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International Journal of Computer Network and Information Security

A Note on Group Authentication Schemes

Mohsen Pourpouneh, Rasoul Ramezanian, Afshin Zarei

Published May 8, 2016• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

In literature, there are many different forms of group authentication in conference key establishment protocols.The agents participating in a group need to authenticate each other in order to become assure that every agents that has access to the group key is an eligible member.In this paper, we informally classify different group authentication schemes, based on how the agents authenticate each other and provide examples of each class.We then improve one of the well-known key establishment protocol to an authenticated version according so that it meets one of our notions of group authentication.

DOI
10.5815/ijcnis.2016.05.03

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In literature, there are many different forms of group authentication in conference key establishment protocols.The agents participating in a group need to authenticate each other in order to become assure that every agents that has access to the group key is an eligible member.In this paper, we informally classify different group authentication schemes, based on how the agents authenticate each other and provide examples of each class.We then improve one of the well-known key establishment protocol to an authenticated version according so that it meets one of our notions of group authentication.
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We introduce the concept of Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Asymmetric Group Key Agreement (AH-AAGKA) and construct a concrete one-round AH-AAGKA protocol. An AH-AAGKA protocol allows the participants of a group to establish a common encryption key associated with several decryption keys; each of which can only be computed by the corresponding legitimate group member. An AH-AAGKA protocol has the following privacy feature. For a member 𝒰i of a group G, if 𝒰i participates in an AH-AAGKA protocol, any protocol participant 𝒰j cannot learn whether 𝒰i is a member of G, unless 𝒰j himself is a member of group G. Our scheme demonstrates new features in comparison with other existing AH-AGKA protocols. If non-group members participate in our protocol, honest parties can identify these non-group members. Our scheme also captures Unlinkability and Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), which are missing in other existing schemes. We propose a novel security model to prove that our protocol holds PFS and present a new privacy model to prove that our scheme meets Affiliation-Hiding property.
Abstract With the development of wireless mobile network and Internet of Things (IoT), users enter the network with a large amount of data and information, including some important personal information, such as ID number, telephone number. Personal privacy disclosure has become one of the focuses of attention. In this article, we propose an asymmetric group key agreement (GKA) protocol based on attribute threshold for IoT to protect user privacy. Users do not need to expose any personal information in the group, but only need to meet the same number of attributes and conduct bidirectional authentication registration with key generation center (KGC) to ensure the legitimacy of mobile terminal members participating in GKA. In the registration phase, user performs heavy preliminary calculations according to the designed protocol, thereby reducing the computation in the key agreement phase and decreasing the complexity of the protocol. The protocol can realize self‐verification, and any member participating in key agreement can verify the correctness of the negotiated key by themselves. Under the assumption of bilinear computational Diffie‐Hellman problem, the security of the protocol is proved. Performance analysis further shows that our protocol has lower energy consumption in terms of communication and computing.
Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Asymmetric Group Key Agreement (AH-AAGKA) protocol can be utilized by the members of a group to authenticate each other secretly. The participants affiliated to the group can execute the AH-AAGKA protocol to establish a common encryption key. Any legitimate participant can compute its own decryption key corresponding to the encryption key. Particularly, every legitimate player's affiliation information is only revealed to other legitimate players. In this paper, we present a one-round AH-AAGKA protocol. Compared with previous work, in our protocol, Group Authority (GA) does not need to be fully trusted (we call it semi-trusted). Therefore, GA cannot impersonate any honest user to execute the protocol. Meanwhile, GA can trace group members through analyzing the communication flows. Our protocol holds the affiliation-hiding property and detectability. Additionally, our scheme exhibits Perfect Forward Secrecy for both GA and outside attackers.