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ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review

Comparing lower bounds on messages and rounds for two classes of key establishment protocols

Anish Mathuria

Published Oct 1, 1998• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

An important requirement in designing protocols for key establishment is to provide assurance to protocol participants that a session key is fresh. This paper compares lower bounds on messages and rounds for two classes of protocols based on fundamentally different methods for achieving session key freshness.
DOI
10.1145/303297.303314

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In this paper, we have proposed a two-party authenticated key establishment (AKE), and authenticated key transport protocols based on lattice-based cryptography, aiming to provide security against quantum attacks for secure communication. This protocol enables two parties, who may share long-term public keys, to securely establish a shared session key, and transportation of the session key from the server while achieving mutual authentication. Our construction leverages the hardness of lattice problems Ring Learning With Errors (Ring-LWE), ensuring robustness against quantum and classical adversaries. Unlike traditional schemes whose security depends upon number-theoretic assumptions being vulnerable to quantum attacks, our protocol ensures security in the post-quantum era. The proposed protocol ensures forward secrecy, and provides security even if the long-term key is compromised. This protocol also provides essential property key freshness and resistance against man-in-the-middle attacks, impersonation attacks, replay attacks, and key mismatch attacks. On the other hand, the proposed key transport protocol provides essential property key freshness, anonymity, and resistance against man-in-the-middle attacks, impersonation attacks, replay attacks, and key mismatch attacks. A two-party key transport protocol is a cryptographic protocol in which one party (typically a trusted key distribution center or sender) securely generates and sends a session key to another party. Unlike key exchange protocols (where both parties contribute to key generation), key transport protocols rely on one party to generate the key and deliver it securely. The protocol possesses a minimum number of exchanged messages and can reduce the number of communication rounds to help minimize the communication overhead.
Group key agreement protocols are designed to solve the fundamental problem of securely establishing a session key among a group of parties communicating over a public channel. Although a number of protocols have been proposed to solve this problem over the years, they are not well suited for a high-delay wide area network; their communication overhead is significant in terms of the number of communication rounds or the number of exchanged messages, both of which are recognized as the dominant factors that slow down group key agreement over a networking environment with high communication latency. In this paper we present a communication-efficient group key agreement protocol and prove its security in the random oracle model under the factoring assumption. The proposed protocol provides perfect forward secrecy and requires only a constant number of communication rounds for my of group rekeying operations, while achieving optimal message complexity.