not every set of alternative coarse-grained histories that can be described may be consistently assigned probabilities because of quantum mechanical interference between individual histories of the set. In the quantum mechanics of closed systems, containing both observer and observed, probabilities are assigned to those sets of alternative histories for which there is negligible interference between individual histories as a consequence of the system's initial condition and dynamics. Such sets of histories are said to decohere. Typical mechanisms of decoherence that are widespread in our universe are illustrated. Copenhagen quantum mechanics is an approximation to the more general quantum framework of closed subsystems. It is appropriate when there is an approximately isolated subsystem that is a participant in a measurement situation in which (among other things) the decoherence of alternative registrations of the apparatus can be idealized as exact. Since the quantum mechanics of closed systems does not posit the existence of the quasiclassical domain of everyday experience, the domain of the approximate aplicability of classical physics must be explained. We describe how a quasiclassical domain described by averages of densities of approximately conserved quantities could be an emergent feature of an initial condition of the universe that implies the approximate classical behavior of spacetime on accessible scales.
How should we think about subjective states vs. objective states? Is it a question of the meaning associated with a state? Recent work on this question arose in consideration of closed timelike curves (CTCs) and their possible role in quantum computers. The issue of ontic and epistemic states is particularly important when considering CTCs because, as one may argue, the interpretation of quantum states as either ontic or epistemic will naturally lead to different assumptions about how quantum systems behave in the presence of CTCs. For example, David Deutsch studied various time travel scenarios in a classical model and then in a quantum model motivated by a strictly ontic interpretation of quantum states. While in the classical model, CTCs could produce paradoxes, however Deutsch argued that no paradoxes can occur in his parallel universes (modified Everett interpretation) quantum treatment. Although all paradoxes are resolved in this way, the resulting theory is not standard quantum theory, but a new nonlinear theory. Many implications can arise using Deutsch's model and I shall discuss some of them in particular. These assumptions are particularly unconventional in part because they require that mixed quantum states are ontic. Pure quantum states can be interpreted as ontic, however most interpretations view mixed states as epistemic, i.e., reflecting an observer's lack of knowledge. I shall here consider an alternative proposal-pure quantum states, represented by density matrices containing off-diagonal elements, are possibly epistemic (since we never actually see them) while mixed quantum states arising in CTCs are always ontic representing the action of consciousness in observers (we do see them). Paradoxically my argument is based on the well-known experiences of gaining knowledge in classical physics; couching this in quantum physics terms, classical mixed states (represented by diagonal density matrices in quantum physics) are just what arise when an "observation" is said to occur resulting in a so-called reduction of the quantum wave function and the appearance of a classical world. In brief, Deutsch's CTC nonlinear post quantum physics model may represent the action of a conscious mind.
Great revolutions in the study of nature in the past century have brought forth an onslaught of philosophical complications to the clarity of the classical perspective to which natural science was espoused prior to the twentieth century. The objective, intuitive principles by which we determined the reality of the world were beset by the ontological implications that flowed out of quantum mechanics and relativistic law. Wary of philosophical problems, a great number of the physical sciences lodge themselves in the comfort of empirical dogmatism as its only means of progression. But in light of the success of quantum systems, the ambiguity that buds must be taken into greater consideration. This paper discusses the background, development, objections, and interpretations of quantum mechanics and concurrent ontological premises to argue that such a philosophical tenet is inherent to nature, and, as such, is capable of producing results and predictions consistent with its physical and mathematical counterparts. To do so, the properties of measurement and the premises of causality are treated in terms of their physical terminology and foundations. The frameworks of Carroll, Everett, Heisenberg, Popper, and others analyze established interpretations and abstractions of quantum mechanics; its ties to the metaphysical and ontological descriptions of an existing entity are explored by means of the contrived spacetime allegory, which in principle determines the parameters that bound real systems. It is evident that ontological accounts for physical phenomena are not only viable and admissible but are necessary as our ability to describe the universe surpasses our ability to test and quantify these descriptions. These realizations allow us to better understand our world and move beyond empirical data when it is technologically unattainable, enabling us to build on statistical bases and approach the structure of realism through its essence of ambiguity.
A pedagogical introduction is given to the quantum mechanics of closed systems, most generally the universe as a whole. Quantum mechanics aims at predicting the probabilities of alternative coarse-grained time histories of a closed system. Not every set of alternative coarse-grained histories that can be described may be consistently assigned probabilities because of quantum mechanical interference between individual histories of the set. In “Copenhagen” quantum mechanics, probabilities can be assigned to histories of a subsystem that have been “measured”. In the quantum mechanics of closed systems, containing both observer and observed, probabilities are assigned to those sets of alternative histories for which there is negligible interference between individual histories as a consequence of the system's initial condition and dynamics. Such sets of histories are said to decohere. We define decoherence for closed systems in the simplified case when quantum gravity can be neglected and the initial state is pure. Typical mechanisms of decoherence that are widespread in our universe are illustrated. Copenhagen quantum mechanics is an approximation to the more general quantum framework of closed subsystems. It is appropriate when there is an approximately isolated subsystem that is a participant in a measurement situation in which (among other things) the decoherence of alternative registrations of the apparatus can be idealized as exact. Since the quantum mechanics of closed systems does not posit the existence of the quasiclassical domain of everyday experience, the domain of the approximate aplicability of classical physics must be explained.
A pedagogical introduction is given to the quantum mechanics of closed systems, most generally the universe as a whole. Quantum mechanics aims at predicting the probabilities of alternative coarse-grained time histories of a closed system. Not every set of alternative coarse-grained histories that can be described may be consistently assigned probabilities because of quantum mechanical interference between individual histories of the set. In “Copenhagen ” quantum mechanics, probabilities can be assigned to histories of a subsystem that have been “measured”. In the quantum mechanics of closed systems, containing both observer and observed, probabilities are assigned to those sets of alternative histories for which there is negligible interference between individual histories as a consequence of the system’s initial condition and dynamics. Such sets of histories are said to decohere. We define decoherence for closed systems in the simplified case when quantum gravity can be neglected and the initial state is pure. Typical mechanisms of decoherence that are widespread in our universe are illustrated. Copenhagen quantum mechanics is an approximation to the more general quantum framework of closed subsystems. It is appropriate when there is an approximately isolated subsystem that is a participant in a measurement situation in which (among other things) the decoherence of alternative registrations of the apparatus can be idealized as exact. Since the quantum mechanics of closed systems does not posit the existence of the quasiclassical domain of everyday experience, the domain of the approximate aplicability of classical physics must be explained. We describe how a quasiclassical domain described by averages of densities of approximately conserved quantities could be an emergent feature of an initial condition of the universe that implies the approximate classical behavior of spacetime on accessible scales.