It is strange to note so little discussion of the exclusion principle in the philosophical literature. Philosophers, largely engrossed in their perennial problems, are hardly aware of the fact that, during the last two decades, there has been introduced into physical methodology a principle of utmost philosophical importance, easily rivaling that of relativity and, in some respects, indeed that of causality. Discovered by Pauli in 1925, it immediately elucidated a whole realm of physical facts and was accepted by physicists with wide acclaim. Called the exclusion principle—or Pauli principle, or principle of anti-symmetry—it was embodied in the axiomatics of quantum mechanics; its peculiar methodological significance passed out of view.
It is strange to note so little discussion of the exclusion principle in the philosophical literature. Philosophers, largely engrossed in their perennial problems, are hardly aware of the fact that, during the last two decades, there has been introduced into physical methodology a principle of utmost philosophical importance, easily rivaling that of relativity and, in some respects, indeed that of causality. Discovered by Pauli in 1925, it immediately elucidated a whole realm of physical facts and was accepted by physicists with wide acclaim. Called the exclusion principle—or Pauli principle, or principle of anti-symmetry—it was embodied in the axiomatics of quantum mechanics; its peculiar methodological significance passed out of view.
Abstract The exclusion principle is one of the most far-reaching theorems in physics. In a telegram to the Nobel committee, quoted in [1], Einstein wrote: ‘Nominate Wolfgang Pauli for physics prize stop his contributions to modern quantum theory consisting of so-called Pauli or exclusion principle became fundamental part of modern physics being independent from other basic axioms of that theory stop Albert Einstein.’ It is interesting to note that quantum mechanics, the theory Einstein alluded to, was formulated a little after the Pauli principle.
The history of the exclusion principle is already an old one, but its conclusion has not yet been written. It is now eighty years since Wolfgang Pauli introduced an ‘extremely natural’ prescriptive rule, while dealing with some spectroscopic anomalies that beset physicists in the heyday of the old quantum theory. The rule excluded the possibility that any two bound electrons in an atom were in the same dynamic state, identified by a set of four quantum numbers. Hence the name of Ausschlieβungsregel (exclusion rule), or Pauli's Verbot (Pauli's veto) as Werner Heisenberg nicknamed it. The far-reaching physical significance of this rule became clear only later. From spectroscopy to atomic physics, from quantum field theory to high-energy physics, there is hardly another scientific principle that has more far-reaching implications than Pauli's exclusion principle. It is thanks to Pauli's principle that one obtains the electronic configurations underlying the classification of chemical elements in Mendeleev's periodic table as well as atomic spectra. To this same principle we credit the statistical behaviour of any half-integral spin particles (protons, neutrons, among many others) and the stability of matter. Shifting to high-energy physics, it is the exclusion principle that fixes the crucial constraint for binding quarks in hadrons, which together with leptons compose our physical world. This book advances a philosophical analysis of the enduring and far-reaching validity of Pauli's principle. It does not aim to address what a scientific principle is.
The modern state of the Pauli exclusion principle is shortly discussed. We describe the discovery by Pauli, his principle for electrons, and how it was generalized for all elementary particles in the framework of quantum mechanics. The motivations and theoretical conceptions that induced the experiments for verification of the Pauli exclusion principle are analyzed. The results and methodology of two different types of experiments are discussed: (1) the search of unusual atoms and nuclei in the stable non-Pauli states, and (2) the experiments in which the emitted radiation of non-Pauli transitions is measured. In conclusion, the comments on the discussed experiments that follow from the general quantum mechanical conceptions and group theory are formulated.
This is the first scientific book devoted to the Pauli Exclusion Principle, which is a fundamental principle of quantum mechanics and is permanently applied in chemistry, physics, molecular biology and in physical astronomy. However, while the principle has been studied for more than 90 years, rigorous theoretical foundations still have not been established and many unsolved problems remain. Following an introduction and historical survey, this book discusses the still unresolved questions around this fundamental principle. For instance, why, according to the Pauli Exclusion Principle, are only symmetric and antisymmetric permutation symmetries for identical particles realized, while the Schrödinger equation is satisfied by functions with any permutation symmetry? Chapter 3 covers possible answers to this, while chapter 4 presents effective and elegant methods for finding the Pauli-allowed states in atomic, molecular and nuclear spectroscopy. Chapter 5 discusses parastatistics and fractional statistics, demonstrating that the quasiparticles in a periodical lattice, including excitons and magnons, are obeying modified parafermi statistics. With detailed appendices, The Pauli Exclusion Principle: Origin, Verifications and Applications is intended as a self-sufficient guide for graduate students and academic researchers in the fields of quantum mechanics, theoretical chemistry, physics, and applied mathematics. It will be a valuable resource for any reader interested in the foundations of quantum mechanics and its applications in areas such as atomic and molecular spectroscopy, spintronics, molecular biology, and applied fields of quantum information.
THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative
The chief object of my paper is to clarify the notion of relativity to the means of observation as the basis for description of physical phenomena. This concept is so important that it deserves the name "the principle of relativity to the means of observation." This principle is particularly important to a correct understanding of quantum mechanics. The notion of relativity to the means of observation is, in a certain sense, a generalization of the notion of relativity to the system of reckoning. The two notions play analogous roles in the corresponding theories. But while relativity theory, which rests upon the notion of relativity to the system of reckoning, takes into consideration only the motion of the means of observation as a whole, in quantum mechanics it is also necessary to take note of deeper properties of the means of observation.