How should we think about subjective states vs. objective states? Is it a question of the meaning associated with a state? Recent work on this question arose in consideration of closed timelike curves (CTCs) and their possible role in quantum computers. The issue of ontic and epistemic states is particularly important when considering CTCs because, as one may argue, the interpretation of quantum states as either ontic or epistemic will naturally lead to different assumptions about how quantum systems behave in the presence of CTCs. For example, David Deutsch studied various time travel scenarios in a classical model and then in a quantum model motivated by a strictly ontic interpretation of quantum states. While in the classical model, CTCs could produce paradoxes, however Deutsch argued that no paradoxes can occur in his parallel universes (modified Everett interpretation) quantum treatment. Although all paradoxes are resolved in this way, the resulting theory is not standard quantum theory, but a new nonlinear theory. Many implications can arise using Deutsch's model and I shall discuss some of them in particular. These assumptions are particularly unconventional in part because they require that mixed quantum states are ontic. Pure quantum states can be interpreted as ontic, however most interpretations view mixed states as epistemic, i.e., reflecting an observer's lack of knowledge. I shall here consider an alternative proposal-pure quantum states, represented by density matrices containing off-diagonal elements, are possibly epistemic (since we never actually see them) while mixed quantum states arising in CTCs are always ontic representing the action of consciousness in observers (we do see them). Paradoxically my argument is based on the well-known experiences of gaining knowledge in classical physics; couching this in quantum physics terms, classical mixed states (represented by diagonal density matrices in quantum physics) are just what arise when an "observation" is said to occur resulting in a so-called reduction of the quantum wave function and the appearance of a classical world. In brief, Deutsch's CTC nonlinear post quantum physics model may represent the action of a conscious mind.
How should we think about subjective states vs. objective states? Is it a question of the meaning associated with a state? Recent work on this question arose in consideration of closed timelike curves (CTCs) and their possible role in quantum computers. The issue of ontic and epistemic states is particularly important when considering CTCs because, as one may argue, the interpretation of quantum states as either ontic or epistemic will naturally lead to different assumptions about how quantum systems behave in the presence of CTCs. For example, David Deutsch studied various time travel scenarios in a classical model and then in a quantum model motivated by a strictly ontic interpretation of quantum states. While in the classical model, CTCs could produce paradoxes, however Deutsch argued that no paradoxes can occur in his parallel universes (modified Everett interpretation) quantum treatment. Although all paradoxes are resolved in this way, the resulting theory is not standard quantum theory, but a new nonlinear theory. Many implications can arise using Deutsch's model and I shall discuss some of them in particular. These assumptions are particularly unconventional in part because they require that mixed quantum states are ontic. Pure quantum states can be interpreted as ontic, however most interpretations view mixed states as epistemic, i.e., reflecting an observer's lack of knowledge. I shall here consider an alternative proposal-pure quantum states, represented by density matrices containing off-diagonal elements, are possibly epistemic (since we never actually see them) while mixed quantum states arising in CTCs are always ontic representing the action of consciousness in observers (we do see them). Paradoxically my argument is based on the well-known experiences of gaining knowledge in classical physics; couching this in quantum physics terms, classical mixed states (represented by diagonal density matrices in quantum physics) are just what arise when an "observation" is said to occur resulting in a so-called reduction of the quantum wave function and the appearance of a classical world. In brief, Deutsch's CTC nonlinear post quantum physics model may represent the action of a conscious mind.
What does quantum physics tell us about the nature of reality, specifically the parts of reality we do not directly perceive called hidden variables? One may think it could tell us a lot because of our enhanced technological sensing abilities that delve into the realms that quantum physics covers so well. Surprisingly, it seems to surround us in a deeper mystery rather than reveal more of nature's secrets. It seems that we cannot escape from philosophical consideration when dealing with what is hidden in quantum physics. In Part I we will look at how Epistemology and Ontology bear upon Hidden Variables. In Part II we will consider Hidden Variables in the light of Contextuality, and Non-Classicality. Inevitably questions of subjectivity and objectivity arise in dealing with states of observation. How should we think about these states? Perhaps it is a question of the meaning associated with our knowledge of a state-that is, a question of ontology or epistemology. The issue of ontic and epistemic states is particularly important when considering hidden variables in quantum physics because, as one may argue, the interpretation of quantum states as either ontic or epistemic will naturally lead to different assumptions about how reality is constructed; if it is constructed or not. It also raises the question of what attributes we are able to observe simultaneously and that brings contextuality into the discussion. If it turns out that reality is constructed contextually what does that imply about ontological realism? If on the other hand reality is constructed non-contextually what does that imply about ontological realism? Many implications can arise when considering these questions from a quantum physical point of view. In this paper I shall discuss how quantum physics provides some answers to these questions by considering quantum physical states and their measurements.
We discuss the nature of quantum states (density operators) and entanglement in quantum theory with closed timelike curves. One of the key concepts in the standard quantum theory is that given any mixed state we can always purify it in an enlarged Hilbert space by bringing an ancillary system. The purified state does not depend on the state of any extraneous system with which the mixed state is going to interact and on the physical interaction. Here, we prove that it is not possible to purify a mixed state that traverses a closed time like curve (CTC) and allowed to interact in a consistent way with a causality‐respecting (CR) quantum system. Thus, in general for arbitrary interactions between the CR and the CTC systems there is no universal ‘Church of the larger Hilbert space’ for mixed states with CTC. This shows that in quantum theory with CTCs there can exist ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ mixtures. Also, we suggest what kind of entangled states are allowed in the presence of CTCs. We argue that the nature of entanglement can be different in the presence of such exotic objects. Towards the end we discuss how the no‐hiding theorem in the presence of CTCs may allow quantum information pop‐up.
The fact that closed timelike curves (CTCs) are permitted by general relativity raises the question as to how quantum systems behave when time travel to the past occurs. Research into answering this question by utilizing the quantum circuit formalism has given rise to two theories: Deutschian-CTCs (D-CTCs) and ``postselected'' CTCs (P-CTCs). In this paper the quantum circuit approach is thoroughly reviewed, and the strengths and shortcomings of D-CTCs and P-CTCs are presented in view of their nonlinearity and time-travel paradoxes. In particular, the ``equivalent circuit model''---which aims to make equivalent predictions to D-CTCs, while avoiding some of the difficulties of the original theory---is shown to contain errors. The discussion of D-CTCs and P-CTCs is used to motivate an analysis of the features one might require of a theory of quantum time travel, following which two overlapping classes of alternate theories are identified. One such theory, the theory of ``transition probability'' CTCs (T-CTCs), is fully developed. The theory of T-CTCs is shown not to have certain undesirable features---such as time-travel paradoxes, the ability to distinguish nonorthogonal states with certainty, and the ability to clone or delete arbitrary pure states---that are present with D-CTCs and P-CTCs. The problems with nonlinear extensions to quantum mechanics are discussed in relation to the interpretation of these theories, and the physical motivations of all three theories are discussed and compared.
Abstract This study examines closed timelike curves (CTCs) in quantum mechanics, focusing on the Deutsch model, one of the most widely studied frameworks for describing quantum systems in the presence of time loops. In this model, a quantum state ∣ψ⟩|\psi\rangle∣ψ⟩ interacts unitarily with its past version, effectively forming a two-qubit system where the chronologically consistent qubit interacts with a qubit ρCTC\rho_{\text{CTC}}ρCTC trapped in a closed timelike curve. The state ρCTC\rho_{\text{CTC}}ρCTC is determined by the Deutsch consistency condition, ensuring self-consistent evolution along the CTC. This approach allows for rigorous modeling of quantum systems under non-classical temporal structures, providing insights into temporal correlations, causality violations, and the potential computational advantages offered by CTC-assisted quantum operations. While alternative CTC models based on postselection have been proposed, the Deutsch model remains a foundational reference for studying quantum evolution in non-linear temporal frameworks. Its analysis informs research in quantum information, retrocausality, and the theoretical limits of computation in exotic spacetime geometries.
This article considers a partly philosophical question: What are the ontological and epistemological reasons for using quantum-like models or theories (models and theories based on the mathematical formalism of quantum theory) vs. classical-like ones (based on the mathematics of classical physics), in considering human thinking and decision making? This question is only partly philosophical because it also concerns the scientific understanding of the phenomena considered by the theories that use mathematical models of either type, just as in physics itself, where this question also arises as a physical question. This is because this question is in effect: What are the physical reasons for using, even if not requiring, these types of theories in considering quantum phenomena, which these theories predict fully in accord with the experiment? This is clearly also a physical, rather than only philosophical, question and so is, accordingly, the question of whether one needs classical-like or quantum-like theories or both (just as in physics we use both classical and quantum theories) in considering human thinking in psychology and related fields, such as decision science. It comes as no surprise that many of these reasons are parallel to those that are responsible for the use of QM and QFT in the case of quantum phenomena. Still, the corresponding situations should be understood and justified in terms of the phenomena considered, phenomena defined by human thinking, because there are important differences between these phenomena and quantum phenomena, which this article aims to address. In order to do so, this article will first consider quantum phenomena and quantum theory, before turning to human thinking and decision making, in addressing which it will also discuss two recent quantum-like approaches to human thinking, that by M. G. D'Ariano and F. Faggin and that by A. Khrennikov. Both approaches are ontological in the sense of offering representations, different in character in each approach, of human thinking by the formalism of quantum theory. Whether such a representation, as opposed to only predicting the outcomes of relevant experiments, is possible either in quantum theory or in quantum-like theories of human thinking is one of the questions addressed in this article. The philosophical position adopted in it is that it may not be possible to make this assumption, which, however, is not the same as saying that it is impossible. I designate this view as the reality-without-realism, RWR, view and in considering strictly mental processes as the ideality-without-idealism, IWI, view, in the second case in part following, but also moving beyond, I. Kant's philosophy.